Scholars of international relations (IR) periodically re-interpret the history of the discipline, assess current trends in the field, and speculate about or advocate particular directions for future research, but they rarely use systematic evidence to do so. To determine the content and trajectory of previous research, these scholars typically read hundreds of prominent books and articles and attempt to discern patterns. To determine the opinions of other scholars in the discipline they attend professional meetings, discuss papers, and chat with colleagues and former students. Ole Weaver got it right when he concluded, “The articles on the history of the discipline, slowly growing in number, are usually not based on systematic research or clear methods. They are, at best, elegant restatements of ‘common knowledge’ of our past, implicitly assuming that any good practitioner can tell the history of the discipline. However, without looking systematically at the past, we tend to reproduce myths” (1998, 52). The problem is even more acute when discussing teaching and curriculum issues, which receive even less systematic analysis than does scholarly research in the field. Casual empiricism often produces interesting and insightful assessments of the discipline—especially when the scholar is widely read, open-minded, well connected, and has lots of grey hair—but they also may introduce bias into the analysis.

An alternative approach to describing and explaining various features of the IR discipline uses scientific sampling techniques to gather evidence on the type of research being published. To assess scholarly opinion about research, teaching, or the discipline, such an approach might survey all (or a random sample) of IR faculty and ask them the same set of questions. In short, IR-oriented political scientists could employ some of the basic techniques of political science research to study their own discipline. We take some initial steps in that direction in this paper and in the larger project of which it is a part.

The Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project is the largest, most extensive data-collection effort to date on the field of international relations. It systematically and empirically analyzes relationships among pedagogy, scholarship, and international policy. In this paper we draw from two of the three major TRIP data sources to describe trends in the...
discipline of international relations over the past 27 years (1980-2006). First, we employ a new journal article database that covers every article published in the 12 leading journals in the field. The article is the unit of analysis and we categorize each article in terms of 26 distinct variables, including methodology, epistemology, issue area, substantive focus, author’s gender, paradigm advanced, region under study, and many others. We include the codebook for the TRIP journal article database in the Appendix to this paper. Second, we analyze results from two surveys of international relations faculty. The first survey was conducted in 2004 and covered all faculty at U.S. colleges and universities who teach or do research in the field of international relations. The second survey was conducted in 2006 and covered both U.S. and Canadian IR faculty members, although we report only U.S. responses in this paper.\(^1\) The journal article database allows us to track changes in the type of research published in the field,\(^2\) while the surveys are primarily useful as contemporary snapshots that document the opinions and practices of IR scholars in terms of their views of the discipline, their research, their teaching practices, and their opinions on contemporary policy issues.\(^3\)

These two extensive databases allow us to begin to address a number of key issues and debates within IR. We find that some traditional ideas about the field are misguided. IR scholars teach and think that paradigms divide the discipline, for example, when they do not. Rather, most peer-reviewed research in the field is non-paradigmatic. There is no evidence to suggest, moreover, that realism dominates, or in the last 27 years ever has dominated, the literature. There is greater theoretical diversity within IR than is often assumed, and that diversity has been increasing over time. The same cannot be said for epistemology, however: the strong commitment to positivist research among American IR scholars has grown stronger over time. Although there seems little reason to persist in the belief that paradigm wars define the field, methods wars remain alive and well. Although three times as many IR scholars report using qualitative methods as their primary approach, compared to quantitative methods, more articles published in the top journals currently employ quantitative methods than any other methodological approach. Finally, we find that IR scholars appear conflicted about the link between their work and the policy arena. Relatively few published articles offer explicit policy recommendations, but scholars believe that their work is both prescriptive and useful to policy makers.

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\(^1\) For an explicit comparison and analysis of U.S. and Canadian results see Lipson et al 2007. For descriptive statistics illustrating major differences between U.S. and Canadian scholars see Maliniak et al 2007a.

\(^2\) A complete picture of IR research would include analysis of books as well as articles. The journal article database likely reflects the major trends in IR research, however, and likely is more representative of the field than a random sample of books for a variety of reasons. First, the ideas, evidence and methods used in most university press books are usually also published in journal form and are thus reflected in the journal article database. Second, articles provide a much larger number of observations, which minimizes random error. Third, and most importantly, the peer-review process on journal articles is arguably more rigorous and constitutive of any disciplinary sub-field. For a similar argument on the utility of journal articles as the definitive research product for the field of IR, see Weaver 1998.

\(^3\) A third TRIP database includes data on IR curricula at 125 U.S. colleges and universities, including departmental (disciplinary or interdisciplinary) requirements, foreign language requirements, study abroad opportunities, and policy-analysis courses.
I. A Brief Note on Methodology

The data presented in this paper come from two main sources: faculty surveys and IR journal articles. For the 2004 and 2006 faculty surveys, we attempted to identify and survey all faculty members in four-year colleges and universities in the United States and Canada who do research in the sub-field of international relations or who teach courses on international relations. This meant that the overwhelming majority of our respondents have jobs in departments of political science, politics, government, social science, or professional schools associated with universities. Hence, the survey excluded many researchers who are employed in government, international organizations, private firms, or think tanks.

For the 2006 survey conducted in the United States, which we focus on in this paper, we used a list compiled by *U.S. News and World Report* to identify all four-year colleges and universities in 2005-2006. There were 1,199 such institutions. We also included the Monterey Institute and seven military schools that were not rated by USNWR but have a relatively large number of political science faculty who teach courses on international relations.4 We then found the IR faculty members teaching at these schools through an extensive series of web searches, email contacts, and phone calls to department chairs, secretaries, and individual scholars. We identified a total of 2,838 individuals who appeared to research and/or teach IR at these institutions. One hundred thirty-three respondents or their agents informed us that they did not belong in the sample because either they had been misidentified and neither taught nor did research in the field of international relations, or they had died, changed jobs, or retired. These individuals were not included in our calculation of the response rate. In all, 1,112 scholars responded to the U.S. version of the survey, either online or through the mail. Certainly, there are additional individuals who were misidentified by our selection process but who never informed us. Hence, our response rate of over 41 percent is a conservative estimate.5

For the TRIP journal article database, we include data from articles in the 12 leading journals in the field. The journals selected were the most influential based on Garand and Giles (2003) “impact” ratings. The journals include *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *European Journal of International Relations*, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Journal of Politics*, *Security Studies*, and *World Politics*. Although *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy* were ranked

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4 These institutions, such as the National War College and the Army War College, were not included in the original sample because they do not have undergraduate programs. However, we chose to gather data on faculty there because we were interested to compare the opinions and practices of faculty teaching civilian undergraduates with those teaching military officers. There were 36 respondents from these institutions.

5 The 2006 survey in Canada was identical to the U.S. survey except in the “Views on Foreign Policy” section, where we substituted the word “Canada” for “U.S.” when appropriate. To identify the population of IR scholars in Canadian colleges and universities we used a comparable method. *MacLeans Magazine* provides an annual ranking of all four-year universities in Canada. There were 93 such schools. We used an identical method—that is, web searches that were supplemented by emails and phone calls—to identify faculty members who were teaching or doing research in IR. After removing those who identified themselves as not belonging in the population, we achieved a 40 percent response rate; 110 of the 275 IR scholars at Canadian institutions answered the survey.
higher than some of the journals on our list, we did not include them because neither is peer-reviewed. In the IR-specific journals—European Journal of International Relations, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Politics, Security Studies, and World Politics—we code every article in every issue for every year of their publication between 1980 and 2006. In the general political science journals—American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science—we only code those articles that fall within the IR subfield (broadly defined).

We include data for the first and third issues of each journal for each year. Our sample, therefore, comprises about 50 percent of the entire population of articles published in the 12 leading journals from 1980 to 2006. All statistics reported and displayed in this paper are drawn from three-year rolling averages to more easily discern trends and smooth out spiky data that result from a limited number of observations, quirks in the publication schedules of some journals, and the acceptance of special issues of journals, in which the articles tend to be more homogeneous than in typical issues.

To ensure inter-coder reliability among our coders when coding the 26 variables studied, we had two initial test rounds of coding, in which all researchers coded the same sample of 100 articles. We compared our results and discussed discrepancies, which allowed us to clarify our rules and procedures. We then divided the journals among the researchers so that each article was assigned to two coders. If both coders independently came to the same conclusion about the value of a particular variable within an article, then we accepted the observation as part of the final data set. If any two coders disagreed on the value of any observation, however, then a senior coder independently coded that observation.

II. Paradigm Wars and the Study of International Relations

Graduate school field seminars are littered with readings that represent the various “isms” in IR theory. Similarly, introductory IR courses and text books for undergraduate students are often organized around these various paradigms – most prominently, realism, liberalism, constructivism, and Marxism. For a time in the late 1980s and early 1990s it seemed impossible to publish an article or get a Ph.D. dissertation approved if the researcher did not situate the work within and choose a side in the ongoing “paradigm wars.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, IR scholars

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6 All articles of World Politics are coded—that is, we consider it an IR journal—but we recognize that an increasing proportion of those articles fall within the sub-field of comparative politics. Hence, we also measure this change over time.

7 Overall inter-coder reliability among the first two coders was 70 percent.

8 Some scholars have persuasively argued that constructivism is not a paradigm in the same way that realism, liberalism, and Marxism are, (Ole Weaver 1998), and that constructivism is compatible with either realism or liberalism (Barkin 2003); Nonetheless, we adopt the norm in the discipline and employ conventional language to describe these “big four” schools of thought. In a 1998 special issue of International Organization, Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner asserted that constructivism had replaced Marxism as the most prominent alternative to realism and liberalism. Since that time, this formulation has been repeated in numerous journal articles, textbooks, and syllabi so that it is now a social fact. We remain agnostic on the issue of whether these terms are measuring qualitatively different variables.
today perceive a discipline that is largely defined by these major theoretical traditions. This perception, although it motivates what is taught in the classroom, is not supported by an empirical analysis of IR research published in scholarly journals.

In the 2004 TRIP survey we asked respondents to think retrospectively and estimate the percentage of the IR literature devoted to each paradigm in the 1980s and the 1990s. In 2006 we asked scholars to estimate what percentage of the literature was devoted to each paradigm today. Figures 1, 2, and 3 display the results.

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Figure 1: Perception of Literature devoted to each Paradigm in 1980’s

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9 The values here are calculated using the responses of survey question 19 on the 2004 survey. The respondents were asked to rank how much of the literature they believed was allocated to each paradigm, given choices of, 75-100%, 50-75%, 25-50%, 10-25%, 1-10% and 0%. We then multiplied the number of respondents who chose that answer by the midpoint of our percentage range. We then averaged these values over all respondents, giving an average amount of time spent on each paradigm. Because the respondents were allowed to pick whatever values they thought best fit their analysis of the literature and were not bounded by 100% combined with the possibility of the average value of the range being higher than the actual intended value, the total sums to 126%. The N for this question varies depending on which paradigm respondents were asked about; Realism, n=786; Liberalism, n=786; Constructivism, n=769; Marxism, n=771, and Other, n=161.
20. What percentage of the international relations literature do you think was devoted to each paradigm during the 1990s-present? (Average)

![Figure 2: Perception of Literature devoted to each Paradigm in 1990’s](image)

- Realism: 38.42%
- Liberalism: 39.40%
- Constructivism: 24.94%
- Marxism: 12.61%
- Other: 12.94%

10 See note 6 on how we calculated these percentages. The N for this question varies depending on which paradigm the respondents were asked about; Realism, n=792; Liberalism, n=792; Constructivism, n=777; Marxism, n=778, Other, n=179.

