



Politics and Paradigm Preferences: The Implicit Ideology of International Relations Scholars¹

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Are international relations scholars objective observers of political events, or do our political preferences influence the way in which we see the world? This article explores that question using data from a survey of international relations scholars. It develops and tests hypotheses about how we might expect adherents of particular paradigms to identify themselves politically on a left-right scale based on the resonance between the content of ideology and the key propositions of different schools of thought in IR. Although they are relatively centrist, I find that realists are the most conservative and right-leaning of international relations scholars, while Liberals are more liberal and left-leaning. Although neither approach has any intrinsic ontological content, rationalism and constructivism also have a distinct ideological profile, the former being more conservative than the latter. Post-positivist epistemological commitments are associated with the political left. More importantly, there is an interaction between ontology and epistemology. Positivism plays a role in breaking the link between political values and paradigm choice. Non-positivists demonstrate the strongest connection between ideology and international relations approach. I consider the implications of these findings for the use of paradigms in international relations theorizing, arguing that they should make us more circumspect about the use of paradigms in our discipline.

Do the political beliefs of those who study international relations affect their beliefs about international relations and the way they study them? Is there an association between the values that guide us in the voting booth and the approaches we adopt in our professional lives? Are we drawn to particular paradigms and epistemologies based on our underlying political opinions? In other words, is our research orientation to some degree ideological, part of an underlying structure of attitudes? Does our prescriptive and normative sense of politics at home influence our positive and empirical understandings about politics abroad? Survey data have indicated that the domestic and foreign policy beliefs at both the mass and elite levels are indeed related (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Wittkopf 1990; Murray 1996). Is this true of international relations scholars as well?

Many in the field would not be surprised to learn that our politics are connected to our political science. Critical theorists and postmodernists reject the notion of the “subject–object distinction,” that is that international relations scholars can objectively observe and theorize about international politics independent of their values. Political orientation is likely one of those influences. These scholars typically employ post-positivist epistemologies in keeping with this belief. There is some evidence for the contention. In a remarkable book, Oren (2003) traces how the trends in political

science and international relations scholarship in the United States are informed and affected by the historical context. Positivistically inclined scholars of international relations, however, would most likely object to this accusation. Although a contentious term, all notions of positivism imply a detached and objective analysis of our phenomena of interest.

If there were such an influence, what would it be? How would political beliefs affect opinions on international relations? E. H. Carr offered a crude hypothesis long ago. In his treatise on early international relations theory, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, he wrote that the “antithesis of utopia and reality...further reproduces itself in the antithesis of radical and conservative, of Left and Right...The radical is necessarily utopian and the conservative realist” (Carr 1964:19). Carr was an early post-positivist who believed that politics and political science went hand in hand (Oren 2009). His hunch suggests that international relations paradigms, so important for the development of the field (even if often bemoaned), might be part of the explanation (Lake 2011). Our choice of approach might be at least partially a function of our political ideology.

To my knowledge, however, no one has systematically examined the effects of political ideology on international relations scholarship at the individual level, likely because of a lack of systematic data. The Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project (TRIP) survey of over 2,000 international relations scholars allows us to test for the first time the association between academics’ theoretical, epistemological, and political inclinations. It asks respondents to identify their political ideology as well as their paradigmatic and epistemological preferences (Jordan, Maliniak, Oakes, Peterson, and Tierney 2009).

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In this article, I derive hypotheses about how political ideology might be associated with one's choice of international relations paradigms. I draw on research in political psychology on the underlying motives, values, and beliefs of the left and the right and look for resonance with the core assumptions of different international relations approaches. A paradigm is an individual-level choice, even if there are social factors such as the views of one's advisors and one's peers that certainly influence that affiliation. This makes political psychology a natural source for hypotheses.

The data largely bear the expectations out. I find for instance that the competitive and greedy view of social relations offered by classical realism sounds a lot like the beliefs that underlie social dominance orientation (SDO). Structural realism's emphasis on the role played by fear and uncertainty echoes right-wing authoritarianism's (RWA) threatening view of the world. SDO and RWA are both conservative phenomena, and consistent with this, I find that realists are the most conservative and right-leaning of all the international relations scholars in the TRIP study, even if they are mostly politically moderate. International relations Liberals, with their more optimistic view of the possibility for progress through international cooperation, lean more to the left, particularly the more idealistic strand of Liberals. Intermediate positions are occupied by neoliberal institutionalists and the English School. Feminists and Marxists are the furthest to the left, as we might expect given their more overtly normative concerns. Epistemology also matters, albeit slightly. Scholars who adopt a post-positivist approach to international relations are slightly more leftist than those who do not.

This might not surprise readers. They might intuitively have guessed as much, even if the article can now definitely show these associations. But there are more surprising results as well. Even international relations approaches with no specific ontological content, such as rationalism and constructivism, have definite political leanings. Constructivists, with their focus on agency, are more left-leaning than the more utilitarian and egoistic-minded rationalists. And the variance in political ideology within those groups is actually *less* than among more traditional international relations paradigms. The differences are not enormous since almost all international relations scholars lean left, but they are enough to raise some concerns about any claims to the objective nature of our scholarship, at least for those who make such claims in the first place.

More importantly, the data suggest a cure (if one agrees there is a disease). There are significant interactions between epistemology, paradigm, and ideology. The data indicate that the political values of positivistically inclined academics are more weakly associated with their paradigmatic adherence than others. It is among those who declare themselves to be nonpositivists, neither post-positivist nor positivist, for whom the link between ideology and paradigm is the strongest.

In the following sections, I first list the reasons why we might expect an association between our politics and our views on international politics. I show how the structure of ideologies resembles that of paradigms

and how our political values might through two pathways influence our choice of paradigms. I then review the ontological content of different international relations approaches, using the sometimes remarkable overlap with conceptions in political ideology to develop hypotheses about the political inclinations we might expect in different schools of thought. The data analysis section presents the results of a statistical analysis with the TRIP data. In the conclusion, I consider the implications of the finding that our theoretical beliefs resonate with our ideological beliefs, arguing that it should make us very cautious and concerned about the role played by paradigms in international relations scholarship.

I begin with a number of caveats. First, I am not claiming that international relations scholars consciously manipulate their findings to suit their own political ends. I do not suggest that international relations debates are thinly veiled political controversies. This is not an attempt at a radical deconstruction of international relations paradigms. Rather, I am simply testing the proposition that we are at least partly and implicitly, most likely unconsciously, led by virtue of our political beliefs toward certain understandings of international politics. Second, claiming that some international relations scholars are more conservative than others by reference to such concepts like RWA and SDO is not to imply, for instance, a secret fascism among realists. RWA and SDO are nothing but scales, and moderate scores on them might simply indicate such politically unremarkable beliefs that welfare dulls the incentive for the poor to seek work or that harsh prison sentences deter crimes. The data show that international relations scholars of all stripes lean to the left of the political spectrum. I am merely looking to explain some of the variation within that limited space.

Third, it could be of course that the causal arrow is reversed, that our political ideology is a function of our beliefs about international relations. Graduate school is a powerful experience, one in which scholars define their unique views of world politics. These might drip down and affect their personal politics. Fourth, I am not making any claims about whether the paradigms we see in international relations meet the technical philosophy of science criteria for such an appellation (Jackson and Nexon 2009). We could just as easily refer to "schools of thought" or "approaches." Fifth, I recognize that the boundaries between many of the paradigms are porous and disputed and that every academic adopts something of an eclectic mix. Nevertheless, I would argue that the associations we do find make it possible to speak of certain coherence within the paradigms; otherwise, we would not be able to develop expectations about their political inclinations that are largely borne out in the data.

