

Feeding Hungry Cities

Linking Rural Supply through Private Investment

Catie | Crowley



Brief No. 8.3

The Project on International Peace and Security © 2016
All rights reserved.

Please direct inquiries to:

The Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS)
Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations
The College of William and Mary
427 Scotland Street
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185
tele. 757.221.1441
fax. 757.221.4650
pips@wm.edu

Electronic copies of this report are available at www.wm.edu/pips

The Project on International Peace and Security

Launched in 2008, the Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) is an undergraduate think tank based at the College of William and Mary. PIPS represents an innovative approach to undergraduate education that highlights the value of applied liberal arts training to producing the next generation of foreign policy analysts, leaders, and engaged citizens.

PIPS is premised on two core beliefs: (1) rigorous policy-relevant research is a core component of a student's education; and (2) when guided by faculty and members of the foreign policy community, undergraduates can make meaningful contributions to policy debates; their creativity and energy are untapped resources. To this end, PIPS each year selects six research fellows and six research interns. Research fellows identify emerging international security challenges and develop original policy papers. Research interns support the work of the fellows and learn the craft of conducting policy research and writing briefs.

For more on PIPS, visit www.wm.edu/pips.

Amy Oakes
Dennis A. Smith
Co-directors

Feeding Hungry Cities

Linking Rural Supply through Private Investment

APRIL 2016

Catie Crowley

Feeding Hungry Cities

Linking Rural Supply through Private Investment

Exodus from rural areas and growth of megacities threaten food security and increase the risk of civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa. The depopulated and underproductive agricultural sector will be unable to support growing urban food demand, while heightened urbanization raises the specter of unemployment and food-related violence in cities. The international community already seeks to improve food security by promoting smallholder farming through education, technology, and financial assistance. Insufficient attention, however, has been paid to linking smallholder farms to national markets. To address this supply chain issue, the United States should expand its ongoing campaign to promote private sector investment in the region's infrastructure with a focus on the transport sector. Through increasing rural connectivity, this measure will help prevent instability by improving rural livelihoods, discouraging growth of urban slums, and bolstering food security.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is experiencing unprecedented urban growth. The number of mega-cities, cities with over 10 million inhabitants, is expected to rise from 3 in 2010 to 35 in 2050.¹ Fueled in part by staggering levels of rural-urban migration, this massive urban growth will strain the supply of the region's weak agrarian sectors, while ongoing exodus from economically stagnant rural life will hollow out agricultural production.² The resulting food deficit will cause scarcity and price volatility that threatens the stability of urban centers. Previous food crises in SSA have led to rioting, coups, and ethnic violence. These social disruptions threaten African democracies and undermine U.S. interests in the region.

Untapped rural agricultural supply can mitigate increasing risk of food insecurity. To complement the successes of current U.S. development strategies that bolster smallholder farming, the United States must facilitate private sector investment in SSA's transport sector through a focused campaign. The resulting boost in rural connectivity will improve food security by providing an apparatus for the passage of agricultural yields to vulnerable urban centers. With this approach, the Washington can prevent the instability that arises from worsened security and ensure long-term resilience to food shocks and price volatility.

Urbanization and Food Insecurity: the Path to Social Upheaval

Rapid urbanization in SSA threatens food security on two fronts. First, increasing urbanization places a greater strain on African governments to provide food and public services for their inhabitants. Second, when people migrate to urban centers, fewer farmers remain in rural areas to support agricultural production. A weaker agricultural

sector will make the region more vulnerable to global food shocks. Combined with high unemployment rates and a growing restless youth population, deteriorating food security could precipitate civil unrest and jeopardize regional stability.

Urban Population Boom

By 2050, SSA's urban population is projected to reach 1 billion, comprising two thirds of the total population of the region.³ In addition to natural population growth, an influx of rural-urban migration will contribute to the growth of cities.⁴ Now accounting for up to 75 percent of urbanization in the region, push and pull factors will drive the influx of people into cities.⁵

- *Abundance of youth.* High birth rates and declining infant mortality have caused a demographic shift in sub-Saharan Africa in which youth populations are largest and fastest growing in the world.⁶ One third of the region's population is aged 10 to 24, and youth make up the majority of unemployment on the continent.⁷ By 2050, the population aged 15 to 24 is expected to more than double from 200 million to 450 million.⁸ As the youth population grows, governments will find it difficult to provide adequate employment. Youth unemployment is a key driver of rural-urban migration as quality education and job opportunities are sparse in rural economies.⁹ Additionally, while rural families migrate to urban centers, the tradition of large families is brought to cities, increasing the population density.¹⁰
- *Lack of opportunity for rural farmers.* Those living in the countryside are particularly affected by poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, governments in the region have neglected rural infrastructure and development in favor of the urban centers.¹¹ Though 59.6 percent of rural Africans work in the agricultural sector, the majority of them do not have access to technology, financial services, and infrastructure necessary to produce above subsistence.¹² Ironically, rural farmers are net consumers of food and often recipients of food aid.¹³ However rural life offers little social mobility, driving people away from the poverty trap of remote villages.¹⁴
- *False promise of urban life.* For many of SSA's poor, migration to the city is considered an opportunity to improve one's status and livelihood.¹⁵ These opportunities are pull factors especially for youth, who may expect to find quick cash jobs in cities.¹⁶ However, urban centers are unprepared to accommodate employment for migrants, and this group tends to earn less than their urban-born counterparts.¹⁷ This migration pattern results in over-crowding, low-wage employment, unemployment, and poverty in cities. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of urban slum-dwellers in SSA doubled from 103 million to 200 million.¹⁸ Only a quarter of African men find jobs in the formal economy before the age of 30.¹⁹ As migrants leave their homes to join the growing population of the urban poor, they find themselves no better off than before.²⁰

As long as incentives remain for rural poor to migrate to urban centers, the population of urban poor will increase at an alarming rate. Along with demographic trends and already high natural urban growth, the region will experience both the economic growth and risks associated with rapid urbanization. One such risk is a drastically declining outlook for food security.