11 Because it had the largest number of open ended responses from the 2004 survey, we added “feminism” as a closed end option on the 2006 survey. However, this did not significantly change the number of respondents who selected “feminism” in their answers to various questions. We added this option in order to determine whether the cost of writing in a response under “other” was causing an under-count of particular paradigms. In this case, it does not appear so, since the percentage answer “feminist” in 2004 was statistically indistinguishable from 2006.
The survey evidence reveals that IR scholars believe the literature is dominated by work that fits within one of the major paradigms, and this is not surprising since we have been telling each other and our students for years that realism and liberalism (and to a lesser extent constructivism and Marxism) are the organizing paradigms of the discipline. The conventional wisdom claims that realism was dominant in the 1980s and that the end of the Cold War led to the collapse of Marxism, the decline of realism, and the rise of liberalism and constructivism. Indeed, this is largely what the survey data show. Today, despite a clear decline in IR scholars’ perception of the importance of realism, they believe that nearly 30 percent of the literature is still realist in orientation. IR scholars’ perception of the percentage of literature devoted to liberalism has also declined, but faculty believe that nearly 27 percent of today’s IR literature can be categorized as liberal. The proportion of literature perceived to build upon constructivism has risen over time, according to faculty respondents, from 10 percent in the 1980s to a high of 25 percent in the 1990s before leveling off at 17 percent today.

This view of the field as being organized largely by paradigm is replicated in the classroom. As Figures 4 and 5 illustrate, realism and liberalism dominate the syllabi of introductory IR courses. Although its share of class time has declined, realism still dominates the teaching of IR today: 25 percent of teaching in 2004 and 22 percent 2006 was devoted to this theoretical tradition. Similarly, IR faculty report spending a declining proportion of their class time—down from 22 percent in 2004 to 19 percent in 2006—on liberalism. Not surprisingly, the amount of class time devoted to Marxism and constructivism are considerably smaller. Marxism declined from 14 percent in 2004 to 7 percent in 2006. As it had in faculty perceptions of the literature, constructivism’s share of class time declined slightly, from 10 percent in 2004 to 9 percent in 2004. Together, realism and liberalism still comprise 40 percent of introductory IR courses at U.S. universities and colleges today, according to the people who teach those classes.

**Figure 4: Time Devoted to Each Paradigm in Intro IR Classes, 2004**
Our data reveal that many beliefs held by IR scholars about their own field are incorrect. Figure 6 displays the change over time in the percentage of articles advancing each paradigm in the top 12 journals publishing IR articles. At least six major patterns emerge:

1. The dramatic decline of atheoretic work from 47 percent in 1980 to 7 percent in 2006.
2. The steady increase in non-paradigmatic articles from 30 percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 2006.
3. The emergence of constructivism in the early 1990s.
4. The prominence of liberalism relative to the other three major paradigms throughout the time series.
5. The complete collapse of Marxist work starting in 1982 (8 percent) until 1991 (under 1 percent). The collapse of the Marxist paradigm in IR precedes the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
6. The relatively small and declining portion of realist articles in the literature.
Perhaps most striking is the finding that the field is not dominated by paradigmatic analysis. Instead, most peer-reviewed research in the top journals is “non-paradigmatic,” and the proportion of work classified as non-paradigmatic has been rising over the past two decades. IR faculty continue to introduce students to the discipline through the big “isms,” but the vast majority of contemporary research takes place outside these four paradigms. Even more surprisingly, it always has.

In no individual year do the four major paradigms (realism, liberalism, Marxism, and constructivism) sum to more than 50 percent of the total number of IR articles published in the 12 leading journals. The peak years for “paradigmatic” research were 1992, 1997, and 200 when just under half of the articles advanced a particular paradigm. These results change very little when we narrow the sample of journals to the top five in the field.¹² In that case the “big four” isms reach a pinnacle in 1997 and again in 2000 at 49 percent of published articles, but they still only constitute the majority of articles published in 6 of the 27 years.

Because of the large percentage of “atheoretic” articles in the 1980s, it is probably no great surprise that most articles published in that decade did not fit within one of the big four

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paradigms. By definition, after all, an “atheoretic” article cannot advance a particular paradigm or theory; in more recent years, however, an increasingly larger proportion of articles were embedded within a theoretical framework – just not a theory associated with one of the four major paradigms.\(^\text{13}\)

While some scholars have been bemoaning the existence and reification of the big paradigms for years (Lake and Powell 1999; Bueno de Mesquita 2005), our analysis of peer-reviewed articles in the field’s leading journals suggests that much of what gets published is testing or creating theory that does not fit comfortably within one of the four major paradigms. One conclusion that follows directly from this finding: \textit{there is a great deal of theoretical diversity throughout the entire time period examined in this study, and especially in the most recent years.}

Skeptics might claim, however, that just because an article is published in a leading journal, does not mean that it becomes part of our collective knowledge within the field. Since the median number of citations for any given article in the Social Sciences Citation Index is zero, this suggests that many published articles have little impact on the way scholars think about international relations.\(^\text{14}\)

In fact, paradigmatic articles are cited far more frequently than non-paradigmatic ones, perhaps explaining the IR sub-field’s persistent attachment to “isms.” Using the number of citations from the Social Science Citation Index as a measure of an article’s impact on the field, we see that articles advancing one of the four major paradigms are much more likely than non-paradigmatic articles to be cited.\(^\text{15}\) For example, constructivist articles receive about twice as many cites on average (14.3) as non-paradigmatic articles (7.2) and almost five times more cites than atheoretic works. Realist articles receive an average of 10.2 citations and liberal articles get 12.3 cites on average. Only articles advancing a Marxist paradigm are cited less frequently (1.5) than non-paradigmatic or atheoretic articles. (As the overall count in Figure 6 illustrates, there are very few Marxist articles in the database after 1990.) This result holds even when we control for the prominence of the journal in which the article is published. In fact, the finding that paradigmatic articles are cited more frequently than non-paradigmatic articles is even stronger in the top five journals. On average, articles advancing one of the big four paradigms generated 18.3 citations, while articles advancing a non-paradigmatic approach generated only 9.9 citations. All types of articles in these journals, except for atheoretic and Marxist works, get cited more often than do articles in other journals.

\(^{13}\) By 2005, for example, roughly 94 percent of all articles published advanced some theoretical perspective, but most of them were “non-paradigmatic.” As discussed in greater detail in the TRIP codebook, “non-paradigmatic articles are self-consciously theoretical, but do not fit cleanly into one of the big four “isms.” For example, explanations based on cognitive psychology, feminism, English-School, or prospect theory would all avoid the designation of “atheoretic,” but would not necessarily fit within one of the four major paradigms.

\(^{14}\) Since we are analyzing the leading journals, the likelihood of any individual article being cited is much higher. The median number of citations for articles in our sample is 5, the mean number is 13.2, and the standard deviation is relatively high at 26.7.

\(^{15}\) All statistics on citation counts are limited to articles published after 1990 because of data availability. We report only on articles that are in our sample for this paper (generally the first and third volumes published every year from all 12 journals).
The prominence of and increase in non-paradigmatic research is a surprise to IR scholars who organize the field in terms of paradigmatic “isms,” but the single greatest shock, at least to the authors of this paper, is the relatively small share of published work that fits squarely in the realist tradition. Michael Doyle reflects the conventional wisdom when he claims, “Realism is our dominant theory. Most international relations scholars are either self-identified or readily identifiable Realists.” (Doyle 1997, 41) This view is widespread within the discipline. Recall that the TRIP survey showed that realism was perceived to be the most prominent and popular approach in the discipline during the 1980s and was a close second to liberalism in the 1990s. Further, our own previous research done on very small samples (Keister et al 2005), as well as previous research done by Vasquez (1999), suggest that realism has dominated academic discourse in IR.\footnote{Vasquez (1983; 1999) has written the seminal work on the place of realism in the IR discipline. According to Vasquez, over 90 percent of the published quantitative studies from 1945 to 1970 were informed by the realist paradigm. Vasquez employed different and broader criteria for identifying realist arguments than those employed in this study. In short, Vasquez examines the assumptions, independent variables, and topics of inquiry in order to identify the realist paradigm. We agree that realists tend to study topics like war, alliances, conflict-cooperation, and the elements of national power, but we do not classify articles within particular paradigms based on the dependent variables or topics of inquiry. Instead, we categorize the topics of inquiry or the substantive focus as a distinct variable. After all, realists, liberals, and Marxists all suggest explanations for the occurrence of conflict and cooperation, so it makes less sense to automatically associate a particular dependent variable with a particular paradigm. Hence, we will identify fewer realist (or any particular paradigm) articles than Vasquez does if we examine the same sample. For the Vasquez criteria see pages 47-59 of The Power of Power Politics, 1999. For the criteria used in this study see the TRIP codebook for variable #10 (Paradigm Advanced) on pages 5-7 in Peterson and Tierney 2005.}

Indeed, the entire TRIP project originally emerged from an observation by an undergraduate student at the College of William and Mary to the effect that “all the IR scholars in the Government Department have abandoned the realist paradigm as a guide to their own research, but they continue to highlight realism in introductory IR courses. Why?” (Actually, it went more like, “Why do you make us read all this realist literature when none of you employ realist assumptions and concepts in your own research anymore?”\footnote{The offending party who got us into this project was James D. Long, who is now studying for his PhD in political science. Thanks James.}) In fact, the student had hit on a national trend: scholars teach realism, and to a lesser extent liberalism, in part because they believe that these theoretical traditions dominate and define the literature, but they do not. Scholars vastly overestimate the extent of realist research in particular and paradigmatic research more generally, and their teaching reflects and reproduces this misperception.

Throughout the time series we expected a large, if declining, percentage of the articles published to fit within the realist paradigm, an approach that Legro and Moravcsick (1999) call “the oldest and most prominent paradigm in international relations.” More specifically, we expected to see realism dominant in the 1980s and then slowly declining relative to liberalism and constructivism in the 1990s and 2000s.\footnote{This is roughly consistent with what Walker and Morton (2005) find in their research on paradigm advanced in journal articles from 1970-2000. While they use a smaller sample of articles (all 515 “data-based” articles published over the 30 year time series in International Organization, World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Conflict Resolution), they do find that realism was dominant in the 1980s (38% from 1980-84, 48% from 1985-90) and declining in the 1990s (36% from 1990-94 and 22% from 1995-2000). The coding scheme used by Walker and Morton is the same as that used by Vasquez, which may explain why the absolute percent values are}
Instead, in the 1980s when conventional wisdom suggests it was dominant, realism was always a distant second compared to liberalism. Realism actually peaks at 15 percent in the mid-1990s, a full 9 percentage points behind liberalism. In fact, over the past 27 years realism has never been the most popular paradigm for journal authors, and in 1999 it fell to third behind constructivism. In 2006, realist articles accounted for only 6 percent of all the IR articles published. A few years ago Legro and Moravcsik (1999) asked, “Is anybody still a realist?” Even when we employ a more expansive definition of the realist core than Legro and Moravcsik allow, the answer appears to be: There are not many realist arguments being advanced in the top 12 journals and their number has been declining over the past ten years.19

Over the last several decades, articles advancing realist theory comprised between 5 and 15 percent of the research published in the field. Recall, the TRIP survey showed that IR faculty believed that between 30 and 49 percent of the IR literature in recent decades was devoted to realism, and faculty devoted 21 to 25 percent of class time to realism, which they perceived to be the dominant paradigm in the field.

