

CURRICULUM VITAE

DONALD E. CAMPBELL

February 6, 2017

Recent publications

- 2013 A measure of the trade-off between responsiveness and non-dictatorship for Arrovian social welfare functions (With Jerry Kelly) *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 15: 95–102
- 2013 Relaxing IIA and the Effect on Individual Power. (With Jerry Kelly) *Review of Economic Design*, forthcoming.
- 2013 Uniformly Bounded Sufficient Sets and Quasitransitive Social Choice. (With Jerry Kelly) *Mathematical Social Sciences* 65: 31– 5.
- 2013 A Measure of the Trade-off Between Responsiveness and Non-dictatorship for Arrovian Social Choice Functions. (With Jerry Kelly) *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 15: 95–102.
- 2013 Relaxing IIA and the Effect on Individual Power. (With Jerry Kelly) *Review of Economic Design*. 2013 (vol 17): 165 – 181
- 2014 Breadth of Loss from the Manipulation of Social Choice Rules. (With Jerry Kelly) *Economic Theory* 55: 393-414.
- 2014 Universally Beneficial Manipulation: A Characterization. (With Jerry Kelly) *Social Choice and Welfare* 43: 329–355.
- 2015 Anonymous, Neutral, and Strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet Domain. (With Jerry Kelly) *Economics Letters* 128: 79– 82.
- 2015 The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly) *Economics Letters* 132: 109-111.
- 2015 Social Choice Trade-off Results for Conditions on Triples. (With Jerry Kelly) *Mathematical Social Sciences* 77:42–45.
- 2016 Characterizing the Resolute Part of Monotonic Social Choice Correspondences. (with Fasil Alemante, and Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 62: 765-783.

Personal stuff

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Home Address: 114 Pasbehegh Drive
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Personal: Born January 13, 1943
US Citizen and Canadian citizen
Married to Diane L. Campbell (two children)

Degrees: Honors B.A. (Economics), Queen's University,
Kingston, 1966

Ph.D. (Economics), Princeton University, 1972

Current Academic Positions:

CSX Professor of Economics and Public Policy,
Department of Economics, College of William and Mary: 1990 -

Associate Member
The Center for Economic Design, Bogazici University, Turkey: 1995-

Past Academic Positions:

University of Toronto, Department of Economics,
and Scarborough College (Division of Social Sciences)
1970-1974 Assistant Professor
1975-1980 Associate Professor
1980-1992 Professor

Visiting Academic Positions:

Visiting Scholar, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University: 1974-1975
Visiting Professor, U.E.R. Scientifique de Luminy, France: Summer, 1978
Visiting Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford University: April, 1979
Visiting Professor, Bar-Ilan University, Israel: May, 1986
Visiting Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel: November, 1994
Visiting Professor, The University of Arizona: January - April, 1995
Visiting Professor, Université de Caen, Caen, France: May and June, 1995
Scholar in Residence, Villa Serbelloni (Rockefeller Foundation), Bellagio, Italy:
August, 1995.
Visiting Professor, Université de Caen, Caen, France: May, 1996
Visiting Professor, Université de Rennes I, Rennes, France: May, 1996
Visiting Professor, University of Athens, Greece: May, 2005
Visiting Professor, Istanbul Bilgi University: July, 2009

Administrative Positions:

1972-1974 Assistant Chair, Division of Social Sciences,
Scarborough College, University of Toronto
1986-1987 Assistant Chair, Division of Social Sciences (i.e., Head of Economics.),
Scarborough College, University of Toronto.

NOT-SO RECENT GRANTS

June 1990 - May 1992:

National Science Foundation, grant no. SES 9007953:
Social Choice in Economic Environments.

Oct. 1992 - Sept. 1994:

National Science Foundation, grant no. SES 9209039:

Nonbinary Social Choice.

Dec. 1994 Rockefeller Foundation: Summer 1995 residence at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center (Bellagio, Lago di Como, Italy) to work with Jerry Kelly on Trade-Off Theory.

BOOKS

- 1987 *Resource Allocation Mechanisms*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 1992 *Equity, Efficiency, and Social Choice*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- 1995 *Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information*. Cambridge University Press.
- 2006 *Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information. Second edition*. Cambridge University Press.
- 2013 Chinese language edition of *Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information. Second edition*. Cambridge University Press. (I didn't do the translating.)
- 2018 *Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information. Third edition*. Cambridge University Press.

