In God We Trust: Religion’s Influence on Foreign Policy

Katherine Gallagher

In a 1979 campaign speech, Ronald Reagan asserted that “a troubled and afflicted mankind looks to [America], pleading for us to keep our rendezvous with destiny…to become that shining city on a hill.”[i] President Reagan’s statements demonstrate the persistent nature of America’s self-conception as the divinely gifted “Promised Land,” a legacy of Puritan ancestry.[ii] This belief that America is a ‘chosen’ nation underwrites a sense of national mission that has significant and conflicting implications for the guiding principles of America foreign policy, primarily promoting imperialist, isolationist and idealist tendencies. Regardless of the ideological path adopted by policymakers as a result of this “holy nationalism,” such a non-secular rationale demands an inquiry into the validity of consequent legislation, focusing on the extent to which religious justifications, as opposed to secular rationales, are permitted to influence the formulation of policy.[iii] Do the constraints on religious influence inherent in America’s Constitution and interpretation of liberal democracy allow for the employment of non-secular reasoning in policymaking? Moreover, if secular justifications for foreign policy are most consistent with the ideals of a liberal democracy, can these motivations justly be applied in a manner that simultaneously admits humanitarian considerations in foreign policy, yet eliminates religious influence?

Imperialism

Religion has been central to American policy making since the nation’s founding by English dissidents. America’s Puritanical history first established the notion of chosenness by invoking social contract theory, specifically the idea of a covenant between God and the Puritans. In his 1630 essay, “A Modell of Christian Charity,” John Winthrop outlines the requirements of this covenant, asserting that God granted New England and her inhabitants a special blessing, imbuing them with “his wisdome power goodnes and truthe,” so that they may have the ability to both resist their enemies and reveal the commands of God to the world.[iv] For the Puritans, the covenant implies obedience to the state as well as to God, stemming from the belief that the state and church are woven into one divine hierarchy.[v] Winthrop supports this notion of dual submission and the responsibilities it entails, asserting that as both a community and a nation the Puritans will “be made a story and a by-word through the world…[because they] walke in his wayes and keepe his Commaundements” while combating heretical beliefs.[vi]

Political scientists Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert, in their work A Nation So Conceived, insightfully characterize the religious foundations of the American commitment to spread the message of God as a “messianic or quasi-messianic consciousness.”[vii] Despite America’s evolution into a liberal democracy, a system based on the emphasis of individual rights and freedoms, this mission to promote conformity to U.S. ideals has persisted throughout American history. In his book Nationalism and Religion in America, History of Theology Professor Winthrop S. Hudson delineates three aspects of national mission, which have applicability for future policymaking. The first facet of Hudson’s argument is America’s self-imposed role as an “asylum for the oppressed,” particularly for individuals who are religiously or politically persecuted.[viii] The second aspect of Hudson’s argument describes America as an exemplar for other nations, a viewpoint which, prominent in the time of John Winthrop, continued to be espoused in Woodrow Wilson’s era. Closely correlated to the second qualification is America’s position as a “guardian of liberty” and, in turn, freedom, a combination of duties which promotes an interventionist ideology.[ix] Hudson’s final condition, the concept that America has been preordained to become a great empire, is evinced most clearly by the concept of manifest destiny. A common defense of imperialism, the manifest destiny is obvious in its religious justifications as it is supported by the doctrine of “regenerating the soil” which advocates conquering and procreating.[x]

Imperialism, with its inherent quest for expansion, has remained prevalent throughout U.S. history. This tradition is classically exemplified by journalist John L. O’Sullivan’s 1845 characterization of the term ‘manifest destiny’ as the nation’s right to “overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us.”[xi] The expansionist impulse surfaced again during the war with Mexico, demonstrated by the challenge of Mexico and appropriation of Texas in 1848. The twentieth century also witnessed the effects of this divinely-inspired imperialist policy when the U.S. sought control over various island nations, including the Philippines, Samoa, and Puerto Rico, and annexed Hawaii in 1898.[xii]

Supported by the concept of a manifest destiny, a second significant institutionalization of imperialism is the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Isolationist in that it clearly divides America’s interests from European affairs, the Monroe Doctrine claimed hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, excluding European influence and foreshadowing the subjugation of countless cultures in the name of American expansion. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger addresses this expansion in his seminal work Diplomacy, alleging that:

Under the umbrella of the Monroe Doctrine, America could pursue policies…not all that different from the dreams of any European King – expanding its commerce and influence, annexing territory – in short, turning itself into a Great Power without being required to practice power politics.[xiii]

Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine permitted the United States to vanquish innumerable civilizations, such as the Native Americans and Mexicans, by appropriating their land “in good conscience” because such destruction was designated as a divinely inspired policy.[xiv] America’s status as “a more pure and principled nation than any in Europe” and its “responsibility” to spread its principles allowed the United States to employ an expansionist policy without suffering the taint of adopting European imperialism.[xv]

Niebuhr echoes the identification of this missionary motivation, asserting “the desire to confer some high value on the colonial nations…religious zeal, technical competence or political democracy.”[xvi] However, Niebuhr’s references to promoting the technical competence of political democracy highlight secular motivations for imperialism. Superficially, the mere existence of a missionary policy, regardless of its derivation, seems religiously based. Niebuhr and Heimert refute this notion, asserting that “most of the nations, in Western culture at least, have acquired a sense of national mission at some time in their history” offering the example of “Russian messianism…derived from its consciousness of being the ‘third Rome.’”[xvii]

Secular motivations for messianism include primarily economic and national security concerns. Jerome Slater, in his article “Is United States Foreign Policy ‘Imperialist’ or ‘Imperial’?,” offers evidence that while trade and investment figures undermine the supposed importance of developing countries (the ones most often subjected to imperialist doctrine), “policymakers, however inaccurately, believe that the health of the United States capitalist system requires an open door to the Third World economies,” requiring “direct political or economic control over them.”[xviii] Such considerations underwrite a significant portion of contemporary American foreign policy calculation. Slater additionally cites national security as a motivation for imperialism, stating that scholarly analyses, memoirs of leaders and official documents reveal that “genuine security fears…[in addition to] other political, strategic, or psychological factors have been at the roots of United States postwar policies, including…‘imperial’ behavior”[xix]

Land-based American expansion has slowed in recent decades, inspiring observations that imperialist tendencies have dissipated. However, different, perhaps less discernible avenues of imperialism have emerged since the Cold War. Slater cites extensive American investment in developing countries as a method of disseminating American values. In addition to this structural imperialism, which has supplanted force as the vehicle for change, cultural imperialism, the influx of U.S. institutions, has augmented American influence in developing countries. Characterized as “more subtle or insidious,” Slater attributes the pervasive nature of this genre of imperialism to “the central role of the United States in the world communication network and mass media.”[xx]

In contrast to this expansionist ideology, the Promised Land self-concept can also lead to isolationism. The motivation underlying this movement has commonly been attributed to the characterization by political theorist George Weigel, “that involvement in the sordid affairs of the world would damage the purity of American democracy.”[xxi] This argument is grounded in the notion of grace, or favor, asserting that America must guard against corruption by the immoral character of the outside world. Thus, isolationism is one possible outcome of the application of realism, a worldview that depicts the nation-state as the primary actor with motivations grounded in self-interest and based on maintaining a favorable global balance of power rather than fulfilling moral obligations. The secular implications arising from the realist viewpoint will be discussed later in this analysis.

Isolationism

The isolationism historically pervasive in American foreign policy is exemplified by the ideology of George Washington, who proscribed an approach which entailed “extending [America’s] commercial relations to have with [Europe] as little political connection as possible” and warned against “foreign entanglements.”[xxii] As previously noted, the Monroe Doctrine also advocated such an isolationist policy regarding Europe, stressing America’s position as a “spectator” in European affairs.[xxiii] Kissinger notes that adherence to the doctrine of isolationism was viewed as a “moral maxim.”[xxiv] He observes that, “America found it natural to interpret the security conferred on it by great oceans as a sign of divine providence, and to attribute its actions to superior moral insight.”[xxv] Isolationism has been the most influential principle guiding American foreign policy, evinced by the egregious lapse of engagement in any international treaties of alliance, a span of time between the U.S. treaty with France in 1778 and the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942.[xxvi]

The practice of isolationism is not limited to early American history; the inter-war era of the twentieth century has also been cited as an extremely isolationist period. This epoch was characterized primarily by “an emphasis [on] the uniqueness of America’s mission as the exemplar of liberty, the moral superiority of democratic foreign policy, [and] the seamless relationship between personal and international morality.”[xxvii] These qualities, coupled with elites’ tenacious belief that European interaction failed to affect American interests, culminated in the rejection of the League of Nations and its doctrine of collective security.