While the number of realist articles published is lower than expected, realism is taken more seriously by articles advancing alternative perspectives than any other paradigm. Specifically, this variable in our journal article database captures which paradigms are treated as alternative explanations, used to derive testable hypotheses or used to frame the research question. A simple “straw-man” depiction of an alternative paradigm does not qualify as “taken seriously.” Instead, the reader needs to learn something about the utility, internal logic, or scope conditions of the alternative paradigm (or a specific model following from some alternative paradigm), to be categorized as “taken seriously.” Throughout the vast majority of our time series, realism is taken seriously more often than any other paradigm (including non-paradigmatic theoretical approaches).20 This suggests that even though the number of realist articles may be lower than expected, non-realists continue to take realist approaches seriously, either by testing their own preferred model against a realist one, or by synthesizing their alternative with some realist approach. Realism still looms large in the minds (and research designs) of non-realist IR scholars. Figure 7 displays these results.

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19 The two journals that have the strongest reputation for publishing realist work, International Security and Security Studies, in fact do publish more realist work than most other journals. We expected, however, that the percentage of realist articles in those journals would be higher than what we observed. Between 1992 and 2006 Security Studies ranged from a low of 15 percent realist articles to a high of 59 percent in 1999. From 2000 to 2006 Security Studies published 30 percent realist articles. International Security has almost never had as high a proportion of theoretically oriented articles as Security Studies. The range of realist work for International Security runs from a low of 2 percent in 1986 to a high of 31 percent in 1995 and 2000. Since 2000 about 20 percent of the articles published in International Security have employed a realist approach.

20 In only one year does any paradigmatic approach appear more often in this category than realism does. In 2002 more articles took liberalism seriously (18 percent) than realism (17 percent).
The overwhelming majority of articles taking more than one paradigm seriously did so by engaging in competitive theory testing, where hypotheses are derived from two or more competing theories and tested against each other to see which does a better job at explaining an empirical pattern. A smaller number of articles, however, sought to synthesize theories from two or more distinct paradigms. The IR discipline is currently experiencing a great enthusiasm for bridge-building, synthesis, eclectic theorizing, integration, and a much heralded recognition of theoretical complimentarity. Perhaps this spate of bridge building in IR is a natural response to the paradigm wars of the previous decade.

Our definition of theoretical synthesis is quite narrow, thereby limiting the number of articles we categorize as synthetic (only 163 articles out of 2806 total). We classify an article as synthetic if the independent variables are drawn primarily from two or more distinct paradigms; in addition, there must be conscious bridge building between/among distinct paradigms. Simply tossing additional variables into a regression model does not make an argument synthetic. The argument must take into account the assumptions and concepts of at least one additional paradigm. In most cases this will involve taking the explanatory variables from different paradigms.

paradigms and integrating them into a single explanation. Thus, the use of an imported methodology (an econometric technique, or formal model) is not sufficient to be considered as synthesis because it does not extend to the worldview advanced by the article. We code an article as synthetic, however, if it combines insights from one of the four major paradigms with some other theoretical approach normally classified as “non-paradigmatic” (such as feminism or cognitive psychology).\textsuperscript{22}

The percentage of articles that synthesize two or more paradigms varies across journal and subfield. Perhaps surprisingly, \textit{Security Studies} published the highest percentage of all synthetic articles in the sample (22 percent), followed by \textit{APSR} (17 percent) and \textit{EJIR} (17 percent). We are most likely to find synthetic articles in the IR theory subfield (19 percent), followed by international organization (14 percent) and international security (12 percent).

Respondents varied in their enthusiasm for synthesis depending upon their paradigmatic commitments. In the 2004 survey we asked a question about theoretical synthesis that was related to paradigm, but was broader: “Recently, much international relations scholarship has been categorized as either ‘rationalist’ or constructivist’. How should we conceive of the models developed within these broader categories” (of constructivism and rationalism)? As alternatives to be tested against each other; as complimentary explanations that should remain distinct; or as two approaches that could be usefully synthesized to create a more complete theory.” Marxists were the most skeptical of synthesis with only 18 percent responding that the approaches could be usefully synthesized. Realists were also more pessimistic than average with 30 percent favoring synthesis. Liberals and constructivists were about equally enthusiastic at 41 percent and 40 percent respectively. The greatest advocates of synthesis were non-paradigmatic scholars at 42 percent. Results are displayed in Figure 8.

\textsuperscript{22} While there is certainly some value to measuring intra-paradigmatic synthesis (such as combining the insights of offensive realism with neo-classical realism or liberal institutionalism with democratic peace theory, we do not capture such intra-paradigmatic integration with this variable. Of course, “Non-Paradigmatic” theories can be “taken seriously” or “synthesized” with one or more of the big four and we capture both these things in our coding.
Figure 8: Impact of Paradigm on Enthusiasm for Theoretical Synthesis

Figure 8 displays the difference between the expected value of a respondent favoring synthesis (assuming no correlation between a respondent’s paradigm and their answer), and the actual count for each paradigm. So, while 370 respondents out of 1000 choose the answer “paradigms that could be usefully synthesized,” if you asked only realists you would get 309 out of 1000. Among Marxists only 182 out of 1000 would choose that answer. The most enthusiastic advocates of synthesis are those who classified themselves as “non-paradigmatic/other.” Among respondents who described their work in this manner, 418 out of 1000 believe that constructivism and rationalism can be usefully synthesized to explain outcomes in IR.

III. Epistemology: How Do We Know What We Know?

As the previous section clearly indicates, there is no hegemonic paradigm within the discipline of IR, at least not as reflected in the articles being published in the major journals. Instead, IR scholars continue to employ a wide variety of paradigms and theories to guide their research. We may have normal science taking place within specific paradigms, in other words, but there is little sign of any particular paradigm establishing a dominant position in a Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1970). The same cannot be said about epistemology.
Few readers will be surprised to learn that there is a strong and growing consensus within the American IR community that a positivist epistemology ought to guide our research. Below we offer some measures of the degree to which positivism has become the dominant epistemological stance in the United States. In the 2004 and 2006 TRIP surveys we asked IR scholars at U.S. colleges and universities: “In general, how would you characterize your work in epistemological terms? Positivist; Non-Positivist; Post-Positivist.” In the 2004 survey 64 percent answered “Positivist” and by 2006 that number had risen to 70 percent. These numbers varied by age, by paradigm, by method, and by issue area. In general, younger IR scholars are more likely to be positivists. Sixty-eight percent of scholars who received their Ph.D.s before 1980 describe themselves as positivists, but 77 percent of those who received their degrees in 2000 or later are positivists. Realists are more likely to call themselves positivists—in fact 83 percent of realists embrace the label. In contrast, only 46 percent of constructivists and no feminist scholars describe their work as positivist. Women are less likely than men to call themselves positivist, with 35 percent saying their work is non-positivist or post-positivist. International security is the most heavily positivist subfield at 86 percent. Eighty percent of political economists describe themselves as positivist, while 71 percent of a relatively small pool of environmental specialists claim the mantle.

The TRIP faculty survey provides strong evidence that IR in the United States is overwhelmingly positivist (and the demographic data suggests that it will become even more positivist as older scholars retire), but the survey data actually understate the extent to which the positivist epistemology dominates journal publications. In 1980 about 58 percent of all articles published in the top journals were positivist. By 2006 that number had climbed to almost 90 percent. Figure 9 illustrates these trends.

23 In 2006, however, we asked the same question of IR scholars at Canadian universities, where only 48 percent reported subscribing to a positivist epistemology. While still a large plurality, this was far from the 70 percent of U.S. scholars who described themselves as positivist. This dramatic difference, which is replicated on other variables, suggests that there is not a single coherent international IR discipline. Instead, different countries and global regions likely have quite distinctive IR communities. For details and discussion of differences between U.S. and Canadian IR scholars along with speculation that Canadians hold an intermediate position between the U.S. and European discipline, see Lipson et al 2007.

24 Even though constructivists are less likely to adopt a positivist epistemology than their American colleagues, most of the leading constructivists in the United States insist that the same rules of inquiry apply to constructivists as to other IR scholars. Most famously, see Wendt 1998, but also Legro 1996, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. This stance differentiates U.S. constructivists from many of their European counterparts.

25 For a detailed discussion about how gender affects epistemological choices see Maliniak et al forthcoming.

26 Recall that the last 12 years of data include the journal EJIR, which tends to publish European scholars in greater proportions. EJIR ranges between 30 percent and 60 percent positivist throughout the time series, and in 2006 when all other journals combined are over 90 percent positivist, only about 43 percent of EJIR articles employed a positivist epistemology. In addition to EJIR, the 2006 data also included Security Studies. Neither journal existed in 1980.
Much of the increase in positivist research is associated with a decline in atheoretic articles that appear frequently in the 1980s. We did not distinguish between non-positivist and post-positivist in our coding of journal articles, although it is likely that the majority of articles that do not fit the criteria for positivist are non-positivist rather than post positivist. There are good reasons to think that a parallel analysis of books or other journals would produce a greater proportion of non-positivist or post-positivist research. If we limit our analysis to the top peer

27 Our definition for positivism, which we elaborate in the codebook, would likely not pass muster with philosophers of science; however, we attempted to capture the meaning of positivism as it is used in the IR discipline. The language in the codebook reads: “We code articles as positivist if they implicitly or explicitly assume that theoretical or empirical propositions are testable, make causal claims, seek to explain and predict phenomena, assume that research is supported by empirical means, and aspire to the use of a scientific method. Generally, these articles present and develop theory, derive hypotheses from their theory, and test them using data (empirical observations from the world). However, we code an article as positivist, even when it does not explicitly employ the scientific method, if scientific principles are used to judge the validity of a study or the author is defending a concept of social science that uses these methods to establish knowledge claims. We also code an article as positivist if it describes a scientific research project—such as POLITY, COW, KEDS, or TRIP—and/ or explains coding rules and evidence collection procedures. Although these articles do not test hypotheses, make causal claims, or use evidence to make inferences, they clearly are part of a positivist research agenda.

We do not claim that this is the only or even best definition of positivism. Rather, we think it captures what most IR scholars (on both sides of the Atlantic) mean when they use the term “positivist.” More importantly, we want the reader to know that whatever label we attach to this variable, the definition above captures what we actually measured. In our view transparency and replicability are hallmarks of scientific research. Our codebook permits other scholars to use our methods and replicate our results.
reviewed journals for IR research, however, we see a field that shares a strong commitment to a positivist epistemology.