ARTICLES IN REFEREED JOURNALS

- 1973 Social Choice and Intensity of Preference. *Journal of Political Economy* 81: 211-218.
- 1975 Voting Equilibrium in a Simple Tax Model. *Journal of Economic Theory* 11:147-154.
- 1975 Income Distribution under Majority Rule and Alternative Taxation Criteria. *Public Choice*.
- 1976 Democratic Preference Functions. *Journal of Economic Theory* 12: 259-272.
- 1977 Computational Criteria for Voting Systems. *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 85-98.
- 1978 Rationality from a Computational Standpoint. *Theory and Decision* 9: 255-266.
- 1979 Realization of Choice Functions. *Econometrica* 46: 171-180.
- 1979 Manipulation of Social Choice Rules by Strategic Nomination of Candidates. *Theory and Decision* 10: 247-263.
- 1980 Algorithms for Social Choice Functions. *Review of Economic Studies* 47: 617-628.
- 1980 Anonymity in Social Choice Theory (with Peter Fishburn). *Theory and Decision* 12: 21-39.
- 1981 Some Strategic Properties of Majority Rule and Plurality Rule. *Theory and Decision* 13: 93-107.
- 1982 On the Derivation of Majority Rule. *Theory and Decision* 14: 133-140.
- 1984 Enforcement of Resource Allocation Mechanisms and Second Best Industrial Policy. *Journal of Economic Theory* 34: 319-341.
- 1985 Impossibility Theorems and Infinite Horizon Planning. *Social Choice and Welfare* 2: 283-293.
- 1986 Revealed Preference and Demand Correspondences. *Journal of Economic Theory* 38: 364-370.
- 1986 Social Compromise and Social Metrics. (With S. Nitzan) *Social Choice and Welfare* 3: 1-16.
- 1987 Revealed Social Preference. *Social Choice and Welfare* 4: 225-234.
- 1988 A Generalization of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics for Nonconvex Economies. *International Economic Review* 29: 201-215.

- 1988 Boundary Optima in the Theory of Public Goods Supply. (With M. Truchon) *Journal of Public Economics* 35: 241-249.
- 1988 Redistribution of Wealth when Knowledge is Dispersed. *Social Choice and Welfare* 5: 1-6.
- 1988 A Characterization of Simple Majority Rule for Restricted Domains. *Economics Letters* 28: 307-310.
- 1989 Wilson's Theorem for Economic Environments and Continuous Social Preferences. *Social Choice and Welfare* 6: 315-323.
- 1989 Arrow's Theorem for Economic Environments and Effective Social Preferences. *Social Choice and Welfare* 6: 325-329.
- 1989 Equilibrium and Efficiency with Property Rights and Local Consumption Externalities. *Social Choice and Welfare* 6: 189-203.
- 1990 Intergenerational Social Choice without the Pareto Principle. *Journal of Economic Theory* 50: 414-423.
- 1990 Can Equity be Purchased at the Expense of Efficiency? An Axiomatic Inquiry. *Journal of Economic Theory* 51: 32-47.
- 1990 Maximal Elements of Weakly Continuous Relations. (With Mark Walker). *Journal of Economic Theory* 50: 459-464.
- 1992 Quasitransitive Intergenerational Social Choice for Economic Environments. *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 21: 229-247.
- 1992 Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments. *International Economic Review* 33: 341-352.
- 1992 Implementation of Social Welfare Functions. *International Economic Review* 33: 525-533.
- 1992 Public Goods and Arrowian Social Choice. *Social Choice and Welfare* 9: 173-184.
- 1992 The Arrow and Plott independence conditions. *Economics Letters* 39: 143-146.
- 1993 Euclidean Individual preferences and Continuous Social Preferences. *European Journal of Political Economy* 9:541-550.
- 1993 t or $1-t$? That is the Trade-off. (With Jerry Kelly). *Econometrica* 61: 1355-1365.
- 1994 A Foundation for Pareto Optimality in Spatial Models. *European Journal of Political Economy* 10: 441-448.
- 1994 A Foundation for Pareto Aggregation (With Ryo-ichi Nagahisa). *Journal of Economic Theory* 64:277-285.
- 1994 Arrow's choice axiom. *Economics Letters* 44: 381-384.
- 1994 A Power Structure Version of Sen's Paretian Liberal Theorem. *Seoul Economic Journal* 7: 269-278.
- 1995 Nonbinary Social Choice for Economic Environments. *Social Choice and Welfare* 12:245-254.
- 1995 Lebesgue Measure and Social Choice Trade-Offs. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 5: 445-459.
- 1995 Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-Offs. (With Jerry Kelly). *Mathematical Social Sciences* 29:181-194
- 1995 Nondictatorially Independent Pairs. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 12: 75-86.
- 1995 Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes. (With Georges Bordes and Michel Le Breton). *International Economic Review* 36: 441-454.