Urbanization and Food Security

Rapid urbanization in SSA poses a threat to food security by creating an imbalance in food supply and demand, producing risk factors in slums, and instability, and redirecting resources and land from the agricultural sector.

- *Market imbalances.* Urban population growth will make the economies of SSA more vulnerable to food shocks. The migration of rural farmers to cities increases the urban population relative to that of rural areas. This shift means a higher level of net consumers relative to producers of food.²¹ With the development of urban centers, consumers have more income to spend on food and adopt diversified diets. These factors sharply increase demand for different types of food, further compounding the issue of inadequate production.²² As this gap between supply and demand grows, countries will become more reliant on food imports, and food price volatility and food shocks will pose a significant threat to food security. One widely cited estimate is that, accounting for demographic growth and consumption levels associated with urbanization, the overall increase in agricultural production must reach 70 percent by the year 2050.²³ The consequences of this threat to food security are particularly severe for the urban poor of sub-Saharan Africa, who spend a larger fraction of income on food.²⁴
- *Urban malnutrition and instability.* Unsafe conditions in urban slums further put urban-dwellers at risk of malnourishment and food insecurity. More than 60 percent of SSA's urban population lives in slum conditions.²⁵ Residents experience chronic poverty and high rates of unemployment. With low purchasing power, and no ability to farm for subsistence, slum-dwellers are most vulnerable to food shocks.²⁶ In a sample study of 3,000 households in two slums of Nairobi, 85 percent of households were food insecure. With few options, slum-dwellers may turn to negative coping strategies like theft and violence.²⁷
- *Crowding out agriculture.* When cities expand, urban sprawl competes with rural and peri-urban farms for land and irrigation resources, such that the ability of farmers to produce is threatened.²⁸ This phenomenon occurs around both major and medium-size cities that are emerging in the region. The arable land that is converted to residential or industrial areas is often vital to supplying perishable foodstuff to cities. One study of urban centers in Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria indicates that urban infrastructure decreased agricultural land by 10 percent, soil fertility by 35 percent, and the value of total food production by 28 percent between 1956 and 2006.²⁹ The sprawling growth of Nairobi cuts into the most fertile and intensely

farmed regions of Kenya, accelerating competition for water and decreasing agricultural output.³⁰


A variety of environmental factors already exacerbate food insecurity in SSA. Recent drought caused by climbing temperatures produced extreme famine in the Horn of Africa.³¹ Precarious weather patterns make supply and prices increasingly volatile.³² Agricultural disease and growing demand for biofuels further reduce the region's food sources. Combined with rapid urbanization, food security prospects in SSA are grim, and threaten the stability of African democracies.

Food Scarcity and Instability

Food insecurity leads directly to political instability. Data from 1990 and 2008 indicate a causal link between rainfall, crop size, and riots. The more scarce the food supply, the greater the likelihood of anti-government protests, civil conflict, and democratic failure.³³ Another study found a correlation between a certain threshold of food prices and civil unrest.³⁴ Of the seven countries with the most food-insecure people, six have experienced civil conflict in the past decade.³⁵ The 2007-2008 global food crisis demonstrated the relationship between high prices of staple food and unrest as food riots broke out in 48 countries worldwide.³⁶ In Mozambique, the price of maize increased by 87 percent from 2007 to 2008, and a series of violent clashes left several dead and 100 injured. Countries like Egypt, Senegal, and Guinea experienced store lootings and riots in response to food prices.³⁷

Countries with large urban populations were more likely to face protests during the food crisis.³⁸ Even a small shift in food accessibility can put thousands of citizens at risk of undernourishment, malnourishment, and starvation. With growing numbers of disillusioned youth, urban slums are poised to become hotbeds for protests, unrest, or civilian militias in the event of worsened food insecurity. In Kenya's Kibera slum violence broke out after a candidate promising to address food insecurity and lack of public services lost the 2007 election.³⁹ The death toll reached 800 as the crisis escalated to ethnic clashes and gang violence.⁴⁰ This pattern of social disruption in relation to food scarcity repeated itself in 2010 and 2011 when food prices rose again. The Arab Spring is often linked to public anger over food prices, which precipitated conditions for protests.⁴¹ The 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali was driven by drought and government mismanagement of food aid.⁴² Riots in South Africa were triggered by the scarcity of maize.⁴³ In these cases, food price volatility and insufficiency led to civil unrest, ethnic conflict, and regime overthrows. The potential for this violence remains high with the risk of widespread food insecurity in the near future. Political instability is a threat to U.S. interests in the region.