IV. Methodology and the Study of International Relations

In 2001, a now famous e-mail from someone calling himself “Mr. Perestroika” claimed, among other things, that quantitative and formal methods now dominate the profession. The e-mail also claimed that the leading political science journals were biased against the IR subfield because of the qualitative nature of many IR scholars’ work. Within the IR sub-discipline similar questions about the role of quantitative and formal work had also surfaced (Walt 1999). With data from the TRIP survey and TRIP article database, we can directly assess claims made about research methods within the IR literature. We measure whether IR articles use quantitative methods (statistics), qualitative methods (primarily case studies), formal modeling (calculus, game theory, spatial modeling), descriptive approaches, or some other research method.28 This research suggests that the perestroika claims are at least partly accurate, and in some high profile journals some of the perestroika goals have been realized.

The TRIP database of peer-reviewed journal articles confirms one of the perestroika movement’s main claims: quantitative methods are the most frequently used in the IR field, at least since 2002. As Figure 10 shows, in the first three years of our sample, 1980-82, a plurality of published articles used the descriptive method. Such articles use quantitative or qualitative information to describe contemporary or historical trends or events in IR and make no attempt to test a hypothesis or develop broader theoretical generalizations.29 Beginning in 1983 this approach began a steep and steady decline that continues today. Descriptive approaches were overtaken in 1983 by qualitative research methods, which dominated the field (with the exception of one year--1999) until 2002, when quantitative overtook qualitative as the most frequently used methodological approach. The rise of quantitative methods was swift and dramatic; the percentage of published articles employing quantitative methods increased every year from 1992 to 2006, with the exception of small declines in 1996 and 2001.

28 Other measures of this variable include counterfactual, analytical/ non-formal conceptual, experimental, and policy analysis.

29 We do not code an article as descriptive if it employs any of the empirical methods described above.
This finding is reflected in data from the *Social Science Citation Index*. As Figure 11 shows, beginning in 1996 articles employing quantitative methods have been cited more often than qualitative works.\(^{30}\) These findings are even more surprising considering that two journals with reputations for seeking and publishing qualitative and analytical/ non-formal conceptual research, *Security Studies* and *European Journal of International Relations*, began publishing in the early and mid 1990s, respectively.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\) The average number of citations per article is slightly higher in quantitative work (9.91), compared to that in qualitative work (9.83).

\(^{31}\) In fact, this reputation is well-founded. Sixty-three percent of *Security Studies* articles and 48 percent of *European Journal of International Relations* articles employ qualitative methods. In both cases qualitative is the predominant method employed.
The perestroika movements’ claims encompassed both quantitative and formal methods. These critics correctly noted the increase in quantitative work, but their claims about the rise of formal work is not supported by the data. Lisa Martin (1999) coded seven journals from 1994 to 1998 and found that formal modeling made up only 13 percent of the security studies literature. Our research supports her findings: 13 percent of all IR articles over 12 journals and 27 years employed formal methods. In security journals, specifically, we find that formal modeling is declining, peaking in 1987 at 21 percent before falling to its lowest point of 7 percent right around the height of the debate in 2000.32

Although Walt’s (1999) fear of formal methods taking over the field of security studies is not born out in the data, a parallel claim that qualitative work in the area of IPE is dwindling appears well founded. From its peak of 68 percent in 1992, qualitative IPE work fell to just under 10 percent of the literature in 2006. During the same period, quantitative research has increased more than two and a half times to 71 percent. The formal work in IPE is broken into two periods. The first, 1980 to 1991, saw steady growth to a peak in 1983 of 12 percent, only to

32 For our analysis of security journals, we include International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and Security Studies as the security-focused journals. When we include those articles coded as International Security in American Political Science Review, International Organization and World Politics the finding holds with a 13% average over the entire sample and a slightly higher peak (24 percent) in 1987.
slowly decline over the next nine years. The second period, 1992 to the present, begins with no formal articles and ends with formal modeling as the second most often used method at 18 percent of the literature, twice the rate at which qualitative methods are employed in the IPE subfield (9 percent).

Analytical/non-formal conceptual articles, ones that illuminate features of IR or IR theory without reference to significant empirical evidence or a formal model, decline over time throughout the 27-year sample. The decline is not constant, however, and the method peaks three times: at 20 percent in 1982 and 1989, and at 23 percent in 1997. This trend is fascinating given the concurrent decline of descriptive articles. Articles developing theory without systematic evidence and articles using evidence with no theoretical grounding, in short, are both on the decline. The introduction of Security Studies and European Journal of International Relations help to soften, but cannot halt, the fall of analytic/non-formal conceptual methods.\textsuperscript{33}

Qualitative IR scholars may be even more disadvantaged in their attempts to publish in broad political science journals than they are in IR-specific outlets. For IR scholars hoping to impress their colleagues in American Politics, it may be helpful to brush up on their econometrics. In 1993 quantitative methods were utilized in 83 percent of articles published in the four general political science journals. The overall linear trend since 1980 is positive, with increasingly strong growth between 1988 and 1996. However, in the flagship journal of political science, the American Political Science Review, efforts by some scholars to encourage methodological pluralism may be starting to bear fruit. Since 2002, 29 percent of IR articles published in APSR used analytic/non-formal methods, 32 percent employed formal theory, 25 percent included qualitative analysis, and 39 percent used quantitative methods. No other journal in our sample shows greater methodological pluralism than the APSR over the past five years.

In the journals ranked most highly by IR scholars, the trends in methodology closely mirror those of the broader group of journals.\textsuperscript{34} Articles using descriptive approaches comprise a plurality for the first few years, but they fall to and remain below ten percent after 1983. Qualitative methods are most prevalent between 1983 and 2002. Over this time, however, the dominance of qualitative methods is greater than in the whole sample of journals, peaking at over 50 percent between 1991 and 1993. In 1988, quantitative was the third least used methodology, employed more often than only experimental and counterfactual approaches. By 2006, 49 percent of articles included quantitative methods. This finding is particularly intriguing, as it shows the relatively late adoption of quantitative methods by the most prestigious journals in the field in comparison to the broader set of journals in the TRIP journal article database.

Given the diagnosis of the perestroika movement within political science, it is instructive that 36 percent of respondents in 2006 choose methodology as the principal divide among

\textsuperscript{33} Analytic/non-formal conceptual work is the second largest methodological category in both Security Studies (23 percent) and European Journal of International Relations (41 percent) over the span of their existence.

\textsuperscript{34} Based on responses to the 2006 TRIP survey, the top five IR journals are IO, IS, ISQ, WP and APSR. Foreign Affairs was in the top five highest rank journal but, because it is not a peer-reviewed journal, we did not code articles published in it. Therefore, APSR is included in the top five peer-reviewed journals discussed in this paper.
scholars, and 83 percent placed it among the top three divides, above paradigm (78 percent) and epistemology (59 percent). Why is methodology so divisive? At first glance, our faculty survey suggests little reason for such division. When IR scholars were asked their primary methodological tool, over 90 percent chose either qualitative or quantitative. Formal modeling came in a distant third, listed by only 2 percent of IR scholars as their primary method. More than three times as many respondents described their work as primarily qualitative (69 percent) as said they primarily used quantitative methods (22 percent). We also asked scholars what other methods beyond their primary method they employed in their research. When those methodologies are included along with the primary method employed, fully 95 percent of scholars claim to use qualitative methods in their research. Eighty-four percent of respondents report using at least two methods, and many employ up to six.

As the TRIP article database clearly illustrates, however, there has been an increase in quantitative work over time, and this may contribute to the divisiveness of methodology within the IR discipline. This trend mirrors another illustrated in Figure 12: younger scholars are increasingly trained with quantitative as their primary methodological approach. Some scholars who trained before this increased use of statistical methods may lack the training or tools to effectively employ such methods in their research. Sixteen percent of respondents who volunteered a primary methodology did not offer a secondary method. Of that group, the vast majority (81 percent) employed only qualitative methods. Certainly, these scholars might feel that a system that tends to publish articles employing quantitative methods was biased against them. Whether any bias exists, the number of articles published using quantitative methods is hugely disproportional to the number of IR scholars who say they use quantitative methods. Sixty-nine percent of IR scholars report that their primary methodology is qualitative, but only 29 percent of articles in 2006 used qualitative methods.

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35 This was the largest number by far – 9% higher than the next highest category (paradigm). These results were almost identical to the 2004 survey results.
V. The Policy Relevance of the IR Discipline

In a recent issue of *The American Interest*, General David Patraeus and Retired Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters clash over whether military officers gain from earning a Ph.D. Patraeus, who has a Ph.D., outlines the benefits of a civilian education, concluding that “we cannot become competent warfighters unless we are as intelligent and mentally tough as we are aggressive and physically rugged” (2007, p.19). Peters counters with a fairly common perspective among the political elite; political science research is irrelevant for making day-to-day policy (see also Ignatieff 2007). He writes: “I know of not a single troop-leading general—not one—whom I believe is a more effective combat commander because he holds a doctorate. On the contrary, too much formal education clouds a senior officer’s judgment, inhibits his instincts, and slows his decision-making….When we begin to theorize, we begin to lose” (Peters 2007, p. 25).

What do the TRIP survey and article database reveal about the relationship between IR scholarship and foreign policy making—what Patraeus eloquently describes as the “cloister” and the “grindstone” (2007 p. 17)? Our research suggests that there is a divide between what scholars think about the importance of policy-relevant research and the research they actually...
produce. The results depict a discipline that rarely links its research to current policy debates—except after a major international event—but also one comprised of large numbers of scholars who consult for the U.S. government and report believing that IR scholarship is useful to policy makers and who say that their research is intended to be prescriptive.

The most striking finding here is that, while 35 percent of scholars in the 2006 TRIP survey said that they had an immediate policy application in mind when conducting their research, only a very small percentage of published IR articles actually include policy recommendations. Over the period included in this study, at no time did the percentage of articles that include specific advice for policymakers exceed 20 percent of the sample, and for the entire time period only 12 percent of articles offered a policy recommendation. That said, there were small increases in the percentage of articles offering suggestions to foreign policy decision-makers in 1980-81, 1988, 1993-94, and 2002-03. We speculate that this may be connected to the election of President Reagan and the escalation of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. That is, major events prompt IR scholars to make more of an effort to link their research to the practice of foreign policy. This interpretation is supported by the TRIP survey, in which a large majority (72 percent) of respondents said that they regularly or sometimes adjusted their research program in response to international events. When major events like 9/11 or the fall of the Berlin Wall are mentioned, the number jumps to 84 percent. Similarly, 54 percent of respondents regularly or sometimes adjust their teaching. This number rises to 79 percent when major international events are mentioned. Large numbers of IR faculty specifically mentioned that 9/11, the end of the Cold war, and the current Iraq war as having significantly affected their research and teaching agendas.

There are some differences across IR subfields. In the two journals focusing on international security offering explicit policy recommendations is more common. During the first four years of publication, around 30 percent of articles published annually in Security Studies included advice for policymakers. Thereafter, the effort to reach out to leaders dropped by half and was more in line with the other IR journals. In International Security, policy recommendations are de rigueur; between 30 and 60 percent of articles address current and/or future policy. In contrast, around 10 to 20 percent of the articles in International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, World Politics, and the major political science journals (e.g., the American Political Science Review) specifically discuss policy. Ironically, the security subfield, which Peters thoroughly dismisses in his polemic against the academy, is, in fact, the most eager to engage the policy community.