Objective Academic Analysis vs. Subjective Political Ideology?

Is there an association between political ideology and paradigms? There are a number of reasons to expect this is *not* the case. First, the substance of our theories

about international relations has, at least until recently, been largely divorced from the study of domestic politics. This should provide an appropriate distance between our political values and our theoretical conclusions. The three most influential books in the last third of a century, those that largely defined the approaches that structure the current discipline—Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Keohane's *After Hegemony* (1984), and Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999)—make little mention of domestic politics.² Second, more recent tendencies in the field are even more meta-theoretical. Scholars stress that rationalism and constructivism lack any core substantive assumptions about international relations (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Fearon and Wendt 2002). This should make the connection between any scholar's political values and his or her theorizing even more tenuous.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, international relations scholars have become increasingly positivistically inclined. Previous analysis of the TRIP data set speaks to this trend (Jordan et al. 2009). While positivism is not synonymous with science, as Jackson (2010) reminds us, the positivistic mindset tells us to look at data objectively, without bias, which should include our own political values and beliefs. It should provide, at the very least, a reminder to check our political beliefs at the door of our office.

Nevertheless, critical theorists, postmodernists, and post-positivists all claim that there is no such thing as value-free, objective research in international relations or in social science in general. Shapcott traces this skepticism to the Frankfurt School, which questioned theory "modeled on the physical sciences... concerned with explaining social processes from a disinterested or value-free position." Critical theory "requires a rejection of the mode of theorizing that dominates the social sciences, and international relations in particular, because it refuses the assumption or value neutrality or objectivity while remaining committed to a comprehensive research agenda" (Shapcott 2008:328). Similarly, Burke writes that postmodernists complain that positivist research "privileges facts over values, reason over subjectivity, and truth over opinion, obscuring the presence of opinion in every claim to truth, of subjectivity in every claim to reason, and value judgments in every assertion of fact" (Burke 2008:362).

International relations scholars might be particularly subject to such biases given the role that paradigms play in structuring the field. The TRIP survey tells us that 84% of IR scholars do identify with one paradigm or another.³ And paradigms do demonstrate a remarkable similarity to ideologies. Both international relations paradigms and ideologies are interrelated sets of ideas about the social world.

Converse's famous definition of ideology is "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" so as to form a "belief system" (Converse 1964:207). For instance, a desire for equality leads egalitarians toward a belief in income redistribution or nondiscrimination laws. Every definition of ideology I have found in the literature is practically identical. Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008:127) write of ideology as being an "internally *coherent* system of belief or meaning... characterized by stability, consistency, logic, and political sophistication." Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950:2) speak of an "*organization* of opinions, attitudes, and values—a way of thinking about man and society." Rokeach (1968:123–124) describes ideology as "an *organization* of beliefs and attitudes", Billig (1984:46) as "*patterns* or *gestalts* of attitudes."

The term "paradigm" figures prominently in a particular philosophy of science articulated by Thomas Kuhn (1970). Political scientists have typically favored other epistemologies with their own terminology, such as Larry Laudan's (1977) "research traditions" or Imre Lakatos (1970) "research programs." Despite their differences about what constitutes scientific progress, however, all three of these fundamentally different philosophers agree that the core assumptions of a paradigm, research program, or research tradition are bedrock, interdependent fundamentals with a logic from which more specific theories are drawn. That is, paradigms are structured like ideologies. Lakatos' "research programs" have a "hard core" (or "negative heuristic") and a "protective belt" (or "positive heuristic"). The former is a set of fundamental assumptions that cannot be questioned without undermining the integrity and viability of the research program. The latter are "additional assertions [which] must be connected...more intimately than by mere conjunction." He writes of the "remarkable continuity which welds [a series of theories] into research programmes" (Lakatos 1970:131–132). Similarly, Laudan writes that "every research tradition exhibits certain metaphysical...commitments which, as an ensemble, individuate the research and distinguish it from others." Those commitments include an "ontology which specifies, in a general way, the types of fundamental entities which exist" and "outlines the different modes by which these entities can interact" (Laudan 1977:75–76). Even Thomas Kuhn, the most skeptical of the traditional positivistic notion of science, writes of "coherent traditions of scientific research" (Kuhn 1970:10). He claims that specific theories drawn from the logic of a paradigm presuppose one or more elements of the paradigm. While I agree that international relations paradigms do not meet the more rigid criteria of Lakatos and Kuhn, as Jackson and Nexon (2009) argue, they do tend at least to have this structure.

Despite the similar structure of ideology and paradigms, we do not necessarily have any clear notion of how they are substantively linked. This makes it difficult to know what kind of political disposition to look for in which paradigms. How does what we think "ought" to be true of politics and social life in general

² These are the three most influential scholars in the discipline, according to the TRIP dataset. See Jordan et al. (2009).

³ This number might be controversial, as I include those who identify no preferred paradigm but who do explicitly embrace rationalism in other questions in the survey. If we do not include self-identified rationalists, the number of paradigmatic adherents drops to 63%, still a sizeable majority.

affect what we think “is” true about international relations? I can identify two possible pathways. First, our sense of what ought to be is often a function of our sense of what is. Our beliefs about what motivates action and explains outcomes in the political and social worlds help us understand what is possible and impossible to achieve politically. As we will see below, the values that left and right prioritize emerge somewhat naturally from prior beliefs about the overall nature of social relations. And those core beliefs might affect our domestic views *and* our international relations perspectives. International relations scholars’ embrace of a particular paradigm might reflect an acceptance of certain assumptions about the way the world works that also has a natural effect on their political preferences. For instance, if one believes that power drives all outcomes in politics, he or she will have a more skeptical view of the possibilities for peaceful political change and might embrace a conservative view of the world in which hierarchy is accepted not as a social good but as an inevitable reality. Such logic is often attributed to political realists who embrace amoral or immoral foreign policies as necessary evils rather than intrinsically satisfying ends.

Second, reversing the causal arrow, our values might directly affect our beliefs about the nature of the world, both in politics and in international relations theory. Our sense of what should be sometimes influences our beliefs about what is. This is the more pernicious notion of ideology as a set of blinders. Someone deeply committed to political liberty is unlikely to accept the notion that the security needs of the state necessitate control over personal autonomy to protect society. They might be led to adopt a less threatening view of the world consistent with their value commitments. This might be true of academics as well. However, such a process might be more benign. Our values might simply create an interest in studying particular topics and predispose us toward the adoption of paradigms that give us better traction on those questions. Those who want to promote international cooperation for instance are less likely to be realists than Liberals.

The Ontology of Ideologies and Paradigms

Given the common structure of ideologies and paradigms and the likely relationship between values and beliefs, we can develop expectations about the associations we might expect between particular international relations paradigms and political ideological identification along a seven-point left-right scale. I acknowledge that such a unidimensional scale might not do justice to the varieties of ideological division, but the data limit us to this measure. Below I review the logic of a number of different international relations paradigms and note parallels with studies in political psychology about the structure of political attitudes so as to derive some specific hypotheses about how paradigms might be political. I pair up a number of different approaches and place them in different categories—the overtly political Marxism and feminism, the core international relations debate between realists and lib-

erals, the hybrids of the English School and neoliberal institutionalism, and the meta-approaches of constructivism and rationalism. These are the approaches either directly measured or inferable from other questions in the TRIP data set.