In addition to America’s belief that it was “blessed by a unique and ultimately superior dispensation,” isolationism also had secular motivations.[xxviii] Historically, America’s geographical position naturally augmented an isolationist stance, buffered by the ocean between itself and its rivals. Moreover, in a nation possessed of an embryonic foreign policy and minimal military power, as well as concerns about subduing its own land, isolationism appealed to policymakers anxious about overextending America’s responsibilities. Connected to the settling of America’s frontier was policymakers’ focus on fomenting national unity, a pressing domestic task garnering more attention than distant international affairs.[xxix]

Regardless of the motivations of an isolationist policy, the feasibility of the United States’ pursuing such an approach has been severely curtailed since the conclusion of World War II, and even more so since the close of the Cold War era. Factors preventing isolationism include membership requirements of international organizations, such as the United Nations (1942) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949), and economic treaties, including the North American Free Trade Alliance (NAFTA) (1993) and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) (1994). The importance of both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1946) and the World Bank (1944) have augmented this economic interdependence, identified earlier as a vehicle for imperialism. Technological advances, particularly the Internet, have additionally hindered the practice of isolationist principles. If isolationism is still practiced by the U.S. in any sense, it is the neo-isolationism identified by Weigel as the notion of a Vietnam-era movement, based upon the American’s fear that the United States will corrupt other nations with her materialist and hedonist values.[xxx]

Since isolation is no longer a viable foreign policy option the future direction of U.S. foreign policy is uncertain. In light of America’s position as a world hegemon, intervention, or at least addressing world affairs is unavoidable. Involvement is inevitable, but the motivation of America’s involvement is subject to polarizing debate with two primary justifications offered: idealism and self-interest.

Idealism

Foreign policy analyst James McCormick identifies four salient aspects of national idealism: the nation-state as one among many actors in foreign policy, domestic values as the principle influence on policy, less emphasis on balance of power politics, and finally, the predominance of “overall global conditions” rather than state-to-state relations.[xxxi] The policy implications of idealism are readily apparent, as historically the moral principles guiding idealism are the only reasons for which the United States has abandoned its isolationist stance. Such departures from tradition are illustrated by three specific cases, establishing freedom of the seas for neutral vessels in the War of 1812, combating the inhumane treatment of Cubans by the Spanish in the Spanish-American War and, reasserting the right of freedom of the seas in World War I.[xxxii]

The emergence of idealism as foreign policy is most readily identified with the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, as illustrated in his famous Fourteen Points (1918). The Wilsonian emphasis on idealist intervention, juxtaposed with the isolation of the inter-war period, is evident in his February 11, 1918 address to a joint session of Congress. With rhetoric very similar to Reagan’s characterization of America as the “city on a hill” Wilson justifies America’s involvement in the peace process by declaring that, “the conditions of the peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization.”[xxxiii] Wilson’s statements illustrate the responsibility implicit in the Promised Land ideology: America has a divinely inspired duty to promote the ideals of liberty and freedom internationally in order to ensure peace. Moreover, Wilson disparagingly dismisses the employment of balance of power politics, advocating that “moral principle…serve as a continued guide to global involvement…[and should] take precedence over any narrowly defined national…interest.”[xxxiv]

After the Senate’s rejection of Wilson’s League of Nations, the rhetoric and employment of idealism, though still influential, receded until Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Carter campaigned on a platform based on a moral foreign policy through which America would serve as a model of democracy for the world augment the acquisition of allies while promoting human rights and domestic values.[xxxv] These aspects of his policy are characterized by Carter’s 1977 Notre Dame commencement address statement, “I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence which we have for humane purposes.”[xxxvi]

The ideology of Carter’s presidency is particularly evident in policy decisions to eliminate aid to nations charged with violating human rights, including Chile, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Mozambique, although the efficacy of these sanctions is debatable. Apart from his human rights campaign, Carter’s foreign policy was more successful in alleviating tensions in Southern Africa, the Middle East, and Panama. However, the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year, decimated public approval of Carter’s already faltering foreign policy and a consequent return to realism was visible in the final year of Carter’s presidency.[xxxvii]

Self-Interest

The moral principles inherent in idealism are difficult to justify with a non-secular rationale. Niebuhr and Heimert distinguish between religious and secular motivations for idealist intervention by citing the tradition’s reliance on the eighteenth century Enlightenment, identified with Thomas Jefferson’s advocacy of a mission to spread the ideals of democracy throughout the world. Although they allow that “the two themes [justifying idealism], political and religious [are] intimately related,” Niebuhr and Heimert maintain the existence of a separation between the two motivations.[xxxviii]