IR scholars as a whole do not routinely link their published research with policy recommendations, but they nevertheless are active in the policy-making process. In 2006, 47 percent of the respondents in the TRIP survey said that they had consulted for the U.S. government, a foreign government, an NGO or IO, or a think tank.

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36 Of course, it is possible that scholars are doing research that make policy recommendations, but they simply are not publishing that research in the top disciplinary journals. This research may be published in policy journals or reports that are commissioned by government agencies, think tanks, or NGOs. We have no systematic data on this type of research.
As a group, moreover, IR scholars believe that their research, despite its lack of explicit policy prescriptions, provides guidance to practitioners. Not surprisingly, as Figure 13 illustrates, large majorities report that policy makers find area studies, policy analyses, and contemporary case studies very or somewhat useful. More surprisingly, at least to some practitioners, somewhat smaller majorities report that theoretical models, quantitative studies, and historical case studies are very or somewhat useful. By and large, policy-making experience does not shape scholars’ beliefs about the utility of various methodologies. Those who said they have done consulting work in the past two years were 9 percent more skeptical about the utility of quantitative studies and five percent more positive about the usefulness of historical case studies, compared to those without recent consulting experience. In addition, scholars who consulted were more likely to believe contemporary cases studies (10 percent) and policy analysis (6 percent) were “very important” to the makers of foreign policy.

Figure 13: Usefulness of Political Science Research to Policy Makers

37 Although scholars were less positive about the utility of quantitative research, a majority (57 percent) still believed it to be “very useful” or “somewhat useful”.

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IR scholars tend to study relatively current issues, which presumably are of significant concern to policy makers. Figure 14 illustrates this point nicely. Sixty to 80 percent of articles in the last decade of the Cold War studied the time period covered by that conflict. Beginning in 1989 the percentage of articles devoted to the post-Cold War world began a sharp rise, surpassing Cold War studies and leveling off at about 70 percent in 2000 and beyond. Articles that explore empirical cases from the post 9/11 period began a similarly steep climb immediately after the event that opened this historical period, and they already comprise 40 percent of the literature. These findings are supported by the fact that 63 percent of all articles published in the past 27 years use empirical evidence from ten-years prior to their publication. Only 37 percent used historical data that was more than ten years old.

At the same time that IR scholars overwhelmingly study contemporary issues and events, a relatively small percentage of the literature focuses on today’s geographic hot spots. In the 2006 TRIP survey only seven percent of respondents said that the Middle East was their main area of study, although 23 percent indicated that it was a secondary area of study. Only 8 percent of respondents listed East Asia as their main research interest, with 19 percent including it as a secondary research interest. The data on IR journal articles suggests that even fewer scholars publish articles on these regions in the major journals. Only between 7 and 15 percent of

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38 We would expect the numbers from the journal article database to reflect something close to the sum of the two numbers measuring primary and secondary geographic region of study. So, for the Middle East we might expect 30
articles over the last 27 years examined events in the Middle East, while 9 to 16 percent examined East Asian cases. As Figure 15 illustrates, the largest region of focus remains the United States, followed by Canada and West Europe. The most striking trend, however, is the increase beginning in the 1990s of “global” work, those articles that include all regions of the world. This increase is likely correlated with the rise of quantitative research and better availability of data from less developed regions of the world. Articles including a global component now comprise a plurality of all published articles. Articles that study no geographic region still comprise a sizable minority of the literature, although they have fallen to below 13 percent of the literature today from a high of 28 percent in the mid 1990s.

![Figure 15: Geographic Regions Studied](image)

VI. Conclusion

Using two new sources of data—the TRIP survey of IR scholars and the TRIP article database—we are able to move beyond speculation about the direction of the field of international relations and use systematically gathered evidence to put many widely held beliefs about the field to the test. Some of these beliefs have been contradicted by our analysis. Articles advancing realist arguments do not dominate the scholarly journals. The perception that they do

percent of the articles to include a Middle East case, while we might expect 27 percent to include an East Asian case.
instead may be a product of the fact that realist articles are more likely to be cited than, for example, non-paradigmatic research. Also realism is a popular foil for non-realist scholars, who often pit their own theories against the claims and findings of realist research, greatly amplifying the influence of a comparatively small body of realist work. The TRIP data also suggest that there is more theoretical synthesis in the field than is often suspected—further underscoring the fact that the major paradigms do not dominate the field. Other common perceptions are affirmed. The IR scholarship in the major political science and IR journals is almost entirely positivist. And, while there is methodological pluralism, quantitative research—especially in the political science journals—comprises an increasing large percentage of what is published.

The findings and arguments presented in this paper only scratch the surface of the TRIP data-collection effort. The 2006 faculty survey included 83 questions, and we coded 2806 articles for 26 different variables. When the journal article database is complete for 1980-2006, it will include data from more than 6,000 articles, and it will be updated each year to include newly published articles. These data, together with our still infant data-collection effort on undergraduate IR education, provide a wealth of information on the field, and particularly on the connections among teaching, research, and international policy.

The question remains, however, whether this is just an interesting but ultimately trivial exercise in navel gazing of interest only to members of our profession? Even if our findings had no significance or meaning outside the IR discipline, they would still be important. Understanding the history of the discipline helps us to craft interesting and important research that accurately explains the world around us. This study also demonstrates that efforts to change the direction of the field can be—indeed, have been—successful. By responding to criticism from members of the profession, APSR has become one of the most diverse journals in terms of methodology. Finally, there may be more parochial reasons for some IR specialists to care. Scholars who produce non- and post-positivist research, as well as those whose work is largely qualitative, may find it difficult to get published, since their work is significantly underrepresented in the major journals.

These are important reasons to turn the spotlight on ourselves and our own work, but there are also good reasons—reasons that extend beyond the walls of the academy—to study the IR discipline. Faculty beliefs about the field and the world around us influence what we teach our students, some of whom may end up in a position to make foreign policy. Many academics bemoan the lack of interest in our research from the policy community, but the TRIP data tell us that we may be largely to blame—our research rarely offers detailed recommendations for addressing major foreign policy challenges.

Ultimately, the reason to navel gaze in a project such as this, we believe, is to help understand international events and trends from centuries and decades past, as well as those in the contemporary system. The academic discipline of international relations seeks to understand and explain the world around us and, for many scholars, to influence those events, whether by training future policy makers or informing effective policy that benefits from and avoids the mistakes of the past. If, as a discipline, we become mired in paradigmatic or methodological wars, we may take our eyes off the prize—a better understanding of the events that shape our world.
Citations


Variables Coded for Each Article

The variable names, descriptions, and coding explanations are listed in the order they appear in the database. When you code using the TRIP article database you don’t need to memorize any of these numerical codes. You simply click on the appropriate button next to the value of a specific variable that appears in the online coding interface.

1) **Year, volume and number (Year, Vol, Num).**

2) **Journal publication name (Name).** We will code all international relations (IR) articles in the following journals:

   1—AJPS = *American Journal of Political Science*
   2—JOP = *Journal of Politics*
   3—WP = *World Politics*
   4—ISQ = *International Studies Quarterly*
   5—JCR = *Journal of Conflict Resolution*
   6—APSR = *American Political Science Review*
   7—IS = *International Security*
   8—IO = *International Organization*
   9—BJPS = *British Journal of Political Science*
   10—EJIR = *European Journal of International Relations*
   11—SS = *Security Studies*
   12—JPR = *Journal of Peace Research*

   We consider the following “IR journals” and thus code every article in every issue for every year of their publication between 1980 and 2006: IO, IS, ISQ, WP, JCR, EJIR, SS, and JPR. In the general political science journals (JOP, APSR, AJPS, BJPS), we only code those articles that fall within the IR subfield (broadly defined).

   For the purposes of this project, we handle the difference between IR and other subfields in the following way: if the dependent variable (DV) has anything to do with an *inter*-state or transnational issue, the article is classified as an IR article and coded. If the independent variables (IVs) make any mention of *inter*-state or transnational issues, the article is also classified as an IR article. For example, an article that examines bureaucratic decision-making

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39 All articles of WP are coded—that is, we consider it an IR journal—but we recognize that an increasing proportion of those articles fall within the sub-field of comparative politics. Hence, we also measure this change over time. Coders should write the word “Comparative,” “Theory,” “Economics,” “American”, or the appropriate descriptor in the comment field for any article that is not an IR article in any “IR journal.”
(IV) to explain the causes of inter-state war (DV) qualifies as IR under our definition. Similarly, an article claiming that economic interdependence (IV) drives electoral competition in Belgium (DV) also is classified as IR. An article claiming that civil wars (DV) are caused by religious cleavages within specific countries (IV), however, is classified as comparative politics, not IR, and is therefore excluded from our database. Hence, many articles that are published in general political science journals will not appear in our database because both the IVs and the DVs focus on strictly domestic factors.

When we encounter articles that are purely theoretical, without reference to a particular sub-discipline (for instance a *strict* game theory article without reference to a specific empirical application), we employ the following rule: if that article is in an IR journal, we code it; if not, we do not code it, unless it specifically refers to *any* IR question/issue. We have adopted this rule because any article published in an IR journal is likely to be read by many IR scholars and is thus likely to have an impact on the IR subfield. A general game theoretic article in *JOP* might well be read by and influence the future research of IR scholars, but we cannot assume that it would. If the same article were published in *JCR* or *ISQ*, however, we would include it in our sample because more IR scholars read these journals, and such articles therefore are expected to have a greater impact on the field.

3) **Journal Editor (Editlast, Editfirst).** The first and last name of the journal’s editor or editors.

4) **Journal Editor Paradigm (Editpar).** This variable captures the preferred paradigm of the journal editor during his or her tenure as editor. We establish the accuracy of this value by searching books and articles written by the editor during the periods prior to and during his/her tenure as editor. We will supplement this coding rule by sending each current and former editor a survey which asks, among other things, the respondent to report his/her paradigmatic, methodological, and epistemological commitments. This is currently the only variable in the TRIP journal article database that has not been coded (as of 8/2007).

This variable can take one of six nominal values. Some scholars might refer to these categories more narrowly as theories or more broadly as approaches, but we adopt the term most commonly used in the literature to refer to these four major schools of thought. One might divide the literature in other ways (in terms of the “rationalist/constructivist divide,” levels of analysis, or epistemology); hence, we attempt to capture such variation in the literature with additional variables specified below. If an author combines or synthesizes two or more paradigms, rather than advancing one in particular, this variable is coded to reflect the paradigm that appears more prominently or is mentioned first. The six values for “Paradigm” are listed below:

40 Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner refer to these four categories as “general theoretical orientations” and distinguish them from “specific research programs” (Katzenstein et al 1999).

41 We include within each school all the variants. For example, neorealism, structural realism, offensive realism, and classical realism are all included in our “realist” paradigm. Neo-marxist and neoliberal approaches similarly fall under the broader paradigmatic categories because they share core assumptions with Marxism and liberalism, respectively. For a narrower (and more conceptually coherent) definition of
Authors working within a particular paradigm tend to focus on certain dependent variables, but paradigms are defined primarily by their core assumptions and secondarily by the independent variables they emphasize. Paradigms are not defined by their dependent variables. Hence, there are both realist theories of war and liberal theories of war. They differ not in their attempt to explain why wars occur, but in their core assumptions and in the explanatory variables they privilege in empirical research.