The null hypothesis, against which others are formulated, is that:

Hypothesis 1: *Political beliefs show no meaningful association with paradigm choice.*

Overly Political Paradigms: Feminism and Marxism

It is easier to develop hypotheses about the likely ideology of feminist IR scholars than other categories, as they are more explicitly normative and political in their scholarship. As Tickner writes, feminism “has its roots in social movements directed at transforming the unequal power relationships between women and men. Therefore, a key goal for feminist theory is to understand how the existing social order, one many feminists believe is marked by discrimination and oppression, came into being and how this knowledge can be used to work toward its transformation. Claiming that knowledge emerges from political practice, many feminists do not believe in, nor see the need for, the separation between theory and practice” (Tickner 2002:276). Feminists are likely to be very liberal/left-leaning, given their egalitarian commitments. True writes that “it is ethical commitments to inclusivity and self-reflexivity, and attentiveness to relational power, that distinguish most feminist perspectives on international relations” (True 2008:409).

Marxist international theory has not been as self-consciously normative as feminism, likely given its historical origins in Marx’s claim that dialectical materialism uncovers scientific laws of social and economic relations between the classes. However, it is of course strongly associated with a political movement, one that seeks to represent the interests of perhaps the most fundamental of leftist constituencies—the working class. Like feminists, Marxists are likely more left-leaning than most other international relations scholars. Like realists, both Marxists and feminists depict an international environment marked by power and domination. However, feminists and Marxists are committed to bringing about a change to those systems. The hypothesis follows:

Hypothesis 2: *Marxists and feminists will be the most pronouncedly left-leaning of IR academics.*

The Core Divide: Realists vs. Liberals

As Carr wrote, we might expect realists to be more conservative than “utopians,” generally used as a term of derision for international relations Liberals. Although there are others, realism is associated with two primary motives, greed and fear. Both motivations are responsible for realism’s generally conflictual and pessimistic understanding of the nature of world poli-

tics. This is true in both structural and classical realism. Recent work has stressed that the differences between the two are generally overstated (Donnelly 2000; Parent and Baron 2011).

Man's egoistic human nature is a consistent theme in realism.⁴ The focus on gain and greed is one reason why morality cannot be expected to play a role in relations among states as all moralities seek to constrain self-interest for the benefit of some larger community. If all are egoistic, then morality is of no consequence.⁵ Assumptions of greed lead to a particular characterization of international politics as marked by competition. If men are insatiable, then these claims must make valuable resources scarce.⁶ Power, of course, becomes the most important currency in international politics both to take from others and to prevent the inevitable effort by others to steal.

There is a remarkable overlap between the core motivations of human and state behavior in classical realism and conceptualizations of social dominance orientation (SDO) in the political psychological literature. SDO is characterized as a "general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal versus hierarchical" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994). Social dominators perceive fewer ethical constraints on their behavior than others. Consequently, they feel less of an altruistic obligation to, and less empathy with, others (Altemeyer 1998; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002). Subsequent theorizing has situated the orientation in a larger complex of values, using correlations with items on Salom Schwartz's very influential value scale designed to capture the entire panoply of human motivations (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987). SDO seems to be the expression of what Schwartz calls "self-enhancement" as opposed to "self-transcendence." This egoism resonates with the greedy classic realist worldview.

Are social dominators intrinsically selfish, or are they driven to it by their beliefs? There is much evidence for the latter. They consciously embrace a worldview in which dishonesty and manipulation are seen unapologetically as tools that individuals simply must use to get ahead in a competitive, dog-eat-dog world (Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, and Birum 2002; Duckitt 2006; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci 2007; Federico, Ergun, Hunt, and Weber 2010). In his pioneering work on SDO, John Duckitt (2001, 2006) finds that SDO is strongly predicted by

beliefs that the world is a competitive jungle, in which, to borrow elements from survey items, life is "governed by the 'survival of the fittest,'" "it's necessary to be cold blooded and vengeful," and "you know that most people are out to 'screw you, so you have to get them first when you get the chance.'" These are very similar to classical realism's admonitions. Not surprisingly, those who score high on SDO identify themselves as conservatives or with rightist parties. It is one, but not the only kind, of conservatism (Altemeyer 1998; Pratto, Stallworth, and Conway-Lanz 1998; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2003; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez 2004). Given the resonance between classical realist views and SDO, it is reasonable to expect the former to be more politically conservative than other academics. Indeed, social dominators score high on a Machiavellianism scale derived from agreement with core realist principles (Hunter, Gerbing, and Boster 1982; Wilson, Near, and Miller 1996; Dahling, Whitaker, and Levy 2009).

Fear is the second motivating force in realist thinking and plays a vital role in structural realist theorizing. The structural revolution in realist theory aimed at generating a theory that accounted for the role of power and the conflictual nature of world politics independent of motivational assumptions about human behavior (Waltz 1979). However, as many have pointed out, there is nothing inherent in the logic of anarchy that generates what Glaser calls neorealism's "competition bias" absent the implicit introduction of a different psychological motivation—fear (Glaser 1994; Donnelly 2000:3, 53–54, 61; Rathbun 2007). Only if actors react to anarchy in a particular way, by assuming the worst about others' intentions, do the dynamics that Waltz predicts ensue (Booth and Wheeler 2008:22–23; Tang 2008). Brooks (1997) calls this a "possibilistic" logic.

When we review the political psychological literature on political ideology, we again find a striking similarity between the core tenets of a variant of realism and a particular manifestation of conservatism—not SDO but RWA. After going into disrepute and disuse, studies of RWA have experienced a renaissance in recent decades based on careful reformulations. Right-wing authoritarians are driven by a desire for security and stability (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Fisher 2003). They are particularly attuned to threats. Adherence to traditional moral values and deference to authorities to coerce and punish violators of social norms are necessary checks on individual freedom to protect society from those that would do others harm (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Altemeyer 1998; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, and Kielman 2005; Janoff-Bulman et al. 2007; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Federico et al. 2010). As Altemeyer (1998:52) pithily puts it: "First, High RWAs are scared." Jost and his colleagues call this the "existential motive" of conservatives (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, and Ostafin 2007). Janoff-Bulman (2009b) writes how conservatives are driven not to "provide" but to "protect."

As was the case with social dominance, the adoption of RWA attitudes is a function of a fundamental

⁴ Thucydides identifies "appetite" as a core state motive in international politics (Lebow 2008). Machiavelli characterizes human nature as "insatiable" and "eager for gain" (quoted in Donnelly 2000:25). Niebuhr stresses the "natural egoistic impulse with which all life is endowed" (Niebuhr 1934:138). The "ultimate sources of social conflicts and injustice are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of men," he writes (1932:23).

⁵ As Machiavelli writes, it must "be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers" (quoted in Donnelly 2000:9). They are "ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers" (quoted in Donnelly 2000:25). Morgenthau writes of the "tragic presence of evil in all political action" (1946:203) and how "universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states" (1954:9).

⁶ Hobbes writes that competition "maketh man invade for Gain" (quoted in Donnelly 2000:14). Even if all states might not be selfish, if enough are, all are forced to behave similarly.

belief—the presumption of a dangerous world. The link between RWA and structural realism is clear. As Donnelly (2000) points out, the latter's logic is generated by a belief that there are a certain number of predatory states out in the international environment that necessitate all others to be highly cautious. Right-wing authoritarians identify themselves as conservatives and with parties of the right (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Peterson, Doty, and Winter 1993; Altemeyer 1998; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2003), suggesting a second reason why realists might be the most conservative of IR scholars.⁷

Liberalism, of the IR variety, generally forms the bookend to realism in courses on international relations and in historical inventories of international relations scholarship. However, its core assumptions are more difficult to articulate (Zacher and Matthew 1995; Rathbun 2010). Liberalism is generally held together by its skepticism about realism. It is a set of theories and arguments that expect increasing or potentially greater cooperation and progress in international affairs, generally defined in terms of increased peace and prosperity. Robert Keohane writes that liberalism “rests on a belief in at least the possibility of cumulative progress in human affairs” and adopts an “ameliorative view of progress in international affairs” (Keohane 1989:10). This gives us reason to expect that Liberals will be less conservative than realists, although probably not as left-leaning as Marxists or feminists. I use Liberal with a capital “L” to describe this group, reserving the lower case “l” to indicate those on the political left.