Regardless of the rationale employed to justify idealist intervention, Niebuhr and Heimert identify two difficulties inherent in possessing a national sense of mission. They illustrate that nations imbued with a messianic consciousness are prone to allow these “noble” ideals to veil baser policy motivations, a trend that simultaneously undermines the credibility of ideals with religious derivations and promotes the use of political discourse to camouflage the legislations non-religious motivations. Reagan utilized virtuous religious rhetoric to portray his containment policy towards Communism as a moral battle against “the evil empire,” oratory which helped to justify his interventions in Central America, actions arguably based on concerns regarding regional stability rather than moral issues.[xxxix]

Concerns regarding hidden motives are compounded by America’s seemingly blessed rise to global economic prowess and hegemonic status. The second problem connected to a national mission is that despite rapidly changing historical circumstances, a messianic conscious will prevent the reevaluation of entrenched values, a reassessment that could benefit a nation by allowing adaptation to new situations. Fortunately for the United States the values of democracy, freedom, and egalitarianism inherent in its national mission are values increasingly adopted by supra-national institutions and other states, minimizing the need to reconsider and alter these mores.[xl]

Analysis

Admittedly, each of the three traditions examined can claim secular justifications. Imperialism is motivated by economic and security concerns, isolationism by geographic and militaristic barriers, and idealism by Enlightenment-based prescriptions regarding the spread of democracy. However, in the American experience, these rationales are inextricably intertwined with religious justifications; to separate the motivations for each ideology to ensure a secular foundation is an arduous and perhaps impossible task.

In light of this difficulty, one might inquire as to why such a separation is necessary. Indeed, law professor Stephen Carter asserts that differentiating between the two motivations is unwarranted, asserting that religious rhetoric is not necessarily detrimental to a liberal democracy. He believes that individuals for whom religion acts as a primary guiding principle should be allowed to use religion to justify their positions. Furthermore, Carter argues that such motivations have not been proven to undermine democracy and that only ignorance has led to the presupposition that religiously motivated positions will be “inimical to American freedom.”[xli]

Several scholars support Carter’s assertions regarding the necessity of acknowledging religion’s place in American society. Academics Robert Fowler, Allen Hertzke, and Laura Olson indicate that only fifteen percent of American do not label themselves as Christian and ninety-two percent of Americans express a religious preference.[xlii] Moreover, democracy, and the liberties and freedoms it entails can be traced to religion, if one subscribes to the Lockeian notion of inalienable rights, God-given civil liberties. Alexis de Tocqueville even posits that religion is healthy for a democracy because it helps alleviate soft despotism by promoting the creation and maintenance of civil associations, organizations helpful in promoting the ideals of democracy. In light of the benefits religion can afford to a liberal democracy, why do religious justifications of foreign policy need to be eliminated in order to maintain a healthy democracy?

Some reasons to eliminate non-secular justifications are evident in the above statements. The overwhelming number of individuals who consider themselves to be religious, particularly Christian, seemingly require a venue that allows this majority to express its preferences. However, it is exactly the predominance of Christianity in the U.S. that necessitates ensuring the protection of minority rights, especially those of non-believers. To refute Carter, it seems unlikely that religious individuals do not consider their faith when formulating an opinion. These people are rational individuals who understand secularly justified positions. Therefore, by excluding religious consideration the government is not limiting freedom of expression, as would be the case for non-Christian individuals if the government allowed for inaccessible, religious justifications of public policy.

Apart from the interests of individual citizens, the interests of democracy need to be considered. Though, according to Locke, democracy is based on religious ideals, this foundation does not require that democracy cater to the inclinations of the religious majority. Locke himself asserts that a child is not always responsible to his parent. The same argument is applicable to the civil rights guaranteed in America by religiously based liberal democracy: these rights do not necessarily need to rely on or adhere to the tenets of Christianity simply because they derive from its theology.

Lastly, though Tocqueville’s admiration for the benefits religion provides for a liberal democracy is justified, the elimination of non-secular justifications of foreign policy hardly abolishes the influence of religion in America. Although foreign policy is an integral part of any policy’s political ideology, its influence on domestic affairs is limited by the nation’s position in the international rather than national sphere. Furthermore, such a lack of official government support for a specific religion has been cited as promoting the prosperity of religion, as it allows for the proliferation of a variety of religions within society. This religious pluralism promotes the central ideals of a liberal democracy, specifically tolerance and freedom of expression.