We code an editor as realist if he or she employs the following assumptions in his/her work: (1) states are the dominant actors in international politics; (2) states are unitary, rational actors; (3) states pursue their interests, which are defined in terms of power; and (4) the international system is anarchic. To be considered a realist, it is necessary (but not sufficient) for the author to frequently employ the role of power or anarchy as key explanatory variables. Some explanatory variables which would meet these criteria include hegemony, polarity, offense-defense balance, or relative and absolute power. Additionally, the researcher must include other assumptions listed above.

We code an editor as liberal if his/her work is consistent with the following assumptions: (1) the primary actors in IR are individuals and private groups, who organize and exchange to promote their own interests; (2) states represent some sub-set of (domestic and, sometimes, foreign) societal actors through domestic political institutions, which transmit demands to government officials authorized to act in the name of the state; (3) the nature of the international system (including state behavior and patterns of conflict and cooperation) is defined by the configuration of state preferences rather than the distribution of power or the dominant system of economic production; (4) as a result of shifting patterns of preferences states may develop shared norms and institutions, which serve some of the functions typical of institutions within domestic polities (see Moravcsik 2003; Keohane 1984; and Keohane and Nye 1977). Liberals often highlight the importance of the following causal variables: domestic institutions, the preferences of societal actors and trans-national actors, the relative competitiveness of economic producers in the international market, economic interdependence, international law, regimes, international institutions, ideas, and beliefs.

liberalism see Moravcisk (2004). We include neoliberal institutionalism under the liberal category because this choice is consistent with discourse in the field of IR, not because we believe it is analytically the cleanest choice. Further, excluding neo-liberal institutionalism from the liberal paradigm would inhibit comparisons to other work in the field that has attempted to catalog trends in IR.

42 For an alternative approach that includes the DV as part of the coding criteria for paradigm, see Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics.

43 Hence, both the underlying structure of preferences among potential governing coalitions, and the specific domestic rules that structure political bargaining and transmit demands are crucial to determining the preferences of a state in IR.
We code an editor as Marxist if his/her work rests on the following assumptions: (1) economic actors are the dominant unit of analysis in international politics; (2) the international system is hierarchic; and (3) mechanisms of domination perpetuate underdevelopment. Marxist approaches tend to focus on class structure, the global capitalist system, and the role of elites within that system as the primary causal variables in their explanations.

We code an editor as constructivist if his/her work assumes that the identity of agents and the reality of institutions are socially constructed. Constructivists employ many IVs that are typical of Liberalism—such as regimes, norms, identities, and institutions—and even sometimes with realists or Marxists. In addition to the causal variables they share with other paradigms, constructivists frequently examine organizational culture, discursive processes, and principled beliefs as explanatory variables. Constructivists certainly are associated with the “ideational turn” in IR research, but they have no monopoly on ideational explanations and many articles that invoke the importance of ideas do not fit within the constructivist paradigm. We include constructivism as the fourth major research paradigm in IR not because it is perfectly analogous to the other three paradigms, but because it has become the fourth major category for organizing research by IR scholars (Katzenstein et al 1999; Nye 2003).

We also employ a “non-paradigmatic” category, which captures scholars that do advance or test coherent theories, but do not fit comfortably within one of the four major paradigms outlined above. We do not imply by this choice that the previous four paradigms are superior to alternatives in the IR literature—such as feminism, post-modernism, cognitive psychology, or a host of other potential rivals—but only recognize the fact that the first four paradigms are the most prominent and frequently discussed in the IR literature.

Those editors who do not employ any theory at all are coded as “atheoretic.” Generally, the work of atheoretic scholars is purely descriptive or tests inductively derived hypotheses that are not related to any theory or paradigm.

In some cases, editors’ work may cross paradigmatic boundaries during their tenure. As long as the majority of their work falls into a single category, we code the editor as falling within that category.

5) **Total articles (Total, TotalIR).** This variable measures the total number of articles published in a given volume of the journal, and how many of these are IR articles.

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44 In fact, unlike Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism, Constructivism does not suggest any particular substantive model of politics or human behavior. As Adler (2002) explains, constructivism is not “yet another IR ‘ism’, paradigm, or fashion.” Instead, constructivism is a “meta-physical stance, a social theory, and an IR theoretical and empirical perspective.” Hence, constructivism may be less a paradigm or theory of politics than a meta-theoretical approach within which a variety of specific theories could be built. This leaves open the possibility of a “liberal-constructivist” or a “realist-constructivist” approach to IR.

45 In this respect we take seriously the constructivist idea that the field of IR has inter-subjectively defined the four major paradigms. These categories themselves are socially constructed and they define our discourse as a field.
6) **Title (Title).** This is the full title of the article.

7) **Author’s name (A1Last, A1First–A4Last, A4First).** We enter the first and last name of all authors listed. Example: Dessler, David; Nye, Joseph.

8) **Number of authors (Numauth).** We record the number of authors for each article.

9) **Author’s gender (A1Gen–A4Gen).** This is recorded for all authors of an individual article. If an author’s gender cannot be determined by his/her name, then we attempt to discover the author’s gender through a literature search or contacting the author directly.

10) **Paradigm advanced/advocated by author or used to guide analysis (Paradv).** Here, we measure the paradigm used to frame the research question and answer. We employ the same values as in #4 above.

   This variable can take one of six nominal values. Some scholars might refer to these categories more narrowly as theories or more broadly as approaches, but we adopt the term most commonly used in the literature to refer to these four major schools of thought.\(^{46}\) One might divide the literature in other ways (in terms of the “rationalist/constructivist divide,” levels of analysis, or epistemology); hence, we attempt to capture such variation in the literature with additional variables specified below. If an article combines or synthesizes two or more paradigms, rather than advancing one in particular, this variable is coded to reflect the paradigm that appears more prominently or is mentioned first. We do not code articles based on the publicly stated preferences of the author. Instead, we read the article to determine which paradigm is advanced in this particular piece of research. So, if Alexander Wendt writes an article that argues that the distribution of power influences the probability of war, that article is coded as “realist,” even though nobody in the discipline would consider Wendt a realist. The unit of analysis is the article. The six values for “Paradigm” are listed below:\(^{47}\):

   0—Realist  
   1—Liberal  
   2—Marxist  
   3—Constructivist  
   4—Non-paradigmatic  
   5—Atheoretic/None

\(^{46}\) Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner refer to these four categories as “general theoretical orientations” and distinguish them from “specific research programs” (Katzenstein et al. 1999).

\(^{47}\) We include within each school all the variants. For example, neorealism, structural realism, offensive realism, and classical realism are all included in our “realist” paradigm. Neo-Marxist and neoliberal approaches similarly fall under the broader paradigmatic categories because they share core assumptions with Marxism and liberalism, respectively. For a narrower (and more conceptually coherent) definition of liberalism see Moravcsik (2004). We include neoliberal institutionalism under the liberal category because this choice is consistent with discourse in the field of IR, not because we believe it is analytically the cleanest choice. Further, excluding neoliber Institutionalism from the liberal paradigm would inhibit comparisons to other work in the field that has attempted to catalog trends in IR.
Authors drawing upon a particular paradigm tend to focus on certain dependent variables, but paradigms are defined primarily by their core assumptions and secondarily by the independent variables they emphasize. Paradigms are not defined by their dependent variables. Hence, there are both realist theories of war and liberal theories of war. They differ not in their attempt to explain why wars occur, but in their core assumptions and in the explanatory variables they privilege in empirical research.

Realist articles frequently employ the following assumptions: (1) states are the dominant actors in international politics; (2) states are unitary, rational actors; (3) states pursue their interests, which are defined in terms of power; and (4) the international system is anarchic. To be considered a realist article it is necessary that the role of power or anarchy is the key explanatory variable. Other explanatory variables that are frequently employed in realist analyses include hegemony, polarity, offense-defense balance, or relative and absolute power.

We code an article as liberal if it is consistent with some or all of the following assumptions: (1) the primary actors in IR are individuals and private groups, who organize and exchange to promote their own interests; (2) states represent some sub-set of (domestic and, sometimes, foreign) societal actors through domestic political institutions, which transmit demands to government officials authorized to act in the name of the state; (3) the nature of the international system (including state behavior and patterns of conflict and cooperation) is defined by the configuration of state preferences rather than the distribution of power or the dominant system of economic production; (4) as a result of shifting patterns of preferences states may develop shared norms and institutions, which serve some of the functions typical of institutions within domestic polities (see Moravcsik 2003; Doyle 1983; Keohane 1984; and Keohane and Nye 1977). Liberals often highlight the importance of the following causal variables (and at least one should appear for any article to be coded as “liberal”): domestic institutions, the preferences of societal actors and trans-national actors, the relative competitiveness of economic producers in the international market, economic interdependence, international law, regimes, international institutions, ideas, and beliefs.

We code an article as Marxist if it is based on the following assumptions: (1) economic actors are the dominant unit of analysis in international politics; (2) the international system is hierarchic; and (3) mechanisms of domination perpetuate underdevelopment. Marxist approaches tend to focus on class structure, the global capitalist system, and the role of elites within that system as the primary causal variables in their explanations.

We code an article as constructivist if its authors assume that the identity of agents and the reality of institutions are socially constructed. Constructivists employ many IVs that are typical of Liberalism—such as regimes, norms, identities, and institutions—and even sometimes with realists or Marxists. In addition to the causal variables they share with other paradigms,

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48 For an alternative approach that includes the DV as part of the coding criteria for paradigm, see Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics.*
49 For the first systematic empirical study along these lines see Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics.*
50 Hence, both the underlying structure of preferences among potential governing coalitions, and the specific domestic rules that structure political bargaining and transmit demands are crucial to determining the preferences of a state in IR.
constructivists frequently examine organizational culture, discursive processes, and principled beliefs as explanatory variables. Constructivists certainly are associated with the “ideational turn” in IR research, but they have no monopoly on ideational explanations and many articles that invoke the importance of ideas do not fit within the constructivist paradigm. We include constructivism as the fourth major research paradigm in IR not because it is perfectly analogous to the other three paradigms, but because it has become the fourth major category for organizing research by IR scholars (Katzenstein et al. 1999; Nye 2003). While the term “constructivism” does not enter the IR lexicon until the 1990s, articles that share the features described above published prior to the use of the term “constructivist” can still be coded as “constructivist.” For example, Wendt’s work in the late 1980s is coded as constructivist even when he and others are giving it different names.

We also employ a “non-paradigmatic” category, which captures articles that do advance or test a coherent theory, but do not fit comfortably within one of the four major paradigms outlined above. We do not imply by this choice that the previous four paradigms are superior to alternatives in the IR literature—such as feminism, post-modernism, cognitive psychology, or a host of other potential rivals—but only recognize the fact that the first four paradigms are the most prominent and frequently discussed in the IR literature.

Those articles that do not employ any theory at all are coded as “atheoretic.” Generally, these atheoretic articles are purely descriptive or test inductively derived hypotheses that are not related to any theory or paradigm.