The Liberal focus on progress and the accompanying belief that modernization generally leads to more peace and prosperity suggests a more optimistic belief in social progress that stands in contrast to a conservative focus on the need for social stability to protect from threats (Doyle 1997). In terms of real world politics, this perspective is evident in liberal/leftist advocacy of civil and political liberties and freedom of personal expression that runs counter to the conservative emphasis on conformity, submission to authority, and moral conventionalism that are necessary to ensure social solidarity in the face of danger (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2003). Humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism have been a central focus of investigation in Liberal international relations theory (Lumsdaine 1993), suggesting that International Liberals will score high on self-transcendence values such as benevolence and universalism as well, as domestic liberals do.⁸ Political liberals are less nationalistic and more cosmopolitan, as nationalism is largely a solidaristic group

response to a perception of outside threat, which conservatives, particularly RWAs, feel more acutely (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Duckitt et al. 2002; Feldman 2003; Duckitt 2006; Stenner 2009b).

Therefore we should expect that:

Hypothesis 3: *Realists will be more politically conservative and right-leaning than Liberals.*

The Moderates: Neoliberal Institutionalism and the English School

Neoliberal institutionalism occupies a middle ground between realism and Liberalism. Robert Keohane (1984) ushered in a revolution in international relations theorizing by showing that cooperation can be egoistically rational and sustainable even under conditions of anarchy. Keohane (1989) writes that neoliberal institutionalism's connection to liberalism was in its embrace of the “*potentially* progressive” nature of world politics, which should mean its adherents will be more left-leaning in terms of their domestic political preferences. Keohane reaches his conclusion by eschewing the “possibilistic” logic in structural realist thinking (Brooks 1997). The realist counterargument, that relative gains obstruct attempts at international cooperation, is based on the premise that states must fear that any imbalance of gains from cooperation might be used against them (Grieco 1988). And, as argued above, fear and threat are central elements of conservative thinking. Since neoliberal institutionalists jettison them to reach their more optimistic conclusions regarding international politics (Rathbun 2007), this suggests they will be more left-leaning than realists. However, it should be remembered that neoliberal institutionalism never relinquishes the realist assumption that states are unitary and egoistic actors. The argument is strictly utilitarian. Moral considerations are largely absent until Keohane relaxes some of his assumptions in a later chapter that generally receives little attention. This lack of self-transcendence, characteristic of conservatives, should moderate the left-leaning tendencies of neoliberal institutionalists.

The English School offers a similarly moderate view. Its most influential theorist, Hedley Bull (1977), offered one of the first sustained and coherent critiques of realism.⁹ Its practitioners, sometimes called British Realists, point to elements in the practice of international relations that tame an international system otherwise dominated by Hobbesian fear so as to create an “anarchical society” (Bull 1977). Sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, trade, and international organizations all create an order in international relations. British Realists identify with the Grotian tradition in the historiography of international relations scholarship, which points to the possibility of progress in world politics. Yet the English School is by no means revolutionary (Linklater and Suganami 2006). Its adherents are realists after all, even as they are British. The Grotian tradition stresses

⁷ It should be noted, however, that realists, while likely more conservative, are probably not extremely conservative. Realists are often the voices of caution against hawkish, nationalistic, and jingoistic voices in their societies. Realism is about careful prudence, mixing diplomatic and military means, not saber-rattling and righteous superiority.

⁸ This is similar to the morality of caring for others, which is found to be of the two core moral models embraced by liberals (Graham et al. 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009). Domestic liberals have an “approach” orientation to provide for others, which explains their support for state programs to help the most disadvantaged (Janoff-Bulman et al. 2007).

⁹ Bull is identified by those who identify in the TRIP survey as English Schoolers more frequently as an influence than any other.

incremental change, a kind of Whiggish international relations.¹⁰ It occupies an ideological place between the more optimistic Kantian idealists and the realists.

On the basis of their cautious optimism, we expect:

Hypothesis 4: *Neoliberal institutionalists and adherents of the English School will locate themselves politically between realists and Liberals.*

Meta-approaches to International Relations: Constructivism and Rationalism

Unlike realism and Liberals, which make explicit substantive statements about what international politics are like, constructivism and rationalism are often said to be meta-approaches rather than paradigms, lacking any firm ontological commitments about international relations (Katzenstein et al. 1998; Fearon and Wendt 2002).¹¹ Indeed, rationalists and constructivists both stress that the nature of international politics can vary substantially from one place or time to the next (Lake and Powell 1999; Wendt 1999). If this is the case, we should observe less political heterogeneity among those who identify with these approaches than others.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that constructivists and rationalists might make certain ontological assumptions that resonate with key elements of political ideology, predisposing them toward one side of the political spectrum or another. As Fearon and Wendt admit, even if there is “no inherent need to commit to an ontology to work in these traditions,” many “may in fact have strong ontological commitments” (Fearon and Wendt 2002:53). It is plausible that the utilitarian foundations of rationalism disposes its practitioners toward an egoistic understanding of politics that would orient them toward conservative politics, at least in comparison with many other IR academics. The assumption of rational egoism suggests a lack of self-transcendence and universalism, which indicates a more conservative worldview. Rationalism is essentially applied microeconomics, and surveys have shown that economists are more conservative than political scientists as a whole as measured by their partisan identification (Klein and Stern 2006; Gross and Simmons unpub. data).

For constructivists, the most obvious substantive commitment is the socially constructed nature of political life. This suggests the important role of agency. The ability of human actors to reflect on their environment and effect change led Keohane (1988) to call this school of thought “reflectivist” initially. In Wendt’s (1992) famous phrase, “anarchy is what states

make of it.” While constructivists stress the co-constitution of agents and structures and point to how the latter can become reified so that stasis rather than change becomes the norm, there is nevertheless more potential for agency in this approach than in more structurally minded paradigms like realism.

A core belief in agency might resonate with the left-leaning embrace of change. Jost et al. find that the right also has an “epistemic motive,” a motivation to avoid uncertainty because they find it more threatening (Jost et al. 2007:990). Webster and Kruglanski (1994; and Kruglanski and Webster 1996) have found that individuals vary in their need for “cognitive closure.” Some individuals are marked more than others by a desire for predictability that prevents them from entering into new and unknown situations. This varies with political ideology. Those on the right are relatively less open to experience, less likely to seek out novel stimuli in both their personal lives and in politics (Wilson 1973; Webster and Kruglanski 1994; Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt 2001; Jost et al. 2003; Janoff-Bulman 2009a,b). This makes conservatives resistant to change and reliant on conformity and tradition to provide a structured and stable world, what Stenner (2009a,b) calls “status quo conservatism.” The left values self-direction and stimulation.¹² This suggests that constructivists will be more liberal/left-leaning than rationalists.