Figure 2. FAO Price Index and Conflict ⁴⁴



U.S. Strategic Interests

The United States has a vested interest in the regional stability of SSA. Unrest in urban centers threatens African democracies by increasing the risk of ethnic violence, regime overthrows, and social upheaval. If these issues persist, they may also lead to rise in terrorism, organized crime, and extended conflict as groups struggle to control food resources.⁴⁵ A major provider of development assistance to SSA, the United States has devoted substantial financial resources to stabilizing the region. In 2014, USAID channeled \$9.5 billion for 3,700 aid projects to SSA.⁴⁶ Instability resulting from rapid urbanization and food insecurity threatens returns on U.S. financial commitments in regional development. The United States is a global leader on sustainability, and cooperation on food security provides an opportunity to set a positive example of sustainable, private sector-led approaches to mitigating food insecurity and its consequences.

Current Programs for Smallholder Farmers

The international community and the United States have sought to support farming in rural SSA with the goal of improving food security and rural incomes. These interventions have traditionally focused on raising productivity, but have placed less emphasis on incorporating smallholders into commercial agricultural supply chains.

More than 80 percent of African agricultural production is from smallholder farms—generally no larger than 2 hectares.⁴⁷ Small-scale farms produce more per land area than large commercial farms given the right inputs and technology.⁴⁸ One study examining 286 smallholder plots in 57 countries found that when farmers adopted sustainable technologies, average crop yields increased by 79 percent.⁴⁹ The opportunity for increased output means that smallholders could bridge the production gap to prevent future food crises.⁵⁰ If incorporated into the commercial supply chain, smallholders can meet growing demand from urban areas and provide a buffer to price shocks.⁵¹

The World Bank estimates that investments in rural agriculture would reduce poverty three to four times more rapidly than equivalent ventures in other sectors of the economy.⁵² With large-scale agriculture, financial gains are concentrated among a few. But as small-scale farms are commercialized, demand and wages for unskilled labor rise, promoting a cycle of broad-based development for rural poor.⁵³ These improvements in livelihoods decrease incentives for migration to urban areas. Thus, bolstering smallholder farming not only improves food security, but also ends cycles of migration and urban poverty that exacerbate food insecurity.


Limited access to credit, inputs, technology, and modern farming techniques for smallholders prevents the productivity jump needed to mitigate impending food insecurity. Recognizing these barriers, major OECD donors, the World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development have implemented programs that expand smallholder capacity to produce.⁵⁴

- *The United States and smallholders.* USAID provides technical assistance and aid to smallholders through its Farmer to Farmer and Feed the Future programs.⁵⁵ These interventions focus on providing inputs, tools, and financial services necessary to maximize yields. The United States has also implemented programs to improve post-harvest storage and create farmer cooperatives that improve coordination in reaching buyers and accessing resources.⁵⁶
- *NGOs, IOs, and smallholders.* Most prominent international development NGOs like Oxfam, Bill Melinda Gates Foundation, and World Vision also target smallholders through community-based interventions. Microfinance, improving access to ICTs, and cash transfers are common platforms to assist smallholders. The World Bank, the United Nations, and the African Development Bank also fund and support numerous initiatives for strengthening SSA's agriculture.

While improving the lives of many small-scale farmers, these responses lack a framework to integrate smallholders into agricultural supply chains and link food supply to growing demand from urban areas.

Incorporating small farms into the agricultural supply chain is crucial to achieving food security. However, road networks in SSA are notoriously poor and are a major obstacle to commercializing smallholder yields.

Figure 2. Agricultural Supply Chain for Smallholder Farmers



The agricultural supply chain entails a series of commercial links between firms that produce, store, process, and trade a good (see Figure 2).⁵⁷ Most small farms are not connected to formal markets, instead storing and selling their surplus locally.⁵⁸ Engaging smallholders in formal market outlets expands the reach of their product, reduces logistical costs, and lowers price uncertainty. This process generally occurs when agricultural companies contract production of a good to smallholders, thus benefitting the purchasing firm by guaranteeing supply of products that meet specifications.⁵⁹

Road quality and density in rural areas of SSA is low—more than one third of rural farmers are too geographically and economically isolated to get their goods to market. Only 19 percent of the region’s roads are paved.⁶⁰ The continent has the highest transport costs in the world, especially in terms of average incomes.⁶¹ Without sufficient road infrastructure smallholders cannot move beyond subsistence agriculture, regardless of productivity.⁶² One study of smallholders in Kenya estimates transportation costs from farm gate to the port of Mombasa to account for 80 percent of costs to the producer.⁶³ Agribusiness has limited reach and supply areas remain close to cities, keeping smallholders in remote areas from being incorporated into the supply chain.⁶⁴ This logistical barrier must be met with improvements in rural transport infrastructure that create an urban-rural continuum.

Investments in rural transportation infrastructure would improve food security in the following ways:

- *Lower transport costs.* Heightened rural connectivity dramatically decreases transport costs for producers. The result is higher profit for farmers and agribusiness. Surveys in Benin, Madagascar, and Malawi indicate that transport costs account for 50 to 60 percent of all marketing costs for farmers.⁶⁵ One study on Rwandan coffee farmers estimated that a 50 percent reduction in transport costs in rural areas would lead to a 20 percent gain in profits.⁶⁶ Increased profit in turn allows greater pre-harvest investment and higher productivity. An OECD report estimates that improving local roads can double agricultural productivity and quadruple sales.⁶⁷
- *Growth of agricultural markets.* With improved access to markets, formerly isolated subsistence farmers would have an opportunity to cultivate small and mid-sized commercial farms, which are most effective at ensuring food supply and food security.⁶⁸ A study of 13 African countries examining data on the quality of rural road networks found that countries with less integrated domestic markets had higher levels of food insufficiency.⁶⁹ Road improvements allow farmers to promptly transport goods to a collection point, minimizing post-harvest food waste.⁷⁰ Better transport mechanisms also lead to more effective redistribution of food in which surplus production in one region can compensate for a food deficit in other regions.⁷¹ In these ways, a transport structure for smallholder outputs advances food security.
- *Increased rural incomes.* The connectivity of rural farms not only benefits smallholders, but also generates both farm and nonfarm wage employment. These jobs may include agriprocessing, trucking, and construction. As a result, increased incomes in remote areas further spur growth by attracting investment and drawing in non-agricultural industries.⁷² In Ethiopia, development of the rural-urban supply chain for teff led to rural growth with the presence of retail shops, traders, commercial flourmills, and trucking.⁷³ This expansion of local economies reduces rapid urbanization by improving rural livelihoods so that seeking employment in the city is no longer an incentive for rural poor and disenfranchised youth.⁷⁴