- 1996 Continuous-Valued Social Choice. (With Jerry Kelly). *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 25: 195-211.
- 1996 Social Choice Trade-Offs for an Arbitrary Measure: With Application to Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economics Letters* 50: 90-104.
- 1996 Trade-Offs in the Spatial Model of Resource Allocation. (With Jerry Kelly) *Journal of Public Economics* 60: 1-19.
- 1996 Independent social choice correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly). *Theory and Decision* 41: 1-11.
- 1996 Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly). *International Economic Review* 37: 803-824.
- 1997 Relaxing Pareto Optimality in Economic Environments. (With Jerry Kelly.) *Economic Theory* 10 (no. 1): 115-130.
- 1997 Sen's Theorem and Externalities. (With Jerry Kelly.) *Economica* 64: 375-386.
- 1997 Preference Aggregation. (With Jerry Kelly). *Mathematica Japonica* vol. 45, no. 3: 573-593.
- 1998 Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and the Condorcet Principle. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 15: 583-592.
- 1998 Quasitransitive Social Preference: Why Some Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 12: 147-162.
- 1999 A democracy principle and strategy-proofness. (With Jerry Kelly). *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 1: 465-474.
- 2000 Weak independence and veto power. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economics Letters* 66: 183-189.
- 2000 Information and preference aggregation. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 17: 85-93.
- 2000 A simple characterization of majority rule. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 15: 689 - 700.
- 2000 A Trade-Off Result for Preference Revelation. (With Jerry Kelly). *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 34: 129 - 141.
- 2002 A leximin characterization of non-resolute and strategy-proof social choice procedures. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 20: 809– 829.
- 2002 Social cost and Groves mechanisms. *Economic Notes* 31: 165-171
- 2002 Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes. (With Jerry Kelly) *Spanish Economic Review* 4:151–158.
- 2002 Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 19:513–515.
- 2003 Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof? (With Jerry Kelly) *Review of Economic Design* (2003) 7:385– 410.
- 2003 A note on the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 20: 273–281
- 2003 A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 22: 557–568. And (2015) Correction to “A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule”. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory Bulletin*, forthcoming
- 2003 Extraneous variables and strategy-proofness (With Jerry Kelly) *Japanese Economic Review* 54: 439–451.
- 2004 Social choice rules with vetoers. (With Jerry Kelly) *Economics Letters* 82: 245–248.
- 2006 Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation. (With

- Jerry Kelly) *Mathematical Social Sciences* 51: 81–89.
- 2007 Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 29: 69–82.
- 2007 Pareto, Anonymity, and Independence: Four Alternatives. (With Jerry Kelly). *Social Choice and Welfare* 29: 83–104.
- 2008 Gains from Manipulating Social Choice Rules. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 40: 349–371.
- 2009 Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice. (With Jerry Kelly). *Journal of Mathematical Economics*. 45: 415–421.
- 2010 Losses from Manipulating Social Choice Rules. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 45: 453–467.
- 2010 Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasi-extreme social welfare functions. (With Jerry Kelly) *International Journal of Economic Theory* 6:405–412
- 2010 Strategy-proofness and Weighted Voting. (With Jerry Kelly) *Mathematical Social Sciences* 60: 15–23.
- 2011 Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda. (With Jerry Kelly). *Economics Letters* 110: 272–273.
- 2012 There are more strategy-proof social choice functions than you think (With Jerry Kelly and Jack Graver) *Mathematical Social Sciences* 64: 263–265.
- 2012 Anonymity, Monotonicity, and Limited Neutrality: Selecting a Single Alternative from a Binary Agenda. (With Jerry Kelly) *Economics Letters* 118: 10–12.
- 2013 A measure of the trade-off between responsiveness and non-dictatorship for Arrovian social welfare functions (With Jerry Kelly) *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 15: 95–102
- 2013 Relaxing IIA and the Effect on Individual Power. (With Jerry Kelly) *Review of Economic Design*, forthcoming.
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- 2013 A Measure of the Trade-off Between Responsiveness and Non-dictatorship for Arrovian Social Choice Functions. (With Jerry Kelly) *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 15: 95–102.
- 2013 Relaxing IIA and the Effect on Individual Power. (With Jerry Kelly) *Review of Economic Design*. 2013 (vol 17): 165 – 181
- 2014 Breadth of Loss from the Manipulation of Social Choice Rules. (With Jerry Kelly) *Economic Theory* 55: 393-414.
- 2014 Universally Beneficial Manipulation: A Characterization. (With Jerry Kelly) *Social Choice and Welfare* 43: 329–355.
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- 2016 Characterizing the Resolute Part of Monotonic Social Choice Correspondences. (with Fasil Alemante, and Jerry Kelly). *Economic Theory* 62: 765-783.

2018 A Stability Principle in Social Choice (with Jerry Kelly and Shaofang Qi). *The International Journal of Economic Theory*. The online version is available. The print version is forthcoming.

NON-REFEREED ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS

- 1970 Voting and Social Choice. *American Economist* 24: 35-44.
- 1994 Trade-Off Theory. (With Jerry Kelly.) *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 84: 422-426.
- 1996 Sharper Impossibility Theorems for Economic Environments. In *Social Choice and Political Economy*, N. Schofield, ed. Boston: Kluwer Pub. Co. pp. 63 - 78.
- 1997 The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice. (With Jerry Kelly). In *The Theory of Social Choice*, Proceedings of the 1994 International Economic Association conference at Schloss Hernstein, Austria. K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura eds. London: Macmillan.
- 2002 Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework. (With Jerry Kelly) Chapter 1 in the *Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare*, K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura eds. North-Holland, pp. 35–94.
- 2003 Public Goods, in the *Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems*, UNESCO.
- 2009 Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives. (With Jerry Kelly). Pages 261–270 in *The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order. Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn*. Edited by SJ Brams, WV Gehrlein and FS Roberts. Springer: 261–270
- 2014 *Online publication*: Two Theorems on the Range of Strategy-proof Rules on a Restricted Domain. (With Jerry Kelly) arXiv: <http://arciv.org/abs/1408.7044>.