Constructivists, however, might lean to the left politically not because of an embrace of agency but because they are generally Liberal in their international relations approach. Much constructivist work has been identified as Liberal by virtue of the progressive nature of its objects of study. Constructivists emphasize the possibility for moral norms to redefine state interests in more cosmopolitan ways.¹³ As Kaufmann and Pape (1999) argue, this work is generally cosmopolitan in nature and consistent with liberal (and Liberal) ideas about human beings having equal worth and having moral obligations to others due to their membership in the community of mankind. Therefore, it becomes important to separate out Liberal constructivists from nonliberal Constructivists. We can think of the marriage of constructivism and Liberalism as defining the Idealist approach to international relations. This suggests a number of different hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: *Rationalists will be more conservative and right-leaning than constructivists.*

¹⁰ I do recognize that a cleavage has, in recent years, opened between “pluralists” identified with Bull and “solidarists” who embrace a more idealistic and individualistic position seeing more of a potential for radical change.

¹¹ Fearon and Wendt (2002:52) write that they are “most fruitfully viewed...as analytical tools, rather than as metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions of the world.” They resist the “ontological and empirical interpretations” of the two approaches as “sets of assumptions about what social life is made of and what kinds of relationships exist among these elements” or “disagreement about substantive issues in the world like how often actors follow a logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness” (53).

¹² Resistance to change, what Stenner (2009a,b) calls “status quo” conservatism to differentiate it from others, does not necessarily correspond one to one with other kinds of conservatism. For instance, economic conservatives are frequently radical in their pursuit of reforming or demolishing elements of the welfare state. Conventionalism and the need for closure are, however, consistently associated with support for a “social conservative” program of traditional morality, social conformity, and strong law-and-order policies (Altemeyer 1988, 1998; Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Sibley 2009).

¹³ This need not necessarily be the case, as Barkin (2003) and Jackson and Nexon (2009) point out, but it generally is. Examples include the nuclear weapons taboo, the transnational campaigns to end apartheid and slavery, or the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1999; Tannenwald 1999).

Hypothesis 6: *As they are meta-approaches without core substantive content, rationalists and constructivists will demonstrate more political heterogeneity than other approaches.*

Hypothesis 7: *Idealism, the marriage of the Liberal paradigm and a constructivist approach, is likely to be located at the left end of the political spectrum.*

Epistemology: Positivists and Relativists

A number of approaches are marked by their post-positivist inclinations, but those epistemologies are intimately related to normative ontological concerns generally associated with the left. “Objective” theory serves to preserve and justify an unjust status quo. Shapcott notes how “critical international relations theory is committed to the cosmopolitan project of achieving higher levels of inclusion in moral and political life for everyone on the planet” (Shapcott 2008:328). He writes of theory “with emancipatory interest” (Shapcott 2008:330). His condemnation of neorealism demonstrates perfectly the post-positivist blend of epistemological skepticism and normative concern: “From the perspective of critical theory, however, humans are unemancipated so long as war and the reproduction of the international realm are seen as beyond human control and as subject to nature-like immutable laws. A critical theoretical approach to the study of war would investigate whether neorealism, and the war itself, are instead ideologies exhibiting the bias of problem-solving theories in favor of the status quo” (Shapcott 2008:332). Postmodernists demonstrate the same inclinations (Burke 2008). As part of being on the left is the pursuit of change on behalf of the weak and disenfranchised, we can hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 8: *Positivists will be more conservative and right-leaning than post-positivists.*

We must also consider the link between epistemology and ontology. It might be that positivism serves to break the link between personal political beliefs and paradigm preference. While post-positivists expect that everyone’s values and beliefs affect their scholarship as there is no such thing as objectively produced knowledge, it could be instead that:

Hypothesis 9: *Any association between political ideology and choice of paradigms is lessened by commitment to positivist epistemology.*

Data and Measurement

The 2009 TRIP data set is a cross-national survey of faculty in ten countries—Australia, Canada, Ireland, Israel, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was designed and administered by scholars at the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William and Mary. The survey organizers compiled comprehensive lists of all faculty

doing research in international relations or teaching courses on international relations or other topics that involved interactions across borders in all ten countries. They were then solicited via email to participate in an online survey. A total of 2,724 scholars responded, with a response rate of 46.4% (Jordan et al. 2009). It is difficult to know of course if this is a representative sample, but it is difficult to conceive of factors that would systematically bias the results of the question at hand.

The TRIP survey asks respondents: “Which of the following best describes your approach to the study of IR?” It allows the responses of Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, English School, Feminism, Marxism, as well as “Other,” and “I do not use paradigmatic analysis.” Ideology is measured by self-placement on a seven-point scale. In the United States and Canada, respondents were asked to identify their position on a scale from very liberal to very conservative. In other countries, they were asked to place themselves on a scale from very left to very right. Intermediate categories are liberal/left, slightly liberal/left, middle of the road, slightly conservative/right and conservative/right. Finally, the survey asks respondents to describe their epistemology as post-positivist, positivist, or nonpositivist.

The categories of neoliberal institutionalist, rationalist, and idealist are not offered as possibilities in the question on paradigms. However, I construct them through combinations with other variables. Another question asks, “Much recent IR scholarship adopts either a ‘rationalist’ or a ‘constructivist’ approach to IR. Which of the following most closely characterizes your work?” I classify respondents who identified as having a Liberal paradigmatic affiliation and who also described themselves as rationalist or mostly rationalist as Neoliberal Institutionalists. I composed a category of Rationalists who described their work as nonparadigmatic or as “other” but who identified their work as rationalist or mostly rationalist. This is likely a noisy variable so I tested the construct validity of the measure by looking for associations between these new categories and the scholars that members of the new categories listed as being the four most influential on their work. Over 15% of my rationalists listed Bueno de Mesquita and/or Fearon on their lists, the highest percentage of any of the categories. Only 2% of nonrationalists did. Almost exactly 16% of neoliberal institutionalists listed Keohane as a core influence, the highest percentage of any of the categories. Only 3% of those in all other categories did. This gives me confidence in my measure, especially considering that these are high numbers considering the amount of missing data for those questions in the survey.¹⁴ Finally, I also identified an Idealist category by combining those who described themselves as Liberal by paradigm and constructivist or mostly constructivist by approach. The remaining respondents are described as mainstream Liberals who claim to be neither or equally constructivist and rationalist.

¹⁴ The data are very dispersed across core influences and marked by lots of non-responses, with relatively small percentages of the total sample listing even the top three scholars—Keohane (8%), Wendt (7%), and Waltz (6%).

Data Analysis

The first column of Table 1 shows the mean political ideology score for adherents of all the paradigms, along with confidence intervals and the *N*. The second, third, and fourth columns break down the sample by epistemological orientation. Figure 1 shows the distribution of ideological scores, collapsed into three categories. International relations scholars are quite liberal/left-leaning without a large degree of variation. The sample has a mean of 2.71 and a standard deviation of 1.31. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed declare themselves to be liberal/left-leaning in some form, with only 16% moderate and 11% conservative. Yet there are differences by paradigm. A one-way analysis of variance produces an F-score of 30.25, which allows us to decisively reject the null hypothesis that all the paradigms have the same ideological mean at the $p < .0001$ level.