Connecting smallholder output to formal markets requires better transport infrastructure. However, significant barriers prevent the extension of rural road networks. The substantial financial and resource costs of these projects strain government budgets and make coordination difficult. Nearly three quarters of infrastructure projects in Africa fail to get off the ground.⁷⁵ Inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies make large road projects sinkholes for government funds.⁷⁶ To minimize these complications, recent approaches have involved the private sector to better finance, design, and implement such projects.⁷⁷ Private sector investment in the transport sector will be crucial to linking rural smallholder supply to urban markets.

Policy Response: Linking Rural Supply to Urban Demand

“The commercial promise of Africa’s agricultural renaissance can be realized only if products actually get to markets”

- Peter Njenga⁷⁸

The United States must take preventative measures to combat impending instability. Urbanization has the potential to drive economic growth but food insecurity threatens this dividend. By focusing on rural agriculture, an objective already high on the development agenda, the United States can assist African democracies in ensuring long-term resilience to food shocks. This approach to combating instability is also an opportunity for Washington to expand commercial investment and improve perceptions of the United States in the region.

The international community has recognized the potential for smallholder farmers to improve food security. Most aid has focused on increasing productivity of smallholders, yet commercializing farms and connecting smallholders to markets is fundamental to meet growing urban food demand. Rural transport infrastructure remains a major barrier to incorporating smallholders into this agricultural supply chain. Private sector investment in infrastructure reduces the corruption and funding strain associated with government infrastructure projects. In order to incentivize the U.S. private sector to invest in SSA’s rural connectivity, the United States must expand its efforts to promote private involvement in infrastructure, with a focus on the transport sector.

Private Investment in Transport

The U.S. private sector has the potential to help bridge the transport gap between rural areas and formal agricultural markets and safeguard food supply to urban centers. Traditionally, African government policies have failed to promote private sector participation in transport infrastructure development.⁷⁹ However, with economic growth and an improved regulatory environment, private engagement in SSA’s transport sector has increased in recent years:

- *Road infrastructure.* External financing of infrastructure in SSA has increased from \$5 billion in 2003 to \$30 billion in 2013.⁸⁰ Investments in transport infrastructure in particular are growing and are no longer driven by extractive industries.⁸¹ In Mozambique the N4 toll road successfully linked Guateng to Maputo through a public private partnership (PPP) involving the company, Trans African Concessions.⁸² With concessionaire, Effiage Group, the Dakar-Diamniadio toll road improved mobility near the capital and saw the formation of small farmer businesses nearby.⁸³ Chinese firms have recognized the profitability of infrastructure investments on the continent, constructing roads like the Apakun-Murtala access road in Nigeria, a PPP with China Harbour Engineering Company.⁸⁴

- *Commercial transport industry.* Recent years have also seen growth of SSA's private transport sector. Commercial bank loans and foreign direct investment (FDI) in agriculture are on the rise and have led to growth in trucking for agricultural transport.⁸⁵ East Africa's high value fruit and vegetable exports have attracted FDI in transport and marketing.⁸⁶ In countries like Nigeria, Senegal, and Ethiopia, a "quiet revolution" is occurring in the trucking industry with the emergence of many small and medium firms along agricultural supply chains.⁸⁷ U.S. private equity firm, Carlyle Group, recently purchased a 50 percent stake in Mozambican cargo transport company, J&J.⁸⁸ This growing industry provides another investment opportunity for U.S. companies.

Private involvement in the transport sector has significant potential gains for U.S. firms and can bridge the transport deficit that is a bottleneck for agricultural supply chain development in the region. The financing introduced for infrastructure projects provides fiscal relief for governments of SSA.⁸⁹ External financing for larger expressways and toll roads also frees up public funds that can be used for the most remote arterial road networks.⁹⁰ These projects are also less likely to suffer from the inefficiencies and/or corruption that plague the region's public sector, thus improving overall quality and efficiency.⁹¹

Facilitating Transport Sector Investment: Expanding DBIA

In 2012 the Doing Business in Africa Campaign (DBIA) was launched to help U.S. companies take advantage of investment opportunities in SSA.⁹² At the 2014 U.S.-Africa Business Forum, President Obama pledged \$7 billion in financing to promote U.S. exports and investments under DBIA and U.S. companies announced construction investments worth \$14 billion. These two-year commitments to the DBIA campaign involved cooperation between multiple donor and commercial government agencies, along with U.S. companies. This executive order also established a President's Advisory Council, led by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and comprised of private sector actors, to generate new initiatives promoting commercial engagement between the United States and Africa.⁹³

Despite the DBIA initiative toward private sector involvement in developing SSA, transport sector has not been a priority of the campaign. Roads represent less than 1 percent of commitments for private participation in infrastructure in SSA between 2005 and 2013.⁹⁴ The financial and developmental returns to these investments are long term, and revenue streams can be more volatile than in other sectors.⁹⁵ Perceptions of high investment risk and cumbersome legal structures in SSA make for high uncertainty.⁹⁶ However, frameworks are in place for mitigating risk, which the United States can leverage to encourage investment.