In addition, many scholars argue that democracy inherently requires a separation of church and state, regardless of the religion’s possible positive contributions. Robert Audi supports this position, declaring that, “the libertarian, equalitarian, and neutrality principles at the level of government, and the principle of ecclesiastical political neutrality among religious institutions” necessitate such a separation.[xliii] From Audi’s statement it can be concluded that this division between church and state benefits both institutions by maintaining their integrity and neutrality, and consequently their legitimacy among the governed population. Audi offers further support for an argument alluded to earlier, positing that individuals must separate their religious convictions from their political motivations so as to ensure that the rationale underlying political decisions is accessible to all citizens.[xliv]

Secular Foreign Policy

The above analysis offers significant endorsement for the elimination of religious discourse from public arenas of debate. The implications of this constraint on the development of future foreign policy are far reaching; historically, non-secular justifications have been the primary impetus for imperialism, isolationism, and idealist intervention. However, additional approaches to foreign policy involving non-religious motivations relating to economic advantages and security concerns still merit discussion.

The salience of economic motivations was highlighted previously in relation to imperialism. Growing use of economic sanctions, often multilaterally imposed, as evidenced by the sanctions currently in place against Iraq speaks to the increased global economic interdependence. Such interdependence, giving rise to the proliferation of international trade agreements, as previously discussed, has become a determinant factor in determining foreign policy.

The most prominent example of an economically motivated foreign policy is visible during President Clinton’s term, when economic security was proclaimed the administration’s primary goal. Entering office on the heels of a recession, Clinton focused his foreign policy on the implementation of NAFTA and GATT to increase America’s access to foreign markets. Two other significant actions were taken in pursuit of this goal: free trade discussions at the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia, and the 1994 “Summit of the Americas” conference, which sought to create the foundation for a free trade region in the Americas by 2005.[xlv]

A second approach to international relations that arguably forms a secular basis for foreign policy is grounded in the principles of national security. Although created during the Wilsonian infatuation with idealism, the essential aspects of collective security are secularly motivated. Though perhaps concurrent with morality and domestic interest, these interests are not necessarily religious, as numerous nations less religious than America, such as Great Britain, have subscribed to this ideology. Though often associated with alliances, collective security differs from the formation of alliances in that alliances are created to alleviate a specific threat, while collective security “defines no particular threat, guarantees no individual nation, and discriminates against none.”[xlvi]

Collective security serves to maintain peaceful relations among states without seeking to take direct action against any particular states until provoked. Wilson envisioned employing collective security as a “defense of the international order by the moral consensus of the peace-loving.”[xlvii] However, the countries need not consent to a common religious view, only to a similar expectation of the type of threat posed and the appropriate response required. President Truman appealed to the secular motivations of collective security when he stated that the “responsibility to enforce the peace…is based upon the obligations resting upon all states…not to use force in international relations except in the defense of law.”[xlviii] This 1945 declaration reveals Truman’s reverence for the rule of law, but not necessarily moral, or religious, obligations.

Diametrically opposed to the dictates of collective security is non-idealist intervention. Supported by the tenets of realism, this type of intervention is based solely on balance of power politics rather than domestic motivations. Highly controversial because of its disregard for morality, non-idealist intervention is best exemplified by the Nixon administration and its statecraft based on Kissinger’s interpretation of realist ideology. Kissinger’s thinking is summarized by McCormick; Kissinger finds, “the essential problem in the postwar world [to be] a structural one: the lack of a legitimate international order” due to the polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union.[xlix] To remedy this problem Kissinger advocated adherence to balance of power politics with a focus on stability rather than peace and motivated by strategic rather than humanitarian concerns.

The political implications of the ideology, that all states needed to be recognized as legitimate political actors, were revolutionary. Such an approach undermined America’s reliance on domestic values to determine foreign policy, and permitted the use of force, previously avoided at all costs. This ideology resulted in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (1972) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (1972), both decisions only marginally influenced by domestic social values. Relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were also significantly altered by Nixon and Kissinger’s new approach, as the administration affirmed the PRC’s sovereignty over a former ally, Taiwan, to ensure global stability.[l]