11) Paradigms taken seriously by author or used as alternative explanation (Paraser1–Paraser3). This variable captures which paradigms are discussed in a serious way—that is, treated as alternative explanations, used to derive testable hypotheses or used to frame the research question. A simple “straw-man” depiction of an alternative paradigm does not qualify as “taken seriously.” Instead, the reader needs to learn something about the utility, internal logic, or scope conditions of the alternative paradigm (or a specific model following from some alternative paradigm), in order to be categorized as “taken seriously.” The fact that a particular model or theory has implications for a given paradigm does not mean that the article takes that paradigm seriously. With one exception, we DO NOT allow the same value to be entered for #11 as for #10. For example, if an author is advancing a “defensive realist” approach and he/she tests an alternative “offensive realist” approach, then the coder would enter “realist” for #10 but not for #11. The one exception in which we DO allow the same value to be entered for #10 and #11 is when the value selected in both cases is “non-...”}

51 In fact, unlike Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism, Constructivism does not suggest any particular substantive model of politics or human behavior. As Adler (2002) explains, constructivism is not “yet another IR ‘ism’, paradigm, or fashion.” Instead, constructivism is a “meta-physical stance, a social theory, and an IR theoretical and empirical perspective.” Hence, constructivism may be less a paradigm or theory of politics than a meta-theoretical approach within which a variety of specific theories could be built. This leaves open the possibility of a “liberal-constructivist” or a “realist-constructivist approach to IR.

52 While there is certainly some value to measuring the amount of intra-paradigmatic debate, our purpose is to measure the degree to which scholars advancing one paradigm are simultaneously engaging or taking seriously arguments from alternative paradigms. Of course, “Non-Paradigmatic” theories can be “taken seriously” or synthesized with one or more of the big four and we capture this in our coding.
paradigmatic,” and the paradigm or non-paradigmatic explanation advanced (#10) and the paradigm or non-paradigmatic explanation taken seriously (#11) are different. We employ the same values as in variables #4 and #10 above. If no other paradigms are taken seriously in an article then the coder should click on “Atheoretic/None.”

12) **Synthesis (Synth1–Synth2).** This variable refers to whether or not the authors attempt to synthesize explanations from two or more paradigms. Here, we are primarily interested in the article’s main independent variables. Thus, we treat an article as synthetic if the IVs are drawn primarily from two or more distinct paradigms. We do not repeat paradigms here. So, if an article is synthesizing a liberal approach with a constructivist one and we have already coded the main paradigm as liberal (for variable #10), we only enter a value of “3” for constructivism. If we encounter an article where we are unsure which is the main paradigm and which is the “synthesized” paradigm, we list the first paradigm mentioned as main paradigm and the second paradigm mentioned as synthesized. So, for this variable (#12) we enter the value for the synthesized paradigm only.

0—Realism  
1—Liberalism  
2—Marxism  
3—Constructivism  
4—No synthesis  
5—Non-paradigmatic

Synthesis is different from variable #11 (other paradigms taken seriously). Certainly, there can be no synthesis if an author does not take seriously more than one paradigm. Variable #12 does not capture the use of more than one paradigm, however, but whether there is conscious bridge building between/among distinct paradigms. To count as an effort at synthesis, the argument must take into account the assumptions and the outlook (or worldview) of another paradigm. In most cases this will involve taking the explanatory variables from different paradigms and integrating them as part of a single explanation. Thus, the use only of an imported methodology (an econometric technique, or formal model) is not sufficient to be considered a synthesis because it does not extend to the worldview put forward by the article. However, if an article combines insights from one of the big four paradigms (Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, and Constructivism) with some other theoretical approach normally classified as “Non-Paradigmatic” (such as Feminism, Cognitive Psychology, Long Cycle Theory, etc…), then we code this as synthesis.

13) **Ideational (Idea).** This variable attempts to capture the role of ideas in explanations for outcomes in IR. Any article where ideas, beliefs, perceptions, learning, norms, identity, knowledge, or personality traits play a central explanatory role in the argument is coded as ideational (NB: If the word perception can be replaced with either “calculation” or “expectation” and still mean the same thing, the variable is not ideational). Put differently, we code an article as “ideational” if its IVs evoke these non-material explanations. In instances where the scholar evokes both material and ideational IVs (such as Walt 1987), we give a value of “yes” to both questions 13 and 14 (so, in Walt’s case, we code that famous article on the “balance of threat” as “yes” because he evokes one ideational variable in addition to three more prominent material IVs).
In addition to causal variables, some articles seek to explain changes in the culture or identity of some group or actor in IR. Hence, if the DV, the IV, or the major concepts (the evaluative framework) used in an article are ideational, then it receives a “yes” for this variable.

0—No (ideational variables are not used)
1—Yes (ideational variables are used)

14) Material (Mater). This dummy variable captures the article’s use of material factors, in either the independent or dependent variables. As with the “ideational” variable, this variable is dichotomous, with either a “yes” or “no” value.

0—No (material variables are not used)
1—Yes (material variables are used)

Material variables are non-ideational and refer to ascriptive characteristics of actors or the structures in which actors are embedded (states, organizations, corporations, class structure, physical capital, etc.), what actors pursue, and what drives their behavior. They can be physical endowments, such as land or capital, or they can describe capabilities, such as military capability, physical location, or natural resource endowments. They also can include formal and objective rules or formal organizations and institutions. An article that attempts to elaborate or extend realist theory will be coded as “yes” for MATER.

In an article that does not contain “variables,” evaluative frameworks that emphasize material components will be coded as “yes” (for example policy analysis that highlights the importance of military capabilities).

15) Epistemology (Epist). This variable seeks to answer the question, by what criteria does the author establish knowledge claims?

0-Positivist
1-Non-positivist/interpretivist/post-positivist

We code articles as positivist if they implicitly or explicitly assume that theoretical or empirical propositions are testable, make causal claims, seek to explain and predict phenomena, assume that research is supported by empirical means, and aspire to the use of a scientific method. Generally, these articles present and develop theory, derive hypotheses from their theory, and test them using data (empirical observations from the world). However, we code an article as positivist, even when it does not explicitly employ the scientific method, if scientific principles are used to judge the validity of a study or the author is defending a concept of social science that uses these methods to establish knowledge claims. We also code an article as positivist if it describes a scientific research project—such as POLITY, COW, KEDS, or TRIP—and/ or explains coding rules and evidence collection procedures. Although these articles do not test hypotheses, make causal claims, or use evidence to make inferences, they clearly are part of a positivist research agenda.
We code articles as non-positivist/interpretivist/post-positivist if they implicitly or explicitly employ interpretative, critical or normative methods, reject the possibility of or are not primarily concerned with establishing causal relationships through the systematic collection and analysis of empirical evidence, strive for "thick description" (Geertz), or make explicit normative judgments about policy or behavior. We code an article as non-positivist if the author attempts to represent a world which is empirically determinable but does not adhere to the rules of positivism (hypotheses, scientific method etc.).

An article evaluating the claim of another author is coded as employing the same epistemological stance as the reviewed article, unless the article being reviewed is challenged on epistemic grounds (a review of a positivist work is assumed to be positivist unless the use of empirical data to establish knowledge claims is challenged in which case it is coded "non-positivist/post-positivist").

16) Time period (Time1–Time9). We classify each article in terms of its temporal domain. This variable reflects the time period of the subject or cases studied by the author in depth; individual anecdotes about particular historical events are not considered when coding this variable. From which historical eras are cases selected and evidence drawn? We code each time period as a dummy variable. We have selected date ranges that correspond to specific historic eras as discussed by historians and IR scholars. None of these dates should be taken as epistemological boundaries and the number of years within each time period varies dramatically. Obviously, individual articles often draw upon historical data from more than one of these time periods, and our coding scheme allows us to capture such choices by coding multiple periods. Articles about the history of the discipline are coded as Timena unless they also evaluate some empirical claims. For example, if the article discusses an empirical event such as the end of the Cold War having an effect on the discipline, it would be coded as Timepcw. Conversely, if the article describes the discipline's effect on an empirical event, the time period of that event would also be coded as Timepcw. The values for this variable are listed below:

- **Timepre.** Pre-history to 476 AD. Captures ancient civilizations, including Egypt and Greece, and extends to the fall of the Roman Empire.
  
  0—No
  1—Yes

- **Timeant.** 476 to Oct. 1648. Captures late antiquity, the early and high Middle Ages, as well as the early modern period in Europe. It extends to the end of the Thirty Years' War and the signing of the Peace of Westphalia.
  
  0—No
  1—Yes

- **Timewes.** Oct. 1648 to June 28, 1914. Captures the Enlightenment period, Age of Colonization, the American and French Revolutions, Napoleonic Wars, the first two Balkans wars, and extends to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo.
  
  0—No
  1—Yes

0—No
1—Yes

Timeint. June 28, 1919 to September 1, 1939. Captures the inter-war period and extends to the German invasion of Poland.

0—No
1—Yes

Timeww2. September 1, 1939 to August 1945. Captures World War II, including V-E and V-J Days in 1945

0—No
1—Yes

Timecw. September 1945 to November 9, 1989. Captures the Cold War period, including the origins of “containment” as the official policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union, the consolidation of the United Nations, and decolonization. It ends with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

0—No
1—Yes


0—No
1—Yes

Timep911. September 11, 2001 to present. Captures the events of September 11 and the post-9/11 world.

0—No
1—Yes

Timena. None/Not Applicable

0—No
1—Yes

17) Contemporary Timeframe (Contemp). This variable reflects whether the article analyzes events within ten years of the publication date.

0—No
1—Yes
2—N/A

So, for instance, if an article written in 1981 used data from 1973, we would code this as “Yes.” If an article from 1995 used data from 1980, however, it would receive a value of “No.” If the article does not concern specific time periods at all, it receives an “N/A.” The N/A designation allows us to expand or restrict the denominator when specifying the ratio of articles that address contemporary empirical questions. Some might argue that purely theoretical articles with no empirical content should be removed when making such a comparison. Our coding rule permits both measures to be constructed.

18) Policy Prescription (Policy). Does the author make explicit policy prescriptions in the article? We only record a value of “yes” if the article explicitly aims its prescriptions at policymakers. A prescription for further research on some topic does not qualify, but a
prescription that the government ought to change its foreign policy or increase funding for
certain types of research does qualify. The fact that a model has implications that are relevant
for policy makers does not count as a policy prescription. A throw away line in the conclusion
does not qualify as a policy prescription.

0—No
1—Yes

19) Issue Area (Issue). This nominal measure includes sub-fields of IR: International Security,
International Political Economy, Human Rights, the Environment, Health, IR theory, US Foreign
Policy, Comparative Foreign Policy, IR historiography, Philosophy of Science and International
Law. The value of this variable reflects the primary issue area to which the article contributes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Issue Area</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>International Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Environment</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Health</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>IR theory</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>US Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Comparative Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>History of the IR Discipline</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Philosophy of Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>International Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>General (or non-specific)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: the value 12 refers to an article that makes a “general” argument about IR that could apply
to more than one of the issue areas (yet it does not specify whether IS or IPE, etc.). If more than
one issue area is specifically addressed in a substantive manner, the most prominent issue area or
one listed first is coded (assuming the article is not “general”). Note that we capture more
specific information that is often closely related to issue area in variable #23, “Substantive
Focus.” Variable #23 allows multiple substantive areas to be selected.