In order to facilitate U.S. private investments in SSA's transport infrastructure and transport industry, the United States must further establish mechanisms for communication between public and private bodies, encourage the uptake of risk

mitigation strategies, and engage a range of U.S. agencies to incentivize private investment in SSA's transport sector.

- *Lowering information costs.* A primary role of the United States is functioning as a source of information and liaison between companies and host governments. Through the DBIA campaign, the United States can mobilize the Department of Commerce, Department of State, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the U.S. Department of Transportation to assess investment opportunities and brief eligible private sector companies on possible business ventures. By corresponding with stakeholders and partners, these agencies can facilitate U.S. company bids for PPP, produce memorandums of understanding with host governments to cooperate on road investment projects, and support private sector deals in trucking and logistics. The DBIA campaign has this set of approaches in their arsenal and should apply them to the transport sector.
- *Facilitating access to insurance.* The United States should assist companies in mitigating investment risks. Workshops that promote efficiency and best practices for contracting projects in Africa's transport sector have seen success in the DBIA campaign. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures losses due to political risk and committed up to \$1 billion in financing and insurance to catalyze private sector investment in Africa in 2014.⁹⁷ To continue its commitment to DBIA, OPIC can renew its funding with a specific allocation for road infrastructure. The World Bank and African Development Bank also mitigate investment risks by financing host government guarantees and insuring against regulatory, currency, and political risks.⁹⁸ The United States should support private companies in applying for insurance from external sources of risk mitigating institutions.
- *Expanding the Advisory Council.* The President's Advisory Council for the DBIA Campaign should expand to include the transport sector. In 2015, the Council proposed establishing a U.S.-Africa Infrastructure Center to identify and vet infrastructure projects, yet did not address transport infrastructure.⁹⁹ Bringing companies with interest in the transport sector to the table can better align initiatives to funding SSA's roads and bolster the transport industry.

These strategies do not require an overhaul of U.S. government resources. By building on the existing DBIA Campaign model that catalyzes private sector investments in SSA, the United States can easily begin to strengthen the transport sector. Because the DBIA campaign is included in the fiscal year 2016 budgets of the involved agencies, the funding burden is shared.¹⁰⁰ These changes would not involve congressional approval and would simply be a shift in focus under the guidance of the Secretary of Commerce and the Advisory Council. Between these bureaus, this campaign can deliver project planning, risk mitigation tools, cooperation with host governments, and financing that will boost commitments in SSA's transport sector. As private sector funding fuels road construction and bolsters transport industries, growth in the transport sector will create a nexus between rural food supply and urban demand.

Conclusion

Private investment in road infrastructure and commercial transport of SSA has the potential to transform agricultural sectors to ensure food security for high-risk urban areas. The United States must further mobilize the private sector for this goal, with increased emphasis on road infrastructure and private transport industries. Through a sector focused, multi-agency campaign, the United States can provide incentives for scaling up infrastructure and transport capacity in the region. This approach will improve food supply, bolstering food security to prevent hunger-driven violence and civil unrest. It is also an opportunity to tap into profitable supply chains. Due to the development community's attention to rural farmer productivity combined with skyrocketing food demand associated with rapid urbanization, these supply chains are poised to create a continuum—food supply into cities, and a landslide of money back to wholesalers, agriprocessing, truckers, and rural farmers. As agricultural development improves rural incomes, this approach will reduce incentives for rural-urban migration that multiply growing urban slums.

¹“The Dividend is Delayed.” *The Economist*. March 08, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21598646-hopes-africas-dramatic-population-bulge-may-create-prosperity-seem-have>.

² David Satterthwaite, Gordon McGranahan, Cecilia Tacoli. *Urbanization and its implications for food and farming*. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* 2010 365 2809-2820; DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0136. Published 16 August 2010.

³Jack A. Goldstone, “The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends that Will Change the World,” *Foreign Affairs* 89 (2010): 38, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65735/jack-a-goldstone/the-new-population-bomb>.

⁴ The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development, Hove, Ngwerume, Muchemwa (<http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.ap/>)

⁵ The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development, Hove, Ngwerume, Muchemwa (<http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.ap/>)

⁶ Population Reference Bureau. 2009. “Population Reference Bureau: World Population Data Sheet 2009,” Population Reference Bureau Website: Washington, DC.

⁷ Kabiru, Caroline W., Chimaraoke O. Izugbara, and Donatien Beguy. *The Health and Wellbeing of Young People in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Under-Researched Area?* Publication. BMC International Health and Human Rights, 2013. <http://aphrc.org/publications/the-health-and-wellbeing-of-young-people-in-sub-saharan-africa-an-under-researched-area/>

⁸ “The Dividend is delayed.” *The Economist*. March 08, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21598646-hopes-africas-dramatic-population-bulge-may-create-prosperity-seem-have>.

⁹ Zuehlke, Eric. “Youth Unemployment and Underemployment in Africa Brings Uncertainty and Opportunity.” February 2009. Accessed March 22, 2016.