Two fundamental secular justifications offered for foreign policy, economic security and non-idealist intervention, permit little room for morality in the formulation of foreign policy, and the third option, collective security, can function without morality supporting it. However, as previously delineated, morality is very influential in America; thus including morality as a policy’s motivation augments popular support for political maneuvering, which is advantageous both for national unity and the public’s approval of the government. Disregard for the primary values of the American populace - democracy, freedom, human rights - might be condoned if such neglect was necessary to maintain American security. However, threats to American security no longer come from sources that can be defeated using the above policies. Given America’s position as an economic hegemon, the need to pursue policies that ensure economic security has been diminished. Collective security has oft proved ineffectual because of disagreements among nations and the prevalence of state interests. Moreover, the efficacy of realist approaches to foreign policy has diminished since the conclusion of the Cold War and is only likely to be useful again if a powerful European Union emerges. The applicability of realist dogma to contemporary foreign policy is further limited by threats from non-state actors, a circumstance evinced by the September 11^th attacks. Though religious rhetoric is impermissible, the above assertions imply that the tradition foreign policy approaches, which limited America’s ability to permit morality and values to influence its foreign policy, are no longer viable.

Even if these options were still efficacious Niebuhr addresses the need for morality in politics. Supporting the foregoing analysis, Niebuhr states that moral justifications are more “persuasive” to the citizenry.[li] He additionally supports the employment of morality in legislative formation by describing the “children of light and the children of darkness.”[lii] The children of light are characterized as foolish individuals who “seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more universal good” similar to Wilsonian idealists.[liii] The children of darkness, in contrast, are “moral cynics,” enamored with the power of self-interest, balance of power theorists. Niebuhr posits that marriage of these two views is necessary to preserve democratic society, which requires both wisdom and freedom from malice.[liv]

Weigel further helps to discern the most advantageous method of formulating foreign policy by delineating between America’s national interest and its national purpose, the former free from the influences of morality, the latter “a horizon concept” inherently dependent on morality. Weigel recognizes the historical connection, a link which has left the two concepts “inextricably joined” to such an extent that the “dialectic between [the two] will remain unresolved.”[lv] Should separation be attempted, it would “lead to the ruin of both public policy and moral reasoning.”[lvi] Weigel aptly summarizes the interaction between the two concepts, positing that:

Those basic security concerns that comprise the irreducible core of the national ‘interest’ should be understood as a necessary interior moment in the pursuit of the national purpose: which should in turn be understood as the quest for ordered liberty within a structure of evolving international public life capable of advancing the classic ends of politics – justice, freedom, security, the general welfare, and peace.[lvii]

The balance between morality and self-interest as motivations for the formulation of foreign policy is delicate and precarious. Although this analysis eliminates religious rhetoric as a legitimate justification for foreign policy, the ties between religion and morality cannot be cleanly severed; thus policymaking retains a degree of religious influence. This distressing truth seems to undermine the validity of American foreign policy in the aggregate. However, such is not the case because, although explicitly religious principles are inadmissible as justifications for foreign policy, morality is a valuable and indeed necessary aspect of policymaking.

The approach best supported by these principles is that of idealist intervention, but solely based on the secular thinking of the Enlightenment era. An inclusive ideology for all Americans, this doctrine proscribes a mission based on the secular values of democracy. As previously noted, idealist ideology can be employed to justify ignoble foreign policy motives and admittedly such camouflaging does occur. However, it is important not to underestimate the government’s responsibility to its citizens. The importance of morality to the public and the advantages of public support, discussed earlier, provide a significant check on government action. Furthermore, the principles of this ideology, freedom and liberty, serve to counteract the entrenchment of values because they inherently support individually motivated change.

This ideology is further supported by America’s economic and military power, factors that have created for the United States a singular position, requiring both restraint and intervention at differing intervals. Though the motivations for this “special place” can no longer validly be viewed as religious, as they once were, the implications and responsibilities of the position are undeniable. America has a responsibility, inherent in its position as a world leader, not to idly observe human rights violations or invasions of a neutral nation, as these actions violate American principles. However, it is imperative that America recognize the limits of that position in order to maintain friendly relations among nations without infringing on their sovereignty.

America fulfills a unique role in global society. This role, once thought to be divinely ordained, can longer be granted such a distinction. However, the development of significant economic and military prowess has led to the imperative continuation of responsibilities inherent in the “Promised Land” ideology: the need to promote American values of freedom and liberty, to resolve humanitarian conflicts, to employ secular morality, not religious theology, in policymaking. These objectives can best be pursued by employing secular policies, grounded in Enlightenment-era philosophy, which serve to minimize religious influence while maintaining the ideals of American democracy.