Realists are by far the most conservative/right-leaning group in the sample, although their average of 3.49 is halfway between middle of the road and slightly liberal/left. Figure 1 shows that 50% of realists are liberal/left-leaning to some degree, 26% are middle of the road, and 24% are conservative/right-leaning to some degree. Readers might wonder how the particular subtypes of realism are associated with political ideology. There is no category for classical or structural realism. However, I separated out three groups. Respondents who listed Morgenthau as one of their four greatest influences might be considered classical realists. Although there are only 25, they have a political ideology score of 4.32, considerably more conservative/right-leaning than realists as a whole. The 47 who were influenced by Waltz, the father of “defensive” realism, score a 3.68. Finally, 27 acolytes of Mearsheimer, the most prominent “offensive” realist thinker, have a political

TABLE 1. Political Ideology and International Relations Paradigms

	<i>Mean Political Ideology Score</i>				<i>Standard Deviation (for all in category)</i>
	<i>All</i>	<i>Positivist</i>	<i>Nonpositivist</i>	<i>Post-positivist</i>	
Realism	3.49 (3.34, 3.63) 384	3.49 (3.33, 3.66) 277	3.70 (3.44, 4.29) 53	3.29 (2.75, 3.82) 21	1.43
Liberalism (all)	2.57 (2.45, 2.68) 357	2.66 (2.43, 2.80) 266	2.48 (2.16, 2.80) 46	2.30 (1.90, 2.70) 31	1.12
Neoliberal institutionalist	2.68 (2.53, 2.84) 215	2.70 (2.54, 2.87) 188	3.0 (2.22, 3.78) 13	2.33 (1.18, 3.49) 9	1.17
Idealist	2.05 (1.79, 2.31) 39	2.33 (1.84, 2.83) 15	2.0 (1.61, 2.39) 14	2.2 (1.65, 2.76) 5	.80
Mainstream	2.51 (2.31, 2.71) 103	2.62 (2.35, 2.89) 63	2.47 (1.96, 2.99) 19	2.29 (1.79, 2.80) 17	1.03
English School	2.91 (2.66, 3.15) 90	3.12 (2.68, 3.58) 31	3.05 (2.70, 3.40) 40	2.31 (1.74, 2.89) 16	1.17
Constructivism	2.46 (2.34, 2.58) 361	2.61 (2.40, 2.84) 126	2.34 (2.11, 2.58) 90	2.41 (2.22, 2.60) 130	1.17
Rationalist	2.79 (2.64, 2.93) 244	2.84 (2.69, 3.00) 203	2.56 (1.92, 3.21) 16	2.44 (1.82, 3.06) 18	1.16
Feminism	1.71 (1.43, 1.98) 45	2.14 (.78, 3.50) 7	1.60 (.92, 2.28) 5	1.73 (1.38, 2.03) 27	1.71
Marxism	1.61 (1.38, 1.86) 94	2.25 (1.12, 3.31) 16	1.36 (1.18, 1.54) 47	1.68 (1.21, 2.15) 28	1.62
Other	2.39 (2.21, 2.58) 169	2.61 (2.23, 3.0) 49	2.29 (1.87, 2.71) 38	2.28 (2.02, 2.54) 71	1.22
No paradigm	2.73 (2.59, 2.86) 344	2.76 (2.52, 3.01) 121	2.71 (2.46, 2.96) 103	2.44 (2.16, 2.73) 61	1.27
Entire sample	2.71 (2.66, 2.76) 2174	2.91 (3.84, 2.99) 1133	2.46 (2.46, 2.71) 455	2.33 (2.22, 2.44) 417	1.31

Mean ideology, followed by 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, followed by *N*. Political ideology measured on a 7-point scale from liberal to conservative.




FIG 1. Distribution of Liberals (Left), Moderates, and Conservatives (Right) by Paradigm

ideology of 4.0, exactly in the middle of the political spectrum.

Liberals have a mean ideology score of 2.57. The difference with realists is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$), confirming Hypothesis 3. If we breakdown the Liberals, neoliberal institutionalists are more conservative/right-leaning than mainstream Liberals and more liberal/left-leaning than realists, but the former comparison does not reach statistical significance ($p = .24$) whereas the latter does ($p < .001$). The English School is located somewhere between Liberals and realists. The difference between British realists and these approaches are highly statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 receives partial support. And Idealists are the most liberal/left-leaning of the different Liberal subcategories. Whereas mainstream Liberals have a mean political ideological score of 2.57, Idealists score a 2.05, significant at the $p < .05$ level. Hypothesis 7 is supported.

Rationalists are more conservative/right-leaning than constructivists. The choice of a more meta-oriented approach does seem to still have political correlates, in keeping with Hypothesis 5. Also, a test of the equality of the standard deviations reveals that the meta-approaches of rationalism or constructivism actually have a *lower* variance in political ideology ($p = .004$) compared to those with more substantive content (while excluding those who answered that they did not identify with any paradigm at all) rather than less. They have less political heterogeneity. Hypothesis 6 is not supported. Rationalists, along with their neoliberal institutionalist cousins and those with no paradigmatic affiliation, have an ideological distribution that is most similar to the sample as a whole.

Feminists and Marxists are the most liberal/left-leaning in the survey, with Marxists being a tad more extreme than feminists, although the difference is not statistically significant. A whopping 96% of Marxists and feminists are on the left of the spectrum, 58% of them extremely so. Even the difference between Marxists and feminists on the one hand and Liberals and constructivists on the other is statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 is supported.

Table 1 also shows the breakdown by three categories of epistemological inclination—positivist, nonposi-

tivists, and post-positivist. Two things stand out. First, ANOVA tests on all of the subsamples continue to indicate that there is an association between political beliefs and paradigmatic affiliation. For all three subgroups, we can reject the null hypothesis that adherents to the different paradigms have the same mean political ideology. Second, those who identify with post-positivism generally have a more liberal/left-leaning political ideology than positivists while controlling for paradigm. This is consistent with Hypothesis 8 that post-positivists are more liberal/left-leaning, as epistemology acts as a kind of proxy for approaches that seek normative change in world politics by breaking down claims to objective knowledge that preserve the status quo. Second, there is greater political heterogeneity between paradigms in the non-positivist categories.

Table 2 presents the results of an OLS regression with dummy variables for all of the paradigms, as well as positivism, so as to gauge the main association of ideology with epistemology as well as the effect of particular paradigms on political values once epistemology is controlled for. It could be that the greater leftist inclination of Marxists, feminists, or constructivists in particular is simply a function of their greater embrace of post-positivistic epistemology, for instance. I use ideology as the dependent variable but only for convenience. As stated above, I cannot assess the causal relationship, but an OLS regression proves easier to interpret than a multinomial logit model with 10 dependent variables. I did, however, run such a model. It yielded identical results, as did a logistic regression with ideology as an ordinal scaled dependent variable rather than a continuous one. “No paradigm” is the excluded category in the regression, allowing a comparison between each approach and those who decline a paradigmatic association.

The greater conservative/rightist orientation of realists and the greater liberal/leftist orientation of Liberals, constructivists, feminists, and Marxists might simply be an artifact of what they study. Perhaps the fearful nature of conservatism draws conservative scholars to international security, which is dominated by realists. Or perhaps realists, who predominantly study security, tend to adopt a conservative view of the