<http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2009/youthunemployment.aspx>.

¹⁰ Hove, Mediel, Emmaculate Ngwerume, and Cyprian Muchemwa. “The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development.” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2, no. 1 (March 11, 2013). <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.ap/>

¹¹ Bates, Robert H. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005.

- ¹² “Fact Sheet: The World Bank and Agriculture in Africa.” World Bank. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://go.worldbank.org/GUJ8RVMRL0>
- ¹³ Thurow, Roger. *Last Hunger Season: A Year in an African Farm Community on the Brink of Change*. PublicAffairs, 2012.
- ¹⁴ Bossuroy, Thomas. "Why Economic Mobility Is Low in Africa." *The New York Times*, September 25, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/09/25/economic-mobility-without-economic-growth/why-economic-mobility-is-low-in-africa>
- ¹⁵ Min-Harris, Charlotte. "Youth Migration and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empowering the Rural Youth." *Human Rights & Human Welfare*, 2010. <http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/africa/YouthMigration.pdf>.
- ¹⁶ Zulu, Eliya M., Donatien Beguy, Alex C. Ezeh, Philippe Bocquier, Nyovani J. Madise, John Cleland, and Jane Falkingham. "Overview of Migration, Poverty, and Health Dynamics in Nairobi City's Slum Settlements." *Urban Health* 88, no. 2 (June 29, 2011): 185-99. Min-Harris, Charlotte. "Youth Migration and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empowering the Rural Youth." *Human Rights & Human Welfare*, 2010. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3132239/>
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ UN-Habitat. *State of African cities 2010. Governance, Inequalities and Urban Land Markets*. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-Habitat; 2010.
- ¹⁹ “The Dividend is Delayed.” *The Economist*. March 08, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21598646-hopes-africas-dramatic-population-bulge-may-create-prosperity-seem-have>.
- ²⁰ Wilson, William J. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Knopf, 2011
- ²¹ Quentin Wodon and Hassan Zaman, “Higher Food Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa: Poverty Impact and Policy Responses,” *The World Bank Researcher Observer* 25 (February 2010): 172, doi:10.1093/wbro/lkp018.
- ²² Reardon, Thomas Anthony; Tschirley, David; Minten, Bart; Haggblade, Steven; Liverpool-Tasie, Lenis Saweda; Dolislager, Michael; Snyder, Jason; and Ilumba, Claire. 2015. Transformation of African Agrifood Systems in the New Era of Rapid Urbanization and the Emergence of a Middle Class. In *Beyond a Middle Income Africa: Transforming African Economies for Sustained Growth with Rising Employment and Incomes*. Chapter 4. (Eds) Badiane, Ousmane and Makombe, Tsitsi. ReSAKSS Annual trends and outlook report 2014. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- ²³ Schutter, Olivier De. *Agroecology: A Solution to the Crises of Food Systems and Climate Change*. Report no. Commentary IV: P. 34-38. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf.
- ²⁴ Schönfeldt, H. C., Gibson, N., & Vermeulen, H. (2010). The possible impact of inflation on nutritionally vulnerable households in a developing country using South Africa as a case study. *Nutrition Bulletin*, 35(3), 254-267. doi:10.1111/j.1467-3010.2010.01837.
- ²⁵ Fox, Sean. *The Political Economy of Slums: Theory and Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa*. World Development, Volume 54, February 2014. ISSN 0305-750X, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.08.005>.
- ²⁶ Mohiddin, Lili, Laura Phelps, and Tamsin Walters. *Urban malnutrition: A review of food security and nutrition among the urban poor*. Report. October 8, 2012. Accessed February 29, 2016.
- ²⁷ Kimani-Murage, E.W., L. Schofield, F. Wekesah, S. Mohamed, B. Mberu, R. Ettarh, T. Egondi, C. Kyobutungi, and A. Ezeh. “Vulnerability to Food Insecurity in Urban Slums: Experiences from Nairobi, Kenya.” *Journal of Urban Health* 91, no. 6 (December 30, 2014): 1098-113. Accessed February 29, 2016. PubMed.
- ²⁸ Babatola, E. B., and P. K. Babatola. "Urban Expansion, A Threat to Food Security in Nigeria. Case of Ado-Ekiti." *International Journal of Science and Research* 4, no. 5 (May 2015). <http://www.ijsr.net/archive/v4i5/SUB151942.pdf>.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Exploring Land Development Dynamics in Rural-Urban Fringes: A Reflection on *Why Agriculture is Being Squeezed Out by Urban Land Uses in the Nairobi Rural-Urban Fringe*, Thuo
- ³¹ *Global Food Security: Intelligence Community Assessment*. Report. September 22, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf

-
- ³² <https://www.farmfoundation.org/webcontent/Advancing-Global-Food-Security-in-the-Face-of-Weather-Volatility-and-Climate-Change-1883.aspx>
- ³³ Cullen Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, "Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa," *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (2012): 36, doi: 10.1177/0022343311426165 <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/49/1/35>.
- ³⁴ Johnson, Nathaniel. "The People Are Hungry: The Link between Food and Revolution." *Grist*. August 15, 2013. Accessed March 26, 2016. <http://grist.org/food/the-people-are-hungry-the-link-between-food-and-revolution/>.
- ³⁵ Brinkman, Henk-Jan, and Cullen S. Hendrix. *Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges*. Issue Brief. July 2011. Accessed February 29, 2016. <http://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf>
- ³⁶ Matuschke, Ira. *Rapid Urbanization and Food Security: Using Food Density Maps to Identify Future Food Security Hotspots*. Report. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2009. http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/esag/docs/RapidUrbanizationFoodSecurity.pdf.
- ³⁷ Berazneva, Julia, and David R. Lee. TS, Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. March 2011.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Gallaher, Courtney. "Livelihoods, Food Security, and Environmental Risk: Sack Gardening in the Kibera Slums of Nairobi, Kenya." PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd:2626/datastream/OBJ/view>.
- ⁴⁰ Rice, Xan. "Death toll nears 800 as post-election violence spirals out of control in Kenya." *The Guardian*, January 28, 2008. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/28/kenya.international>.
- ⁴¹ Lagi, M., K.Z. Bertrand, and Y. Bar-Yam. *The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East*. Report. August 10, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf
- ⁴² Brinkman, Henk-Jan, and Cullen S. Hendrix. *Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges*. Issue Brief. July 2011. Accessed February 29, 2016. <http://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf>
- ⁴³ Berazneva, Julia, and David R. Lee. TS, Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. March 2011.
- ⁴⁴ Lagi, M., K.Z. Bertrand, and Y. Bar-Yam. *The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East*. Report. August 10, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf
- ⁴⁵ *Global Food Security: Intelligence Community Assessment*. Report. September 22, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf)
- ⁴⁶ "Foreign Aid Dashboard." *USAID Economic and Analysis and Data Services*, 2014. Accessed February 29, 2016. <https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-dashboard.html#2014>
- ⁴⁷ Annan, Kofi, and Sam Dryden. "Food and the Transformation of Africa." *Foreign Affairs*. December 19, 2016. Accessed February 29, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-10-16/food-and-transformation-africa>.
- ⁴⁸ Lewis, Kim. "Smallholder Farmers Key to Food Security." *Voice of America* (Washington, District of Columbia). October 31, 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/content/smallholder-farmers-actionaid-agriculture-food-security-/1780613.html>; Hazell, P., Poulton, C., Wiggins, S. and Dorward, A. 2007. The future of small farms for poverty reduction and growth. 2020 Discussion Paper 42,.: IFPRI, Washington DC.
- ⁴⁹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. "Smallholders and Family Farmers." Digital image. Factsheet. Accessed February 22, 2016. http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf
- ⁵⁰ Annan, Kofi, and Sam Dryden. "Food and the Transformation of Africa." *Foreign Affairs*. December 19, 2016. Accessed February 29, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-10-16/food-and-transformation-africa>.
- ⁵¹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *A Data Portrait of Smallholder Farmers*. Issue brief. 2010. Accessed February 29, 2016.

-
- ⁵² Feyder, Jean. *Trade and Environment Review*. Issue brief no. Commentary I: P. 9-12. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013.
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/ditcted2012d3_ch1_en.pdf.
- ⁵³ "IFAD in Kenya." International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2012. Accessed March 24, 2016.
<http://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/operations/country/home/tags/kenya>.
- ⁵⁴ "IFAD in Kenya." International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2012. Accessed March 24, 2016.
<http://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/operations/country/home/tags/kenya>.
- ⁵⁵ Alex, Gary. "Farmer-to-Farmer: The Impact You Can't Measure." *Feed the Future Blog* (blog), March 25, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2016. [https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/farmer-farmer-impact-you-can't-measure](https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/farmer-farmer-impact-you-can-t-measure).
- ⁵⁶ "Feed the Future." Feed the Future. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/>.
- ⁵⁷ *Leaping and Learning: Linking Smallholders to Markets, Research Reports and Studies*. Report. May 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://www.odni.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8407.pdf>
- ⁵⁸ *Leaping and Learning: Linking Smallholders to Markets, Research Reports and Studies*. Report. May 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://www.odni.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8407.pdf>
- ⁵⁹ "Contract Farming: FAQ." Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/contract-farming/faq/en/>.
- ⁶⁰ Biau, Carole, Karim Dahou, and Toru Homma. *How to Increase Sound Private Investment*. Report. NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative, 2011. Accessed March 24, 2016.
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/41775855.pdf>.
- ⁶¹ *Africa Review Report on Transport: A Summary*. Report. Economic Commission for Africa Conference on Sustainable Development. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2009. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁶² Livingston, Geoffrey, Steven Schonberger, and Sara Delaney. *Sub-Saharan Africa: The State of Smallholders in Agriculture*. Report. Rome: IFAD Conference on New Directions for Smallholder Agriculture, 2011.
- ⁶³ *Leaping and Learning: Linking Smallholders to Markets, Research Reports and Studies*. Report. May 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://www.odni.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8407.pdf>
- ⁶⁴ World Bank. *Kenya: Issues in Trade Logistics*. Report. July 2005. Accessed March 24, 2016.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTLF/Resources/Kenya_Final_Report_Jul05.pdf.
- ⁶⁵ World Bank. 2007. *World development report 2008: agriculture for development*. Washington, DC, USA.
- ⁶⁶ *Leaping and Learning: Linking Smallholders to Markets, Research Reports and Studies*. Report. May 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://www.odni.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8407.pdf>
- ⁶⁷ *Encouraging Private Investment in Africa's Road Infrastructure*. Report. December 11, 2008. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/41865331.pdf>.
- ⁶⁸ *Global Food Security: Intelligence Community Assessment*. Report. September 22, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf)
- ⁶⁹ Brenton, Paul and Portugal-Perez, Alberto and Regolo, Julie. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7003. *Food Prices, Road Infrastructure, and Market Integration in Central and Eastern Africa*. August 1, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁷⁰ Njenga, Peter. *Agricultural Logistics Management and Related Infrastructure*. Issue brief. Dakar: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016.
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Events/DakAgri2015/Agricultural_Logistics_Management_and_Related_Infrastructure.pdf.
- ⁷¹ Torero, Maximo. *A Framework for Linking Small Farmers to Markets*. Report. Rome: IFAD Conference on New Directions for Smallholder Agriculture, 2011
- ⁷² *Global Food Security: Intelligence Community Assessment*. Report. September 22, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf)