20) Level of analysis (1image–no level) “Level of analysis” refers to the unit of study. We
adopt Kenneth Waltz’s use of three levels of analysis and enter a “yes” or “no” in the appropriate
column for each level. **We record a “yes” when an author locates either her IV or DV at
that level.** Articles may be coded “yes” for multiple levels.

Level 1 refers to the individual level of analysis and includes such independent variables as:
personality, perceptions, beliefs, images, values, human nature, bias, accidents, timing,
means/ends calculations, group processes (such as groupthink), and any other factors specific to
the individual decision makers and/or the decision-making process.

Level 2 refers to the nation-state level of analysis and includes such independent
variables as: regime type, regime stability, partisan politics, economic system, governmental
structure, bureaucratic interests and bargaining, standard operating procedures, national culture,
national resources, geography, and any other factors internal to the state.

Note that these are coded as level 2 variables only when they are ascriptive, not when
they are interactive or distributional. Geography, resources, regime type, and other variables
may be considered level 3 when causality inheres in the distribution of these variables across the
international system. For example, the statement, “The fact that the United States is a democracy explains the development of its foreign policy,” is coded as a level 2 argument, but the statement, “The increasing number of democracies in the international system during this historical period explains the declining number of interstate wars,” is coded as level 3.

Level 3 refers to the international level of analysis and includes such independent variables as: anarchy, security dilemma dynamics, the offense/defense balance, the distribution or balance of power, specific catalytic events that are external to the actor whose policy is being explained, action/reaction processes, international market forces, international institutions and norms, transnational actors, and any other factors external to the state, including the distribution across the international system of any level 1 or 2 variables.

(1image) First image—0—No 1—Yes
(2image) Second image—0—No 1—Yes
(3image) Third image—0—No 1—Yes
(nolevel) No levels of analysis/can’t tell—0—No 1—Yes

21) Methodology (Quant–Theory). This is a nominal measure of whether the study uses quantitative (statistics), qualitative (case studies), formal modeling (calculus, game theory, spatial modeling), or some other methodological approach. Many articles utilize more than one methodology. For example, an article with a formally modeled theory as well as a case study would be coded for both formal modeling and qualitative analysis. Again, for each methodology employed, we record a “no” (0) or a “yes” (1) in the appropriate column.

1—Quantitative (Quant): this methodology involves numerical values for both the IVs and DVs and some way of linking the IV and DV values. Hence, articles that contain only descriptive statistics that illustrate an empirical trend do not qualify and instead should be categorized as “descriptive” as explained below. To qualify as a quantitative methodology, an article must include some attempt by the author to relate his/her quantitative data to an actual hypothesis. Note: this variable is coded as quantitative even if more advanced statistical techniques (such as regression analysis) are not used.

2—Qualitative (Qual): this approach includes primarily case studies. Most qualitative evidence is organized in a systematic manner for the purpose of testing a hypothesis, providing a systematic approach to illustrating path dependence, examining a deviant case not explained by prevalent theories, or for generating new hypotheses or theories. Detailed historical descriptions that do not employ qualitative evidence for the purpose of theory building or theory testing do not qualify as a qualitative method. Instead, those articles are categorized, as explained below, as “descriptive.” Anecdotal evidence that is not presented in a systematic way does not count as a qualitative methodology.53

King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that “quantitative and qualitative traditions are only

53 Similarly, Bennett (2003) distinguishes between the systematic use of qualitative data to test hypotheses, which is characteristic of the case study method, from pure descriptive recounting of events. For a thoughtful and more expansive view of different tools employed in qualitative research, see Munck (2004).
stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant” (4). We remain agnostic about the substance of this claim; consequently, our qualitative label captures two types of qualitative research, those which abide by strict rules of inference as defined in King, Keohane and Verba, and those which test hypotheses through broader forms of qualitative evidence. As such, the use of descriptive statistics embedded within an historical narrative can be part of a qualitative argument. Further, non-positivist approaches, such as textual analysis, (broadly conceived) are also coded as qualitative methodology.

3—**Formal Modeling (Formal):** this methodology may take either or both of two forms: (1) formal, derived mathematical equations or (2) use of diagrams (such as game theoretic decision trees and spatial models). A simple arrow diagram does not count as formal modeling. The use of examples to illustrate the empirical implications of a formal model does not count as a separate methodology. However, if the article rigorously tests hypotheses generated from the formal model (for example using statistics or case studies), then the appropriate methodology is coded in addition to formal modeling (for example, quantitative and qualitative, respectively, in the examples above).

4—**Counterfactual (Count):** this approach requires the explicit use of a subjective conditional in which the antecedent is known or supposed for purposes of argument to be false. While any article implicitly uses counterfactual reasoning when making a causal inference (King et al. 1994), we aim to capture the explicit use of a counterfactual method as articulated in Fearon (1991) or Tetlock (1996).

5—**Analytic/Non-formal Conceptual:** this approach attempts to illuminate features of IR or IR theory without reference to significant empirical evidence or a formal model. (Wendt, Dessler, and Waltz are all examples of analytical/non-formal conceptual articles). We do not code an article this way if it employs any of the empirical methods described above. This means that articles with a significant non-formal theoretical component DO NOT get coded as “Analytic/Non-formal” even if they make a significant theoretical contribution. (For example, Lake 2006).

6—**Descriptive:** this approach uses quantitative or qualitative information to describe contemporary or historical trends or events in IR. No attempt is made to test a hypothesis or develop broader theoretical generalizations. We do not code an article as descriptive if it employs any of the empirical methods described above.

7—**Policy Analysis:** This category includes articles whose primary purpose is the evaluation of options available to policy makers to respond to a specific policy problem.

8—**Experimental:** This category includes articles which use experimental research designs or simulations to test or defend their claims.

22) **Region under study (Reg1–Reg6).** If an article specifically employs evidence from a particular region or country/countries within that region, we list the region. If more than one region is mentioned, we list each region. If the study concerns all regions of the world (such as an article about total IMF lending) and does not make references to particular regions/countries, we code it as global (10). If an article is coded as “global” because of a large n study that
includes a large number of regions, we still select particular regions if the article also contains a
case study or otherwise focuses on those regions in greater depth. If an article’s theory claims to
explain all global phenomena, but only presents evidence for specific countries/regions, we only
enter values for these variables pertaining to those specific regions. For instance, an article
claims that all states balance power within the international system and has two case studies—one study examines US-Soviet relations during the Cold War and the other examines India,
Pakistan and China. We code this article with the following values: 0, 4, 6, and 7. If the study
intends to be global in nature but data limitations restrict the number of regions covered (there is
no good data on infant mortality in Oceana), it is still coded as “Global.”

0—US
1—Canada and Western Europe
2—Latin America (including Mexico)
3—Sub-Saharan Africa
4—FSU/Soviet Union/Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except for Afghanistan
5—Middle East/North Africa
6—East Asia (incl. China)
7—South Asia (including Afghanistan)
8—Southeast Asia
9—Oceania
12—Antarctica
10—Global
11—None/purely theoretical

These categories contain the following countries:

0. United States of America
1. Canada and Western Europe
   Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Canary Islands (Spain), Denmark, Finland, France,
   Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,
   Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
   Vatican City

2. Latin America and Caribbean
   Antigua, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile,
   Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French
   Guiana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico,
   Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the
   Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, [All possessions, ex. St. Barts,
   Guadeloupe, Bermuda, Puerto Rico

3. Sub-Saharan Africa
   Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African
   Republic, Chad, Comoros Islands, Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Democratic Republic of Congo
   (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
   Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
   Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Sao Tome &
   Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia , South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland,
   Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

4. FSU/Soviet Union/ Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except Afghanistan
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, East Germany (German Democratic Republic) from 1949 to 1990, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

5. Middle East/North Africa
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco (incl. Western Sahara), Bahrain, Gaza & West Bank, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey (incl. Turkish Cyprus), United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, etc.), Yemen

6. East Asia
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Tibet

7. South Asia
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

8. Southeast Asia
Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar/Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

9. Oceania
Australia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

23) **Substantive Focus (Sub1–Sub3).** This variable captures the substantive focus of the article, often measured as the DV used. There may be multiple values in this column—that is, an article may have more than one substantive focus. We enter a number for each value from the following list:
0—Environment
1—WMD proliferation and Arms Control
2—Inter-state war
3—Economic Interdependence
4—Regional integration
5—International (intergovernmental) organization(s)
6—Terrorism
7—Trade
8—Balance of power
9—International law
10—North-South relations
11—Development
12—Alliances
13—Transnational actors/ NGOs
14—International regimes/International norms
15—Regime type
16—Foreign policy
17—Weapon systems, defense spending and arms races
18—Bargaining, Deterrence and strategy
19—Sanctions
20—Diplomacy
21—Foreign Aid, lending and debt
22—Monetary policy
23—Domestic Politics
24—Intra-state conflict/Civil war
25—Interstate Crisis (international conflict short of war)
26—Public Opinion
27—Immigration
28—Public Health/Infectious Disease
29—Other: __________________

24. Author’s Affiliation (AuthAfil). This variable records the author’s institutional affiliation (Harvard University, the Rand Corporation, etc...). In almost all journals for all years, this information is provided on the first page of the article or in the “About Authors” section in the front matter. If this information is missing, the author’s CV should be located and coder should determine the affiliation of the author at the time of publication.

25. Author’s Rank. (AuthRank). This variable records the author’s academic rank at the time the article was published. It can take one of X values listed below.

0 – Assistant Professor
1 – Associate Professor

54 An author classified as a “lecturer” in a European university is equivalent to an Assistant Professor.
2 – Full Professor
3 – Visiting Professor
4 – Adjunct Professor
5 – Graduate Student or PhD Candidate
6 – Instructor
7 – Professor Emeritus
8 -- Other

**Comment Field:** This field can be used to make general comments on the article. Coders may use this field to help the third coder resolve potential disagreements. For example, if a coder recognizes an important but easy to miss piece of an article, one could highlight it in the comment section so that the third coder does not miss it. The other standard uses of the comment section follow:

1. If an article is not an IR article but it must be coded because of the journal that it is in, then the coder indicates this by writing “Comparative Politics” or “American Politics” or “Economics” as the first line in the comment section.

2. If the article is part of a “Controversy” or a “Response” to a previous article published in the journal, the coder indicates that in the comment section.

**Methods**

Given time and resource considerations, we developed the following process for determining each of the variable values: We read an article’s abstract, skim the article (paying particular attention to headings within the text and to any tables, graphs, or illustrations), and read the introduction and conclusion. If the author explicitly declares his/her epistemology, paradigm, methods, etc., then we code accordingly. Quite often, the author’s commitments are implicit and we have to read more closely to infer the value of the variables. If there are some variables that cannot be coded using this process, we read the article more thoroughly. On average, each article takes 15 minutes to code.

To ensure inter-coder reliability among our coders, we had two initial test rounds of coding, in which all researchers coded the same sample of 100 articles. We compared our results and discussed discrepancies, which allowed us to clarify our rules and procedures. Once we collectively improved our coding, we divided the journals among the researchers so that each article was assigned to two independent coders. If both coders independently came to the same conclusion about the value of a particular variable within an article, then we accepted the observation as part of the final data set. If any two coders disagreed on the value of any observation, however, then a senior coder would independently code that observation.

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55 Deans, Chancellors, and Provosts should be coded as full professors unless otherwise indicated in the title.