TABLE 2. Association of Paradigm, Epistemology and Research Focus with Ideology

	<i>All Respondents</i>		<i>By Epistemology</i>			<i>By Country</i>	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Positivists</i>	<i>Nonpositivists</i>	<i>Post-positivists</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>
Realism	.70 (.10)***	.73 (.11)***	.62 (.15)***	1.16 (.25)***	.88 (.30)**	.82 (.14)***	.52 (.31) [#]
Liberalism (mainstream)	-.24 (.12)*	-.19 (.13)	-.21 (.18)	-.26 (.28)	-.07 (.27)	-.29 (.15)*	.88 (.31)**
Idealism	-.61 (.15)***	-.46 (.16)**	-.10 (.15)	-.73 (.22)***	-.26 (.26)	-.40 (.19)*	-.67 (.19)***
Neoliberal institutionalism	-.07 (.11)	-.06 (.12)	-.10 (.15)	.31 (.38)	-.19 (.51)	.06 (.15)	.17 (.26)
English School	.13 (.14)	.22 (.15)	.29 (.26)	.33 (.21)	-.17 (.31)	.28 (.26)	.44 (.19)*
Constructivism	-.28 (.09)*	-.19 (.10)*	-.19 (.17)	-.42 (.17)*	-.003 (.18)	-.19 (.14)	-.27 (.19)
Rationalism	-.01 (.10)	.002 (.11)	.003 (.15)	-.21 (.32)	.05 (.35)	.01 (.14)	-.17 (.28)
Marxism	-1.17 (.14)***	-1.10 (.15)***	-.67 (.50)	-1.34 (.16)***	-.80 (.31)*	-1.00 (.28)***	-1.19 (.24)***
Feminism	-.76 (.16)***	-.54 (.18)**	-.35 (.51)	-.69 (.38) [#]	-.54 (.24)*	-.53 (.30) [#]	-.59 (.25)*
Other	-.36 (.11)**	-.26 (.12)*	-.15 (.21)	-.44 (.23)	-.15 (.21)	-.14 (.18)	-.38 (.22) [#]
Gender (male)	.38 (.06)***	.38 (.06)***	.42 (.09)***	.37 (.11)***	.28 (.13)*	.34 (.08)***	.28 (.13)*
Associate professor	-.10 (.08)	-.13 (.08)	-.11 (.11)	-.15 (.17)	-.22 (.19)	-.05 (.10)	-.46 (.23)*
Full professor	-.13 (.07) [#]	-.13 (.07) [#]	-.06 (.10)	-.16 (.15)	-.32 (.15)*	-.12 (.10)	-.18 (.17)
Non-tenure track	.18 (.08)*	.18 (.08)*	.24 (.12)*	.41 (.17)*	-.12 (.21)	.14 (.12)	-.06 (.15)
Positivism		.06 (.08)				.12 (.11)	.16 (.17)
Post-positivism		-.18 (.08)*				-.13 (.11)	-.10 (.16)
IPE	.02 (.08)	.01 (.09)	.09 (.11)	-.04 (.16)	-.12 (.21)	.02 (.11)	.07 (.16)
Security	.01 (.003)**	.01 (.003)**	.01 (.004)**	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.28 (.10)**	.34 (.22)
IO	-.10 (.11)	-.09 (.13)	-.07 (.15)	.10 (.24)	-.20 (.23)	.01 (.13)	-.47 (.30)
Constant	2.46	2.43	2.42	2.43	2.41	2.27	2.73
<i>N</i>	2018	1879	1064	424	391	1216	307
<i>R</i> ²	.15	.16	.11	.28	.11	.16	.26

Table entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [#] $p < .10$. Paradigms, rank, gender, positivism, and research focus are all dummy variables. "No paradigm", "non-positivism," and assistant professor rank are the excluded categories.

world as they spend so much time examining its conflicts. The opposite might be true of Liberals or constructivists given their interest in cooperation and international organizations. If this were the case, we might expect that when controlling for subject of study, paradigm and ideology would no longer be correlated or the relationship might be weakened. I include variables for three of the areas of research focus identified by survey respondents—international political economy (IPE), security, and international organizations (IO). The excluded category is all other areas of study. I also include gender and a number of dummy variables for academic rank as proxies for age, which was not part of the TRIP database available to the author so as to protect the anonymity of the respondents. The excluded category is assistant professor, with the other categories being associate, full, and nontenure track (NTT).

Model 1 shows results identical to the analysis of variance.¹⁵ Since the paradigms and epistemologies are dummy variables, the coefficients represent the change in ideology on a 7-point scale associated with allegiance to a particular paradigm as compared to someone with no loyalty at all. In Model 2, post-positivism is associated with greater liberalism/leftist orientation as against nonpositivism as expected in Hypothesis 9, and its inclusion does change the coefficients of a number of dummy variables from Model 1 to Model 2. IR Liberals, Idealists, feminists, and constructivists are less liberal/left-leaning in comparison with those who answered "no paradigm" when episte-

mology is taken into account. Yet the coefficients of these dummies are still statistically significant. However, there is no significant difference politically between positivists and nonpositivists. The model accounts for 16% of the variance in political ideology.

Turning to the controls, full professors are more liberal/left-leaning than assistant professors, and men are more conservative/right-leaning than women. It appears that those who study international security are more conservative than those who do not, but there is no effect for international organization or international political economy.

The third, fourth, and fifth columns present results of an OLS regression broken down by epistemology. The association between paradigms and ideology is much stronger among nonpositivists than positivists. Among the latter, only realists can be distinguished statistically from those with no paradigmatic adherence. But idealists, constructivists, and Marxists are all distinct ideologically from nonadherents among nonpositivists. The fit of the model is highest for nonpositivists by a significant margin, an R^2 of 0.28 as opposed to only 0.11 for positivists and post-positivists, indicating that paradigm choice and political ideology are much more strongly related for the former. The size of the coefficients increases when we compare the positivist to the nonpositivist samples, although in different directions. Realists, neoliberal institutionalists, and the English School move to the right. Idealists, Liberals, Constructivists, Marxists, and Feminists move to the left.

The low fit for post-positivists might strike us as surprising, as they are typically the most overtly and unapologetically political of academics. However, this

¹⁵ Out of concern about the non-normal distribution of the data on the dependent variable, I also collapsed some of the categories so as to make for a more normal distribution. The results were unchanged for all the independent variables.

becomes more understandable once we realize that there are very few respondents in many of the categories (rationalist and Liberal post-positivists are rare, for instance). And since post-positivism is itself associated with a move to the left of the spectrum, there is likely little effect left over for paradigmatic affiliation as the ideological variance is already truncated among this subsample.

It does appear from this data that a commitment to positivism lessens the association between political values and paradigmatic choice. Positivists do appear to practice a more detached and value-free approach to scholarship. It appears that the main effect of epistemology on nonpositivists (as compared to positivists) is to strengthen the association between political ideology and paradigm, not to make nonpositivists more liberal/left-leaning as a whole. It is not terribly clear what the label of nonpositivists category is capturing, but a likely possibility is that it is the choice of those who both dislike positivism and post-positivism. This means that they do not embrace a more activist approach to scholarship denying the fact/value distinction that pushes them to the left. But simultaneously, they do not believe that the study of international relations should be modeled on the methods of the natural sciences. This leaves them without a clear political leaning and with less of a concern to separate values from scholarship. The result is the strongest association between paradigm and political ideology.

Besides Marxists and feminists, realists are the only group that is politically different from those with no paradigm across all three epistemologies although the effect is weakest for positivists. Realism is second only to Marxism in its political associations. It is somewhat ironic of course that those in the school of thought that has asserted most strongly the necessity of approaching the study of international relations differently than the study of domestic politics has this inclination, particularly as one's political ideology is more likely domestically than internationally driven. To make sure that this was not simply an artifact of the disproportionate effect of a few very conservative outliers, I also ran the analysis excluding those few in the sample, who were very conservative/right-leaning, conservative/right, and even slightly conservative/right-leaning. Realism continued to be associated with political ideology even in this truncated sample.

Mindful that there might be systematically different populations across countries with different distributions of both political ideology and paradigmatic affili-

ation, I also performed an OLS regression with nine dummy country variables. I do not report the results here, as they were virtually identical (and it is difficult to fit nine more dummy variables on a page). Nevertheless, this analysis, akin to a fixed effect model, does not take into account that different populations might evaluate what it means to be highly liberal/left-leaning, conservative/right-leaning, etc. differently in different countries. There is the possibility of a scaling problem. Therefore, I probe a bit further into the analysis by running the same full model for subpopulations from the United States and the United Kingdom, by far the two largest groups in the sample. American-based academics make up 62% of the sample, while academics in the United Kingdom 17%. The next largest groups are Canada (9%) and Australia (5%).