-
- ⁷³ Reardon, T., D. Tschirley, B. Minten, S. Haggblade, C.P. Timmer, and S. Liverpool-Tasie. *The Emerging 'Quiet Revolution' in African Agrifood Systems*. Issue brief. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2013.
- ⁷⁴ *Global Food Security: Intelligence Community Assessment*. Report. September 22, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2016. [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Global_Food_Security_ICA.pdf)
- ⁷⁵ Ernst & Young. *Bridging the Gap: Ensuring Execution on Large Infrastructure Projects in Africa*. Report. EGYM. 2014
- ⁷⁶ Collier, Paul, Martina Kirchberger, and Mans Soderbom. *The Cost of Road Infrastructure in Low and Middle Inc*. Report. January 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016 http://www.soderbom.net/Roads_Jan_2015.pdf.
- ⁷⁷ Ernst & Young. *Bridging the Gap: Ensuring Execution on Large Infrastructure Projects in Africa*. Report. EGYM. 2014.
- ⁷⁸ Njenga, Peter. *Agricultural Logistics Management and Related Infrastructure*. Issue brief. Dakar: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁷⁹ *Africa Review Report on Transport: A Summary*. Report. Economic Commission for Africa Conference on Sustainable Development. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2009. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁸⁰ Gutman, Jeffrey, Amadou Sy, and Soumya Chattopadhyay. *Financing African Infrastructure: Can the World Deliver?* Report. March 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁸¹ Delevinge, Lawrence. "A \$100 Million Trucking Bet – but Not in the US." CNBC. January 27, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/27/carlyle-makes-100-million-africa-trucking-investment.html>.
- ⁸² Ernst & Young. *Bridging the Gap: Ensuring Execution on Large Infrastructure Projects in Africa*. Report. EGYM. 2014.
- ⁸³ Carter, Laurence. "Five Secrets of Success of Sub-Saharan Africa's First Road PPP." World Bank. May 29, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/five-secrets-success-sub-saharan-africa-s-first-road-ppp>.
- ⁸⁴ "About PPP." Zephyr Gold International Consulting. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁸⁵ Mhlanga, Nomathemba. *Private Sector Agribusiness Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Working Paper no. 27. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2010.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ Reardon, T., D. Tschirley, B. Minten, S. Haggblade, C.P. Timmer, and S. Liverpool-Tasie. *The Emerging 'Quiet Revolution' in African Agrifood Systems*. Issue brief. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2013.
- ⁸⁸ Delevinge, Lawrence. "A \$100 Million Trucking Bet – but Not in the US." CNBC. January 27, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/27/carlyle-makes-100-million-africa-trucking-investment.html>.
- ⁸⁹ Biau, Carole, Karim Dahou, and Toru Homma. *How to Increase Sound Private Investment*. Report. NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative, 2011. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/41775855.pdf>.
- ⁹⁰ Ernst & Young. *Bridging the Gap: Ensuring Execution on Large Infrastructure Projects in Africa*. Report. EGYM. 2014.
- ⁹¹ Biau, Carole, Karim Dahou, and Toru Homma. *How to Increase Sound Private Investment*. Report. NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative, 2011. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/41775855.pdf>.
- ⁹² "Doing Business in Africa Campaign Fact Sheet." MBDA. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://mbda.gov/main/global-business/doing-business-africa-campaign-fact-sheet>
- ⁹³ Ibid.
- ⁹⁴ Gutman, Jeffrey, Amadou Sy, and Soumya Chattopadhyay. *Financing African Infrastructure: Can the World Deliver?* Report. March 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016.
- ⁹⁵ Dollar, David. "Supply Meets Demand: Chinese Infrastructure Financing in Africa." East Asia & Pacific on the Rise. October 07, 2008. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/supply-meets-demand-chinese-infrastructure-financing-in-africa>.
- ⁹⁶ Biau, Carole, Karim Dahou, and Toru Homma. *How to Increase Sound Private Investment*. Report. NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative, 2011. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/41775855.pdf>.

⁹⁷ "Doing Business in Africa Campaign Fact Sheet." MBDA. Accessed March 24, 2016. <http://mbda.gov/main/global-business/doing-business-africa-campaign-fact-sheet>.

⁹⁸ Benoit, Philippe. *Mitigating Project Risks - World Bank Support for Government Guarantees*. Issue brief no. 79. World Bank, 1996. Accessed March 24, 2016.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-1303327122200/079benoit.pdf>.

⁹⁹ "The President's Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa Part II." The White House. April 08, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2015/04/08/president-s-advisory-council-doing-business-africa-part-ii>.

¹⁰⁰ United States. Executive Office of the President. Office of the United States Trade Representative. *Salaries and Expenses Resource Estimates Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Budget Submission February 2015*.