The last columns show these results. In the American population, as compared to the overall population, realists (idealists) tend to be more (less) conservative/right-leaning when compared to those with no paradigm than in the sample as a whole. Post-positivism also does not reach statistical significance; the sign is still negative but the standard error is larger. However, overall, the results are roughly similar to the overall sample, not surprisingly given the predominance of Americans in the pool. The UK sample is noticeably different from the American in a number of respects. First, while realists are conservative when compared to those with no paradigmatic adherence, the coefficient is smaller than in the United States. Idealists are somewhat more left-leaning vis-à-vis agnostics in comparison with the United States. Constructivists are not statistically distinguishable from the excluded category. By far, the biggest difference however is Liberalism. Liberals are more conservative than realists in the United Kingdom. They are on the right side of the political spectrum, at least in the restricted space that academics occupy. The author does not have a ready explanation for this finding except that the very concept of Liberalism is remarkably difficult to pin down and likely has very different meanings in the United Kingdom and United States. Further investigation might be necessary to pin down the multiple understandings of this slippery term. The model has a greater fit in the United Kingdom than in the United States.

Table 3 presents some predicted probabilities of identifying with the most popular paradigms in the sample as a function of variation in the range of political ideological scores, calculated using an add-on to

TABLE 3. Predicted Probabilities of Paradigmatic Choice by Political Ideology

	<i>Realist</i>	<i>Constructivist</i>	<i>No Paradigm</i>	<i>Neoliberal Institutionalist</i>	<i>Rationalist</i>
Very liberal/left	.07	.22	.16	.09	.10
Liberal/left	.12	.22	.17	.10	.12
Slightly liberal/left	.18	.19	.18	.09	.12
Middle of the road	.27	.17	.17	.09	.12
Slightly conservative/right	.37	.13	.15	.07	.12
Conservative/right	.48	.10	.13	.06	.10
Very conservative/right	.59	.07	.10	.05	.08
Percentage of total sample	18	17	17	10	11

Table entries indicate likelihood of choosing paradigmatic affiliation for those with a particular political ideology based on multinomial logit model.

STATA called “Clarify” developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2003) and based on a multinomial logit model whose results are not presented here. The paradigms are categorical dependent variables, and all were included. Ideology is an independent variable. The model also included gender and epistemology as controls, as they proved significant above, set to their means to generate these results. I also list the percentage of the total sample that identified with these selected paradigms.

Political ideology has a strong effect on choosing to be a realist. While the most liberal/left-leaning respondents have only a 7% likelihood of identifying this as their preferred approach, the most conservative have a 59% chance, even as realists comprise only 18% of the sample. There are very few conservatives in the sample, but they are overwhelmingly realist. In contrast, the likelihood of identifying as a constructivist declines from 22% to 7% as one moves from the furthest left to the furthest right on the ideological spectrum. Political ideology, however, does not seem to affect the relative likelihood of being a rationalist or a neoliberal institutionalist. The chance of making such a choice is relatively consistent across the political spectrum.

The Implications of Implicit Ideology

Having established that there is indeed a political component to our paradigmatic affiliation in international relations, what are the implications? One might claim this association is a testament to the way we practice social science. The resonance between our core beliefs about international politics and our political ideology suggests a good deal of logical consistency. A structured set of attitudes in the citizenry is taken to be an indication of political sophistication in American politics. The association between domestic and foreign policy beliefs is generally stronger among political elites than the masses. Many would claim that this is what we are looking for in scientific analysis—deductive rigor. It is natural that we should apply our views of the social world to both our personal political choices and our core assumptions about IR theory. And of course, the association, while present, is not enormous given the predominantly liberal leanings of IR scholars. Perhaps what we learn about international politics affects our political values and beliefs rather than the reverse.

This author is not so sanguine, even while recognizing that this analysis is just a first step in exploring the question and that there are weaknesses in the study such as the relative crudeness of the ideology measure and the difficulties drawing boundaries between paradigms. The similar structure of ideologies and paradigms suggest that paradigms are just ideologies, which is not comforting. The association between the content of our core political beliefs and our core theoretical beliefs suggests that we know the answers going in, which is unsettling for any who believe that objectivity is a necessity for good scholarship. The fact that we find this association even among a somewhat politically homogeneous group, and among a group of

scholars who are constantly reminded that domestic and international politics operate under different rules, is perhaps reason for more consternation than less. Restricted variation on this variable makes it harder to find statistically significant results. Yet despite this stacked deck, there is still such a connection. Indeed, it is strongest for the group that should perhaps demonstrate this tendency the least—realist scholars, who remind us to separate the analysis of domestic and international politics.

The core values and beliefs underlying ideologies are not falsifiable; they are gut instincts about what we “know” to be true but can never decisively prove. If paradigms are ideologies, international relations scholarship will simply resemble hyper-partisan bickering in the political sphere. Lake describes the academic “sectarianism” akin to “theological debates between academic religion,” which “produces less understanding rather than more.” Each ism claims “its own explanatory ‘miracles’” and asserts “its universal truth and virtue” (Lake 2011:465–466). This sounds a lot like ideology. This might not surprise those post-positivists who doubt our ability to disassociate our values from our scholarship. In a sense, this study uses positivist methods to provide ammunition for poststructuralist arguments (even as we recognize that post-positivists would not be terribly concerned or even think that there was a way to solve the problem if they were). Elements of the analysis above would certainly provide ammunition to the sizeable group who adopt no paradigm in their research, roughly 17% of the respondents, many of whom frequently complain about the damage done to IR scholarship by these labels and clubs. It cautions us to instead embrace the “analytic eclecticism” endorsed by Sil and Katzenstein (2011), relying only on paradigms as tool kits from which to borrow rather than traditions to identify with.

There is of course the possibility, raised at the beginning of the paper, that the causal process hypothesized in this article is actually reversed. It might be that our political beliefs are affected by our paradigmatic beliefs. If this were the case, our objectively derived knowledge would inform our beliefs about how politics at all levels works and leads us to particular political preferences. The data do not allow us to properly test for this possibility. The author personally does not take comfort in this possibility. Our political values are likely largely set long before we first open *After Hegemony* in graduate school. As reviewed above, political psychologists believe our political beliefs are the reflection of deep motivational needs that do not just arise after college (Jost et al. 2008). In a study of why academics are overwhelmingly liberal, Fosse, Freese, and Gross (unpub. data) find that those who enter graduate school self-select on the basis of academia’s reputation as a liberal bastion. Their political values are set before they arrive; they are not a product of socialization in the academy. This is obviously a different process than the one this article suggests, but it is still food for thought. And even if our paradigmatic beliefs drive our political opinions rather than the reverse, any association speaks to the irreconcilability of different core assumptions about politics

and leads us to expect difficulty in academic communication.

At the same time, the data analysis ameliorates this concern somewhat. As seen above, positivism leads to more, if never completely, objective analysis, and positivism is on the rise in international relations scholarship. The link between paradigms and ideology is much weaker for positivists. I take on the critique of post-positivists that social science and natural science are not the same, while arguing that objectivity is nevertheless something we should strive for and that varies among scholars. For those who also strive for value neutrality in their work, the findings of this article should at least caution us to be self-aware of our preconceptions as we enter into new academic enterprises, that is, to take the politics out of our paradigms.

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